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Abstract  
Effective corporate governance is an essential element in any country; it has a significant 
effect on a country’s economic development because of its direct impact on a firm’s 
performance. One form of corporate governance is the ownership structure, which has 
attracted a great deal of research – specifically regarding the agency costs that result from the 
conflict between the owners and managers. Additionally, numerous researchers have studied 
the impact of ownership concentration on a firm’s value and have concluded that ownership 
concentration is an essential mechanism of corporate governance.  
The determinants of ownership concentration have drawn the attention of many researchers, 
who based their arguments off of Demsetz (1983), who believed that ownership structure 
should be viewed as endogenous with a firms’ performance. Nevertheless, the question of 
why ownership concentration varies across regions, countries, and firms remains unanswered. 
Two main lines of thought may influence the degree of ownership concentration within 
countries: laws and cultures (Holderness, 2017).  
Capital markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are characterised by a 
high ownership concentration, with a few listed firms and a large number of closed companies 
(Bolbol & Omran, 2005). Additionally, stock markets in the MENA countries are behind and 
need further development (Ben Naceur, Ghazouani, & Omran, 2008). Also, corporate 
governance in the MENA countries is weak and controlled by lenders, mainly banks, that play 
the main role in governance (Turki & Sedrine, 2012).  
Therefore, this study investigates three critical dimensions in ownership concentration. First, 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, second the effects of 
ownership identity on firm performance, and finally, the determination of ownership structure 
in the MENA region. This study contributes to the existing literature not only as the first 
investigation on both the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance and the 
determination of ownership concentration in the MENA region, but also as the first to 
examine the effects that a significant political event, namely the Arab Spring movement, had 
on ownership concentration. 
The data consists of 912 firms and 5,521 observations in 8 MENA countries – Turkey, 
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain – spanning between 2008 
and 2014. The industry was divided into 3 main categories: a financial group, a manufacturing 
company, and a service group. 
The study uses ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects model, generalised 
method of moments, 2SLS, quantile regressions, instrumental variable quantile regressions, 
tobit regression and IV-tobit. It also applies a different approach to control countries, 
industries, and years effects. The study results prove that ownership concentration in the 
MENA region plays an effective role in mitigating agency problems and enhancing a firm’s 
performance. Also, it is found that ownership types have different effects on a firms’ 
performance. This study also highlighted that the degree of the role of law, and corruption 
control, have negative effects on ownership concentration. However, firm size, firm age, and 
Tobin’s Q have significantly positive relations with ownership concentration. Moreover, the 
Arab Spring movement has a positive impact on firm performance, yet the average ownership 
concentration is decreased by the MENA nations’ revolutions.  
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Chapter One :  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background (corporate governance)  
Effective corporate governance is important for any country because it has a significant effect 
on the economic development of a country, due to its direct impact on the performance of 
firms. Therefore, it is important to have the appropriate corporate governance mechanisms in 
place to safeguard stakeholders’ interests and to ensure effective and efficient performance.  
Interest in the role of corporate governance and its impact on firm performance began 
attracting attention in the aftermath of the financial and economic problems around the globe. 
Such problems included the Asian crisis from 1997 to 1998, the corporate financial scandals 
of the early 2000s, and the recent subprime market crisis in the United States, which began in 
late 2007. Despite a significant number of research papers on the role of corporate 
governance, there has been no consensus regarding the mechanism that can best address the 
agency problem, ultimately ensuring good performance and sustainable growth in the 
economy (Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010). 
Corporate governance is a highly debated topic, is very broad, and has been an interesting 
topic since 1930. Across numerous countries it has been agreed upon, that corporate 
governance is an essential element in the development of any country’s financial market and 
firms’ value (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, better 
governance enables firms to access capital markets on better terms, which is valuable for 
firms intending to raise funds (Doidge, Andrew Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007). Moreover, Pathak, 
Ranajee, and Pradhan (2012) argued that corporate governance in the long term could affect 
the economic growth and financial stability of any country. Therefore, there have been many 
different interpretations for this topic throughout the decades, and its definitions and 
interpretations have varied widely across countries and firms.  
The term corporate means a unique entity that is established either for profit or non-profit. It 
has legal rights and liabilities that are formed through legislation. However, the word 
governance is a way of governing that uses decisions to explain any expectations, power, and 
performance. Also, governance is the way of making a good enterprise environment maximise 
a firm’s value (Bain & Band, 2016).  
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After the publication of the Cadbury (1992) report, many academics and researchers became 
more interested in corporate governance. The Cadbury Committee stated that freedom 
allowed firms to improve and succeed, but at the same time, this freedom needed to be 
legalised within frameworks and regulations. Therefore, the codes of governance expanded 
around the world based on the Cadbury code. 
Also, the United States was more concerned about corporate governance. The United States 
became the world’s leader in this topic after many scandals, especially the Enron collapse in 
late 2001. After the first round of scandals, the United States passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(Sarbanes, 2002) which is referred to as SOX 2002; is also known as the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act. SOX 2002 was designed to ensure that 
management would certify any financial statements published and guarantee their accuracy. 
In addition, external auditors were required to be independent and report the accuracy of 
corporate financial statements. Also, SOX 2002 gave significant power to the board of 
directors to review a firm’s performance. 
However, so far, there has been no formal definition of corporate governance around the 
world. The classical definition from Adam Smith (1776), which lasted until Berle and Means 
(1932), emphasised the idea of separating ownership and control between owners (principal) 
and managers (agent). This idea is known as the agency problem, and it was followed up in 
depth by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, some academics gave broad definitions 
while others tended to give specific definitions that focused in one area. For example, the 
Cadbury Report (1992) defined corporate governance as the way companies are directed and 
controlled. Also, Thomsen (2008, p. 15) defined it as ‘the control and direction of companies 
by ownership, borders, incentives, company law, and other mechanisms’. 
Some definitions focused more on the stakeholders’ benefits. For example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) stated that corporate governance is how a firms’ investors ensure the return of 
what they have invested in the company. Also, Tirole (2001) said that corporate governance is 
the way firms are designed to encourage management to safeguard the wealth of the firms’ 
shareholders. Furthermore, Mitton (2002) described it as the way of protecting small 
shareholders from managers and other shareholders. 
However, corporate governance also involves the interest of society. It is the inside and 
outside mechanisms that ensure the accuracy and accountability of the information given to 
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the firms’ stakeholders. In addition, corporate governance involves the assurance of 
companies’ responsibilities to society in all aspects of the firms’ business activities (Solomon, 
Solomon, & Suto, 2004). However, there are no specific definitions for corporate governance, 
and the existing definitions limit the scope of corporate governance (Fazlzadeh, Hendi, & 
Mahboubi, 2011).  
Many institutions believe that good governance can only be achieved by having the right 
relationships with all parties involved in a firm’s business activities. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, corporate 
governance is the role of the organisation’s stakeholders to make sure that objectives are well-
defined and achieved by monitoring a firm’s performance. Banks (2004) argued that a firm 
should create a cooperation structure between a firm’s interested parties and its shareholders. 
Nowadays, corporate governance has become more complicated because the expansion of 
enterprise and many different parties are involved in firms. Also, because of globalisation and 
high competition among companies in the market, there has been more concern about 
standardising common concepts of corporate governance among the countries (Strouhal, 
Bonaci, & Mustata, 2012). Modern corporate governance is not only about increasing 
shareholders wealth or securing investor returns, but it also focuses on enhancing corporate 
fairness, transparency, and accountability. Also, it focuses on shareholder value and how 
firms can adjust themselves to meet the needs of stakeholders. 
Lastly, corporate governance is an important field of study that involves many factors, such as 
the legalities, social environment, and economics. More attention to this topic can help 
minimise the economic risks of fraud, misuse of power, or even a firm’s collapse because of 
bad governance. Reviewing a country’s code of corporate governance and changing them, can 
help reduce these threats.  
Based on the literature about agency cost theory (covered in detail in Chapter 2), there are 
different forms of corporate governance mechanisms that can be implemented to reduce 
agency problems at the firm level (such as management–shareholder conflicts). One corporate 
governance mechanism is on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, and this mechanism is the main focus of this research. 
 
4 
 
1.2 The Main Debates and Research Objectives 
The question of why ownership concentration varies across regions, countries, and firms is 
debatable among that written in literature. Two areas may influence the degree of ownership 
concentration within countries: laws and cultures (Holderness, 2017). One study indicated 
that the level of the law that protects investors in public firms is negatively related to the 
degree of ownership concentration (La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
However, Holderness (2009) doubted that the country-level factor has any significant effect 
on ownership concentration. Although he argued that legal protection has an effect on shaping 
ownership structure, he believed that law and ownership concentration are unpredictable to 
each other Holderness (2016). 
Furthermore, the determinants of ownership concentration have drawn the attention of many 
researchers because of the argument of Demsetz (1983), who believed that ownership 
structure should be viewed as endogenous. Thus, ownership concentration is affected by 
several factors within firms and countries. This explains why ownership concentration 
fluctuates within firms within a single country (Bottasso & Sembenelli, 2004; Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985) and within multiple countries (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Holderness & Sheehan, 
1988; La Porta , Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Seifert, Gonenc, & Wright, 2005; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 1998).  
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) also believed that legal protection plays an essential 
role in forming ownership concentration. However, they argued that countries with origins in 
common law provide a high level of protection to shareholders, leading to a lower ownership 
concentration. In contrast, countries based in civil law have inadequate ownership protection, 
consequently leaning toward a high ownership concentration.  
Although causality indicates the direction between variables, many studies have shown that 
the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance could exist in 
both directions. For example, Kole (1996) demonstrated that high firm performance leads to 
increased ownership concentration. This means that although corporate governance affects 
firm performance, high firm performance may also attract and form different corporate 
governance mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argued that corporate governance 
mechanisms depend on one another; one mechanism should not be treated in isolation from 
other mechanisms.  
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Some researchers have used ownership structure as an exogenous variable, which is supported 
by the path-dependence assumption that the ownership structure is stable. These researchers 
(Leech & Leahy, 1991; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) do not 
consider any effects of performance on ownership structure. In contrast, other researchers 
argued that ownership structure are endogenous to firm performance. Thus, good firm 
performance leads to ownership concentration. Given the latter argument, ownership 
endogeneity is critical when studying the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance.  
First research question: what are the determinates of ownership concentration?  
The effects of ownership structure on firms’ performance has attracted a great deal of research 
– specifically regarding three primary areas. (1) the agency costs that result from the conflict 
between the owners and managers (Berle & Means, 1932; Cubbin & Leech, 1983; Leech & 
Leahy, 1991); (2) the capacity for managers to personally benefit at the expense of the 
shareholders, especially in a diffused, uncontrolled, ownership structure (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976); and (3) the essential role large shareholders play in 
controlling and enhancing a firm’s performance (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). 
Additionally, numerous researchers have studied the impact of ownership concentration on 
firm value and other performance measures (Short, 1994). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found 
that ownership concentration is an essential element of the corporate governance mechanism 
because it enables larger shareholders to exert control over the firms in which they invest. 
Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006) believed that there could be an ambiguous relationship 
between large owners and firm value. Despite all this, the question of whether or not 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on firm performance remains largely 
unanswered (Holderness, 2003). 
This topic was first discussed by Berle and Means (1932), who suggested the existence of a 
connection between firm performance and shareholding dispersal as an effect of the agency 
theory. Offering another perspective, Demsetz (1983) believed that a firm’s ownership 
structure should be viewed as an endogenous outcome of market share trading. This was 
supported by Loderer and Martin (1997), M. H. Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). These researchers used simultaneous equation 
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models that showed a significant relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s 
performance. 
Furthermore, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argued that the new ownership structure comes 
from owning firm shares and intending to maximise profit. The ownership structure is 
modified when the company’s owner decides to sell part of his or her company to the public, 
which also carries a high chance of making that structure more diffuse. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) argued that there should be no relationship between variations in ownership 
structure and firm performance. Similarly, Demsetz (1983) found no correlation between 
ownership concentration and profit. 
Some studies have showed that blockholders play an essential role in reducing agency costs. 
However, others studies have indicated otherwise. For example, Nyman and Silberston (1978) 
argued that control should be viewed as structural rather than behavioural and that control is 
related to power. In other words, concentrated ownership gives shareholders the ability to 
control manager activities, which could help enhance management efficiency and improve 
firm performance. 
Blockholders’ ownership monitoring reduces the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership 
concentration allows owners to monitor managerial performance effectively. Thus, 
blockholder ownership protects minority shareholders from owners and managers 
expropriating the wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that managers in firms with a 
dispersed ownership structure, have an incentive to consume perquisites for themselves, and 
as a consequence, they fail to maximise shareholder wealth. 
In countries that have a low level of investor protection, ownership concentration has a 
significant effect on firm performance (Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta et al., 1997; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Researchers on corporate governance found that ownership 
concentration plays an essential role in eliminating agency costs. Furthermore, where there 
are low levels of investor protection, blockholder ownership privilege produces private 
benefits that motivate owners to retain ownership of their firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Also, private benefits for controlling 
shareholders reduces the incentives for giving up control (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). Moreover, 
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having controlling shareholders in a firm can benefit the firm overall. Thus controlling 
shareholders have the power to monitor management and force them to make decisions that 
increase a firm’s value, thereby benefitting all other shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Second research question: does ownership concentration affect firm performance? 
‘Who owns the firm (the state, private ownership, foreign investors) has long been an 
important topic for research on organizations’ (Xia & Walker, 2015, p. 1). Consequently, 
ownership concentration cannot be separated from ownership identity. Ownership structure 
can be classified into two main dimensions: ownership concentration and owner identity 
(Nazir & Malhotra, 2016).  
Xia and Walker (2015) found that owner type is significant for a firm’s performance. Some 
studies showed that managerial ownership works effectively in reducing agency costs. For 
example, (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) believed that managerial ownership increases firm 
performance by mitigating agency costs. Morck et al. (1988) found a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the increase in insider 
ownership works negatively regarding firm performance (Demsetz, 1983) because large 
managerial ownership leads to managers being more concerned about their own interests 
instead of worrying about the interests of shareholders.  
Other studies indicated that government ownership could solve the asymmetrical information 
exchange disclosed to investors and can align interests between managers and owners (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Thus, the government has access to different sources of information and 
to different financing organisations and non-government firms (Eng & Mak, 2003). However, 
government cannot play an active role in monitoring its investments because it has weak 
monitoring over firms (Mak & Li, 2001). Moreover, the government has a political role over 
firms, rather than an economical one that could boost a firm’s performance (Boycko, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1996). In the same context, foreign investors can help firms by supplying funds 
and avoiding risk-taking strategies (Nakano & Nguyen, 2013), and can provide technology, 
research and development, and managerial skills (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Huang & Shiu, 
2009).  
Moreover, institutional ownership helps in improving firm performance by monitoring 
managerial activities (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Large institutional investors have effective 
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monitoring that leads to a positive influence on a firm’s market value (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Conversely, institutional ownership may have a negative effect on firm performance 
when institution representatives work alongside firm managers (Pound, 1988). Lastly, family 
ownership may have an agency problem with other shareholder groups (Claessens & Fan, 
2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). For example, a family member can acquire a top 
management position, enabling that person to have control over the firm’s board of directors 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and giving that person the opportunity to gain financial and other 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
Third research question: what are the effects of ownership identity on firm 
performance?  
Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to investigate the concentration of ownership in 
the MENA region by using listed firms. This main objective can be broken down into three 
separate objectives: 
Objective 1: to investigate the factors that affect the determination of ownership 
concentration in the MENA region. This is undertaken by examining three important 
factors in shaping ownership structure: country, industry, and firm level. The 
significance of this objective is in revealing the similar and different determinants of 
ownership concentration between developed and emerging markets. 
Objective 2: the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance in the 
MENA region by using five different ownership concentration indexes, and taking 
into consideration the endogeneity issue between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. The significance of this objective is in revealing the role of ownership 
concentration in the MENA region in enhancing firm performance and mitigating 
agency cost. 
Objective 3: the effects of ownership identity on firm performance in the MENA 
region by examining four core groups: institutional ownership, private ownership, 
government ownership and foreign ownership. The significance of this objective is in 
revealing the effects of different ownership identity on firm performance. 
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1.3 Research Motivation  
Most studies on ownership structure are conducted in an economically developed country that 
are characterised by a unique institutional environment, a market structure, and a legal system 
raising the need for a research in developing economics. MENA region is one of those 
developing countries that can be studied to answer the questions of the determinates and the 
effects of ownership concentration on firm performance, because of many reasons. Capital 
markets in the MENA region are characterised by a high ownership concentration, a few 
listed firms, and a large number of private companies (Bolbol & Omran, 2005). Moreover, 
privatisation in this region is slower compared to other developing countries, which can be 
explained by the failure of the capital markets to encourage privatisation, the scarcity of 
financial resources, weak private sectors, and poor regulations (Belkhir, Maghyereh, & 
Awartani, 2016). Also, the MENA stock markets face a modest flow of foreign investments 
(Öztürk & Volkan, 2015).  
The economy of the MENA region depends mainly on the production of crude oil (Graham, 
Kiviaho, Nikkinen, & Omran, 2013). According to a World Bank report (2015), the region’s 
economic growth dropped by 2.6% in 2015, and the growth forecast for the short term is 
‘cautiously pessimistic’. Furthermore, although most countries depend on private credit 
bureaus (PCBs) for a credit reporting method that grants inclusive credit information, the 
MENA countries still rely mainly on public credit registries (PCRs) that do not provide 
complete credit information (Belkhir et al., 2016).  
Corporate governance in the MENA countries is weak and controlled by lenders, mainly 
banks that play the main governance role (Turki & Sedrine, 2012). According to recent 
reports by Transparency International and World Bank, the justice system, media, and 
legislative systems in many countries in the region are controlled by the political system. The 
World Bank and Transparency International reported (2015) that the public governance 
indicator in the MENA countries is below the international average, suggesting the need for 
significant actions to improve public governance. Similarly, governance indicators reported 
by the World Bank (2013) showed a low level of corruption control, inefficient regulations, 
and a weak rule of law (ROL), (Awartani, Belkhir, Boubaker, & Maghyereh, 2016). This 
situation may negatively affect the MENA countries’ potential opportunities to obtain external 
finances (Belkhir et al., 2016).  
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1.4 Main Contributions of this Research 
This study contributes to the current literature on the relationship between ownership structure 
and a firm’s performance in many ways. First, this research contributes to the literature by 
filling in the gap of the shortage of studies in developing countries in both the factors that 
affect the determination of ownership concentration, and the effects of ownership 
concentration on firms in an emerging market.  
Second, to the authors’ best knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to investigate the 
effects of ownership concentration on firm performance in the MENA region, by using a large 
data set of eight countries for a period of seven years. Also, not only is there an examination 
of the effects of total ownership concentration on firm performance, but also an investigation 
into the role of ownership identity. Third, to the authors’ best knowledge, it is the first study 
to examine the determination of ownership concentration in the MENA region. Finally, this 
research is the first of its kind to examine the effects of political factors, including the Arab 
revolution (Arab Spring), on the ownership structure and firm performance of the examined 
companies in the MENA region.  
Overall, this study is a comprehensive research study of ownership concentration in the 
MENA region, making it unique. The study could be useful in two ways. The financial 
markets of public firms in the MENA region characterised by a high ownership concentration. 
Thus, it is worth investigating the factors behind this concentration. Ownership right 
distribution is also an interesting topic for policy makers when they consider how economic 
sectors should behave and be formed. Identifying the determinants of ownership 
concentration may allow a legislative change to limit the control of economic resources by 
small investors. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is made up of five chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic and provides the 
study outline; it includes the background of corporate governance, the main debate regarding 
the subject, the importance of this study, and the main contributions of this research.  
Chapter two has a summary of the different aspects that affect the MENA capital markets and 
gives an overview of the MENA economy, the capital markets in this area, corporate 
governance, and the Arab Spring and its economic impact on the MENA nations.  
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Chapter three investigates in both a theoretical and empirical way, the determinants of 
ownership concentration in the MENA region. Two main lines of thought that may influence 
the degree of ownership concentration within countries and their laws and cultures are 
considered. Also, the study has three levels: firm-, industry-, and country-level uses. This 
chapter covers the main debate about the determinants of ownership concentration, existing 
literature about this issue, methodology used in the study, and the results and discussion. 
Chapter four investigates the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance in the 
MENA region. This chapter covers the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, the existing literature about this issue, methodology used in the study, and 
finally the results and discussion. Moreover, this study uses five different ownership 
concentration indexes to give an overall understanding of how various ownership 
concentrations affect firm performance.  
Chapter five highlights the effects of different ownership identities on firm performance. 
Ownership identities are categorized into four core groups: institutional ownership, private 
ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership. This chapter covers the main 
debate, about how different types of ownership, has different impacts on firm performance. It 
also covers the existing literature about this issue, methodology used in the study, results and 
discussion.  
Finally, Chapter six presents a summary of the thesis. It provides a general idea of the 
conclusions drawn regarding the three main arguments of this study: the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, the effects of different ownership identity on 
firm performance, and the determinants of ownership concentration. Also, this chapter 
summarises the findings and highlights the  limitations of the study.  
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Chapter Two : Economic, Stock Market and Corporate 
Governance in the MENA Region 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The capital markets of the MENA region can be separated into two economic groups. Capital 
importers stand for the lower-average-income countries and economies, that do not 
necessarily rely on oil, but underwent an economic restructuring in the 1990s called the 
economic reform program (Al-Omari, 2010). In these nations, security markets were 
reinitiated to perpetuate the implementation of privatisation programs and to provide a source 
for medium- and long-term funds (Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). Oil exporting nations are the 
second group and consist of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that contain 45% 
of the global oil reserves (Al-Shammari, Brown, & Tarca, 2008). Some MENA capital 
markets are not strong. This is because of the fact that there is political or economic 
imbalance or simply because these country’s jurisdictions are in the early processes of 
economic reform, Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE, 2013).  
This chapter provides a short summary of the various aspects that affect the MENA capital 
markets, and it forms the foundation needed for comprehension of the results of the empirical 
analysis in chapters three, four, and five. The other part of this chapter is organised in the 
following way. Section 3.1 gives an overview of the MENA economy, section 3.2 gives an 
overall idea of the capital market in this area, section 3.3 highlights the corporate governance 
structures, and section 3.4 goes over the Arab Spring Movement and its economic impact on 
Arab MENA nations. 
2.2  MENA Economies 
When the World Bank went through its estimates of economic growth of the MENA area in 
2016, the growth rate dropped to 2.6%, which was 0.2% less than the October 2015 
estimations. The major reasons behind this recent revision in the growth rate include the 
constant civil wars, terrorist acts, and reduced oil prices (World Bank, 2016). Economic 
growth in the MENA region is mainly characterised by crude oil. The difference created in 
any of the national equity markets can therefore be affected by a common source of 
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information and which can influence other markets in the region as well (Graham, Kiviaho, 
Nikkinen, & Omran, 2013). For instance, Zarour (2006) showed a progressive relationship 
between the increase in oil prices and stock returns in the MENA region. Previous studies 
showed that there is a negative relationship between financial associations and geographical 
proximity. Nations with a smaller cultural distance have improved stock market comovement 
(Lucey & Zhang, 2010). In addition, the Saudi-Iran disagreement intensified the tension in the 
area. If the disagreement is allowed to build up even more, there could be an increase in 
military money allocation, especially in the nations that are directly associated with Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Because of the nature of government expenditures and the deteriorating oil 
prices, such a move would weaken the economies of these countries. In addition, this recent 
disagreement has impacted tourism, investments and trade, and led to more geopolitical risks 
in an area that is already unstable (World Bank, 2016). 
MENA’s oil importers, on the other hand, have been unable to maximise their profits on the 
low prices of oil, because they are experiencing the reverberations of civil wars and conflicts 
in the area, or because they are facing a lack of security, or both. During this time, oil 
exporters in the area were experiencing problems because of cheap oil. Most of the oil 
exporters, especially those in the GCC nations, were facing losses because oil prices dropped 
by a third in relation to the break-even price required to balance the budget (Devarajan & 
Mottaghi, 2015). If the prices do not change from around USD 30–45 p/b in 2016, these 
nations will face losses. Nonetheless, government expenditure does not decline because the 
majority of the population are government employees, and they are entitled to numerous 
benefits. This will allow the wealthy oil exporters in areas such as Saudi Arabia, a country 
that owns large reserves, to run deficits for a few years. The World Bank stated that at the 
present expenditure rates and a constant oil price of USD 40 per barrel, these nations will not 
have any more oil in 10 years. At this expenditure rate and constant policies, the GCC and 
their counterparts will experience budgetary deficits of about 9.4% of their total GDPs in 
2016. 
On the other hand, the IMF states that the MENA region’s broad policy reaction has not been 
enough to maximise its potential. Looking into the future, the economic problem is worsened 
by the subdued outlook in the external environment. In this case, this section gives an 
overview of the policies of various nations, and a look back at the eight policy issues 
impacting almost all economies in the area. The nations are left with the task of in-depth 
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specification, prioritisation, sequencing, and analysis - these are beyond the objective of this 
paper (IMF, 2016). 
Many counties in the area have undergone macroeconomic policy changes in the past few 
years, all of them concentrating on fiscal adjustments that favour a tight monetary policy. 
Because of the support from the IMF, these nations have made headlines in cutting down on 
their budget deficits and reducing inflation and increasing exports, the size of their account 
deficits, and the level of their foreign exchange reserves. This is a result of implementing 
structural changes. Major oil exporting nations in this area have also adopted these structural 
changes. In the beginning, these nations only concentrated on reducing expenditures in the 
case of low prices of oil and reduced investments, then focusing on increasing revenues 
brought in by non-oil products.  
Also, numerous nations have created midterm programs through an identified path, for a 
greater reduction of deficits, structural changes, and human development policies, in a general 
framework, focusing more on the private sector in production and investment (IMF, 2016). In 
the MENA region, there has been a variation in development recently regarding handling 
macroeconomic imbalances and adopting comprehensive structural changes. Because of this, 
their commencing point and the nature of the remnant policy challenge may differ from nation 
to nation. Nonetheless, the region is faced with a strict economic and financial policy agenda. 
Even the developed countries have acknowledged that change is a continuous process. This 
process places a premium on keeping the momentum of an all-around approach, combining 
important policy initiatives correctly, adopting the necessary changes on time, especially in 
reaction to unexpected exogenous developments, and creating and maintaining the standard 
institutional support and human capabilities. 
A lot of changes require short-term costs. As much as this hurts budgets, it cannot be avoided. 
Priority must be on reducing these costs by proper planning and combining of policies, 
compensating the costs with the gains realized by the changes, and protecting the most 
vulnerable members of the community. 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned factors, the IMF has brought up eight points that the 
MENA region should work on to deal with this late economic recession. increasing the 
measures to privatise and de-regulate economic activity, changing public finances, 
strengthening human resources, bettering labour markets, increasing internal and external 
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investments, increasing financial intermediation, freeing up external trade payments, and 
making sure that there is a healthy macroeconomic policy mix. 
2.3 MENA Stock Markets 
Capital markets in the MENA region are characterised by a high ownership concentration, a 
few listed firms, and a large number of private companies (Bolbol & Omran, 2005). 
Moreover, privatisation in this region is slower compared to other developing countries, 
which can be explained by the failure of the capital markets to encourage privatisation, the 
scarcity of financial resources, weak private sectors, and poor regulations (Belkhir, 
Maghyereh, & Awartani, 2016). 
In the past 20 years, the MENA region has gone through a phase of financial-sector 
liberalisation, which includes updating stock market legislation activities. The entire MENA 
region can be defined as a bank-based economy (Graham et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the 
vitality of capital markets for economic growth has been acknowledged. Because of this, the 
change objective has included rejuvenating the existing stock market in some nations and 
creating stock markets in others. Most of the MENA nations have legislated new capital 
market legislations to lure in private investors and enhance investor protection. The major 
conditions of these legislations include creating a new legal framework to administer 
specialised capital market organisations to reinforce financial disclosure, allowing external 
investors free access to the market, and reinforcing investor rights through conditions that bar 
unfair market prices ( Ben  Naceur, Ghazouani, & Omran, 2007).  
As much as MENA nations have advanced in capital market growth, their efforts have gone 
unnoticed because of rapid changes in other parts of the globe. Amidst the backdrop of a 
much more globalised world, the problem facing MENA legislators in avoiding financially 
repressive policies will be to adopt wise macroeconomic policies and structural changes. In 
the same way, macrostabilising measures should be reinforced by establishing a favourable 
environment for financial growth; one that is inclusive of minimal government interference in 
credit disbursement and that has reinforced institutional qualities, especially in the legal 
system (IMF, 2016). 
Despite the notable development in the region, stock markets in the majority of the MENA 
nations are faced by a lot of structural and regulatory challenges. These markets include 
Egypt, Israel, Iran, Turkey, major institutional holdings, and narrow free floats. Looking at the 
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backgrounds of the economic structures, diversification of the sectors is minimal, and the 
vulnerability to oil prices is high (Ben  Naceur et al., 2007). Though there is a wide variety of 
legal, regulatory and supervisory developments, which have intensified market transparency 
in the past few years, major shortages linger regarding market supervision. The GCC nations, 
a minor set in the MENA region, have acquired international experience in recent years, 
mainly because of increased oil prices between 2003-2008, a compilation of petrodollars, and 
the worldwide investments of their sovereign wealth funds (SWF). The amassing of wealth 
and liquidity has also played a part in the rise of the formal trading of securities and the 
creation of stock markets in the area (Graham et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, it is believed that financial system development brings down a firm’s cost 
of external finances (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). MENA nations in the past couple of decades 
have been involved in a sequence of liberalisation steps with the objective of improving their 
financial sectors (Ben Naceur, Ghazouani, & Omran, 2008; Ben Naceur & Omran, 2011). 
Some of the most important steps taken include minimising government interference on 
deposit and lending rates and credit allocation, the eradication of high reserve requirements, 
and the need for external investors to acquire permission to buy shares in the stock market 
(Shiguang, Naughton, & Tian, 2010). These steps are expected to improve the financial 
development of the region, hence increasing the chances of companies obtaining foreign 
investments. However, most analyses indicated that these steps are far from reaching their 
desired targets (Bourgain, Pieretti, & Zanaj, 2012). It should, however, be noted that despite 
these changes, security markets in the MENA region are still far from developing a shortage 
of listed firms, limiting free float of shares, and having thin trading. Only countable nations 
such as the GCC nations have standard development and good banking (Creane, Mobarak, 
Goyal, & Sab, 2004). A majority of the other nations are faced with an influx of government-
owned banks in the banking sector, inefficient risk management systems, and inefficiency in 
credit allocation. In the same way, most of these nations have a highly concentrated banking 
system, and there is limited freedom of new banks in their ability to enter into the market 
(Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, & Rocha, 2010; Turk-Ariss, 2009). 
In addition, a report by the IMF showed that the majority of the countries in the MENA 
region perform quite well in regulation, supervision, and financial transparency. However, 
much more needs to be done to ensure the stability of the institutional environment and to 
support the growth of the non-bank financial sector. In the MENA region, development in the 
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financial sector has not been evenly spread among the nations. Some of the nations, mostly 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, Jordan, and the UAE, have made 
major developments in their financial sectors’ banking areas. Others, such as Egypt, have 
made significant developments, but more still needs to be done. The main results of the 
MENA region in reference to the six themes are as shown below: 
2.3.1 Monetary Policy 
More often than not, rates of return in the MENA region are not influenced by anything. 
There is use of indirect monetary policies, and government securities have been put in place. 
Use of open market operations is, however, problematic because of the low development or 
shortage of secondary markets for government securities. To add to this, there are not many 
nations that have an all-around framework for creating and managing monetary policies. 
2.3.2 Banking Sector 
In most of the GCC nations, there is a well-developed banking sector that generates profit and 
is reliable. However, in half of the MENA region, this does not apply. The banking sector is 
faced with massive government interference in the disbursement of credit, financial losses, 
interchange ability issues, and broad spreads in the rates of return. More than half of the 
nations’ banks are crowded, with assets of the three largest banks taking up over 65% of the 
total asset. Also, there is the urgency to make strides towards modern banking and financial 
skills in the region. 
2.3.3 Regulation and Supervision 
Most of the MENA nations, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, have reinforced 
their banking and supervision regulations, updated their procedures to occasionally collect 
important information, and inspected and audited banks. Measures have also been taken to 
change the international Basel standards, by putting more capital adequacy ratios and 
reducing loans that are non-performing. This has, however, not yielded the expected results 
because for most nations, 10–20% of their total loans are non-performing. 
2.3.4 The Non-bank Financial Sector 
There is a need for more development in the non-bank financial sector, for instance in pension 
expenditure, the stock market, insurance firms, and the corporate bond market. Where there 
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are such markets, there is normally very little in the way of trading activities. The growth of 
these markets is troubled by legal barriers regarding ownership and an established legal 
framework. 
2.3.5 Financial Transparency 
MENA nations have slowly opened both their current and capital accounts. More than half of 
the nations have opened their financial sectors; though many have limitations on foreign 
ownership of assets and return of earnings, whereas some nations continue to have many 
different currency rates or parallel exchange markets. 
2.3.6 Institutional Environment 
In most parts of the MENA region, the quality of institutions is not up to par. For example, in 
some nations, the judicial system is vulnerable to political pressure and delays, which leads to 
weak law enforcement. The adherence to property rights is also very low, and this challenges 
trading activities and development in general. 
Table ‎2.1 MENA Comparative Financial Development Indicators  
Comprehensive
  Index
Banking 
Sector
Nonbank 
Financial 
Sector
Regulation 
and 
Supervision
Monetary 
Sector 
and Policy
Financial 
Openness
Institutional 
Environment
MENA average 5.4 5.3 4.8 6.5 5.4 6.1 4.7
World Average Scores
   High 7.5 7.3 6.7 8.9 7.3 8.9 5.9
   Medium 5.3 5 4.1 6.5 5.6 6.1 4.8
   Low 3.3 3.1 2.7 3.5 3.1 3.9 3.8
 Source; IFM report 2014, within overall scale of 0–10, intermediate scales are as follows: High—above 6; 
Medium—4–6; Low—below 4. 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in MENA Region  
Corporate governance in the MENA countries is weak and controlled by lenders, mainly 
banks that play the main governance role (Turki & Sedrine, 2012). According to recent 
reports by Transparency International and World Bank, the justice system, media, and 
legislative systems in many countries in this region are controlled by the political system. The 
World Bank and Transparency International reported (2015) that the public governance 
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indicator in the MENA countries is below the international average, suggesting the need for 
significant actions to improve public governance. Similarly, governance indicators reported 
by the World Bank (2013) showed a low level of corruption control, inefficient regulations, 
and a weak rule of law (ROL) (Awartani, Belkhir, Boubaker, & Maghyereh, 2016). 
Accordingly, ownership concentration can play a major role in corporate governance in this 
region, to monitor managerial performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
The credibility of corporate governance is one of the parameters that assure the economic 
agents that their claims and property rights are safe from misuse by the government or 
individuals.  Thus, the level of the law that protects investors in public firms is negatively 
related to the degree of ownership concentration (La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). In well-administered nations, the rule of law is upheld above any other 
legislation. Independent organisations are believed to be trustworthy and work towards 
adhering to property rights and contract enforcement. It is because of this that lenders have 
more trust that their capital will be given back, even in the case of defaulters, so they may be 
persuaded to extend credit at more favourable terms. Most of the legislation that manages the 
MENA markets, however, has been adopted recently and has been inspired by international 
practices. Because of this, the challenge of misuse of laws does not pose a threat now. On the 
other hand, there is a difference between legislation and its effective application in many 
world markets. The difference depends on the region (Sourial, 2004). 
As much as the MENA nations keep increasing their efforts to better their public governance, 
these nations still harbour institutions that have deficiencies. Surveys by global organisations 
show that the political system has a strong grip on the judicial system, the media, and the 
legislature. In addition, it has been shown that the ability to gain access to quality public 
services and business opportunities can only be through nepotism, tribal affiliations, money, 
or patronage. Because of this, there is widespread corruption, poor follow-up on contracts, 
and a lot of property rights insecurity. This negatively affects a company’s ability to obtain 
foreign investments (Belkhir et al., 2016).  
Most of the MENA nations have markets that are small and tightly regulated, where 
government ownership is dominant, and market forces are limited (Turki & Sedrine, 2012). 
This can highly explain why the MENA region is characterised with high ownership 
concentration. In addition corporate governance in the MENA region having lack of a 
difference between the chair of the board and the CEO, the lack of board independence, and 
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inefficient protection of shareholder rights. Therefore, the corporate governance in the MENA 
region is a public policy concern of increasing importance.  
Sourial (2004) believed that most of the key shareholders in the MENA region are politicians, 
individuals from a royal bloodline, or important organisations. There is a possibility of one 
family controlling numerous firms directly or indirectly. The managing shareholders have 
strong motives to keep tabs on the firm and its administration; they can also affect the 
administration of the firm positively. A disagreement is obvious when the shareholders 
embezzle the company’s resources. 
The corporate governance of MENA countries is similar to that of developing economies, 
mainly because of the underdeveloped form of the financial markets and the dominance of 
family-owned companies (Omran, Bolbol, & Fatheldin, 2008). They also showed that 
corporate legislature mainly depends on the civil law customs. The relationship between the 
legal origins and the financial arrangements is evidence of interference by a third party, which 
in most cases is the government. It is evident that in this case, the Arab nations perform 
poorly because their political nature is characterised by poor governance. The effects of this 
are passed over to the corporate administration because most Arabic companies are 
parastatals, or owned by families, and most stock markets are still incomplete. This, however, 
clearly shows that there have been developments in the MENA region over the past 20 years; 
many nations have taken up new corporate legislations, and many companies have gradually 
embraced corporate governance developments (International Finance Corporation, 2008). 
Despite all this, the MENA security markets have undergone changes in their administration. 
In the 1980s, the markets were either not managed or were managed by a committee that was 
picked from the board of exchange. In short, most of the functions were handled by the 
exchanges because of the small size of the market. Because of the increased vitality of the 
security markets, thanks to the economic change programs, there has been the need for an all-
round, well-regulated market. Slow changes began in each market with management tasks 
being separated from the exchanges, while also creating government or security commissions 
to regulate and keep tabs on the market (Sourial, 2004).  
These recently created regulatory committees took up any of the four administration models. 
 A model administered by a board of directors and chaired by a minister, who 
is appointed by the president, royal decree, or prime minister 
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 The U.S.-commissioners-based model, administered by commissioners who 
are appointed full time 
 The UK model containing a single regulator for the entire financial sector 
 The traditional structure model in which a committee in the exchange takes up 
the regulatory functions 
The MENA nations’ objective of quality corporate administration is to minimise the agency 
conflict between the administration and the shareholders, while also reinstalling investor 
confidence. It is clear that most of the legislation in the MENA markets that uphold 
shareholders rights is stipulated in the laws and bylaws of security markets and company 
legislation. This legislation mainly focuses on the shareholders rights in acquiring ownership 
registration, taking part in elections during meetings, and also taking part in making key 
decisions involving major corporate changes. Because of a lack of equity culture and a lack of 
knowledge regarding investor’s rights and the common qualities of all markets, there is little 
participation of shareholders in safeguarding their rights. The results are low participation 
from shareholders in meetings, creating a conducive environment for market abuse (Sourial, 
2004). 
2.5 Arab Spring and its Economic Effects. 
The Arab Spring was the revolutionary wave that started at the end of 2010; it had the aim of 
changing the rule of local governments. There were many factors that led to this revolution, 
including human rights violations, political corruption, economic decline, unemployment, and 
poverty. The Arab Spring affected the MENA region both directly and indirectly. Countries 
with governments and legal systems that were directly reshaped by this revolution included 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. 
The reasons for the Arab spring include dictatorships, poverty, high rates of unemployment 
and a lack of job opportunities in the majority of the Arab countries. The economies in the 
majority of these Arab nations are controlled by the government, and for many years, the 
economy did not develop. On the 17th of December, there was a protest by a Tunisian trader 
that set himself ablaze to protest about harassment from the authorities. The Arab Spring 
movement had a negative effect on the economy in the majority of the Arab nations. Foreign 
investments have eluded the Arab region since the protests began, and this has resulted in 
Arab merchants transferring their wealth to other continents (Abumustafa, 2016). The Arab 
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stock market has proven to be unstable, even when there are no major upsets in the market. To 
reduce risk, Arab investors are advised to keep an open mind in terms of other markets and 
keep a long-term view of the markets. For a person to safely invest in Arab markets, mutual 
funds are the recommended buy. Also, because of the high cost and intensive labour in terms 
of research needed, the cost of annual funds may be higher than that of mutual funds 
(Abumustafa, 2007).  
During the Arab Spring movement, there was a drastic decline in foreign direct investment 
into Arab nations. The decline was estimated at around 46% during the maiden year. In 2011, 
Egypt and Tunisia, both key stock markets in terms of capital, underwent huge losses of about 
50% of the total market’s value. The tension emanating from the political conflict discouraged 
investors. A survey of the Arab stock markets showed that the number of listed companies 
and required legislations were below standard while the market capitalisation was very low in 
comparison to other markets (Abumustafa, 2016).  
In a recent survey carried out by Abumustafa (2016), the Arab Spring was shown to have a 
retrogressive effect on the economy in the years 2015 and 2016, in the majority of the Arab 
nations. However, the GCC nations, especially Saudi Arabia, experienced growth in their 
markets. The Arab spring has led to increased investment opportunities in the last 4 years, 
mostly in Egypt.  
The Arab stock market is the best place for potential investors because of the high tensions in 
the majority of the Arab stock markets in the last 3 years and that expectation these tensions 
will continue for years to come. The financial system has been the main cause of problems for 
the economy and the stock markets in the Arab nations. In most cases, there is a limit to the 
number of foreigners who can control a firm. The second coming of the Arab Spring is 
expected to be worse than the previous one despite recent stability and profound interest by 
investors. (Ghosh, 2016) studied the effect of the Arab spring on the MENA region’s banks. 
The study showed that profits decreased by 0.2% and risks increased by 0.4%. In addition, the 
study indicated that the performance and stability of the banks in the Arab countries were not 
affected by political unrest as originally thought. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview about the MENA region’s economy, stock market, 
corporate governance and Arab Spring. To evaluate the MENA economy as a whole: most of 
the MENA countries depend on crude oil in its economy, as such, this region is facing very 
low growth due to the drop of the oil price. Capital markets in the MENA region are 
characterised by a high ownership concentration, a few listed firms, and a large number of 
private companies. In addition, privatisation in this region is slower compared to other 
developing countries, which can indicate the failure of the capital markets to encourage 
privatisation, the scarcity of financial resources, weak private sectors, poor regulations and 
weak corporate governance. Accordingly, this can support the theory, that ownership 
concentration can substitute the weakness of corporate governance in emerging markets. Also 
this can explain the hypothesis that legal factors which protect investors can affect companies’ 
ownership concentration. The Arab Spring can be a proxy for political risk, because it is a 
revolutionary wave that started at the end of 2010 to change the rule of local governments. 
Many factors led to this revolution, such as human rights violations, political corruption, 
economic decline, unemployment, and poverty. Therefore, the Arab Spring factor, may affect 
both ownership concentration and firms’ performance in this region.  
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Chapter Three : The Determinants of Ownership 
Concentration 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The determinants of ownership concentration have drawn the attention of many researchers. 
Demsetz (1983) believed that ownership structure should be viewed as endogenous to firm 
performance. In addition, ownership concentration is affected by several factors within firms 
and countries. This explains why ownership concentration fluctuates within the firms in a 
single country (Bottasso & Sembenelli, 2004; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) and within multiple 
countries (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; La Porta  et al., 1999; Seifert 
et al., 2005; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1998). 
However, most of the studies covered countries that have devolved economic structures 
characterised by a unique institutional environment, market structure, and legal system. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that affect the determination of ownership 
structure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with its limited and rigidly 
regulated financial markets (Turki & Sedrine, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the question of why ownership concentration varies across regions, countries, 
and firms remains unanswered. There are two main lines of thought that may influence the 
degree of ownership concentration within countries and their laws and cultures (Holderness, 
2017). One finding was that the level of the law that protects investors in public firms is 
negatively related to the degree of ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1998). However, 
Holderness (2009) doubted that the country-level factor has any significant effect on 
ownership concentration. Although legal protection has an effect on shaping ownership 
structure, he believed that law and ownership concentration are unpredictable (Holderness 
(2016). 
However , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 228) believed the following. 
Diffuse or concentrated, that are of approximate appropriateness for the firms they 
serve. These structures differ across firms because of differences in the circumstances 
facing firms, particularly in regard to scale economies, regulation, and the stability of 
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the environment in which they operate. If these structures were the outcomes of 
perfect markets for control, they would eliminate any systematic relation between firm 
performance and ownership structure. (p. 228)  
Beck et al. (2003) also believed that legal protection plays an essential role in forming 
ownership concentration. However, they argued that countries with origins in common law 
have a higher level of protection for shareholders, leading to a lower concentration of 
ownership. In contrast, countries with a tradition based in civil law have inadequate 
ownership protection; consequently, they tend to have a high ownership concentration. 
Moreover, Palia (2001) confirmed the endogeneity of ownership structure to firm value. 
According to Bhagat and Bolton (2008, pp. 257-258), 
The relation between corporate governance and performance might be endogenous 
raising doubts about the causality explanation. There is a significant body of 
theoretical and empirical literature in accounting and finance that considers the 
relations among corporate governance, management turnover, corporate performance, 
corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. Hence, from an 
econometric viewpoint, to study the relationship between any two of these variables 
one would need to formulate a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the 
relationships among these variables. (pp. 257–258) 
Therefore, ignoring endogeneity when studying corporate governance, may result in making 
the coefficient inefficient and unreliable in any regression test.  
Although causality indicates the impact and direction between variables, many studies 
indicated that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance could exist in both directions. For example, Kole (1996) demonstrated that high 
levels of firm performance leads to increased ownership concentration. This means that 
although corporate governance affects firm performance, high firm performance levels may 
also attract and form different corporate governance mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) argued that corporate governance mechanisms depend on one another; one mechanism 
should not be treated in isolation from other mechanisms. If this were to occur, a misleading 
conclusion could occur. 
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On the other hand, some studies had ownership structure as an exogenous variable, one 
supported by the path-dependent assumption that the ownership structure was stable. Such 
studies Leech and Leahy (1991), Morck et al. (1988) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986) do not 
consider any of the effects of performance on ownership structure. In contrast, other studies 
showed that some corporate governance mechanisms are endogenous to firm performance. 
Thus, firm performance may have better corporate governance. Given the latter argument, 
ownership endogeneity is critical when studying the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. 
Therefore, this chapter is an investigation into the factors that affect the determination of 
ownership structure of firms in the MENA region. This study is important for three reasons. 
First, it is an attempt to contribute to the literature by filling in the gap with further research 
into this issue. Second, to the authors’ best knowledge it is the first study to comprehensively 
examine this matter in the MENA region, which will help in two ways. Public firms in the 
MENA region’s financial markets are characterised by a high ownership concentration. Thus, 
it is worth investigating if a theoretical perspective lies behind this concentration. Ownership 
right distribution is also an interesting topic for policy makers Ownership right distribution is 
also an interesting topic for policy makers when they consider how economic sectors should 
behave and be formed. Identifying the determinants of ownership concentration may allow a 
legislative change to limit the control of economic resources by small investors. Finally, this 
research is the first of its kind to examine the effects of political factors, including the Arab 
revolution (Arab Spring), on the ownership structure of the examined companies in the 
MENA region. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: a review of the existing literature that 
considers firm, industry, and country factors; a look at the variables and methodology used; a 
presentation of the results; and a discussion of the results. 
3.2 Review of Existing Literature and Hypotheses Development 
After the seminal study conducted by (Grossman & Hart, 1980), the idea of benefiting from 
controlling a firm’s resources has drawn the attention of many researchers. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argued that a firm’s economic nature is relevant when determining the degree of 
ownership concentration. Firms with significant cash flow volatility tend to have a high 
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ownership concentration. In contrast, large businesses have a low ownership concentration 
because of their significant equity. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) believed that profitable firms can refinance their operations and 
expansion projects with their earnings, without the need for equity financing. This makes their 
existing shareholders own more equity, therefore helping in the formation of ownership 
concentration. Looking at data from 39 countries, Dyck and Zingales (2004) used 393 sales 
blocks as controlling variables, to find if private benefits have a relationship with the degree 
of ownership concentration. Their findings showed that high private benefits are linked to a 
high level of ownership concentration. However, the authors argued that the existence of 
proper accounting standards, good protection for minority shareholders, and proper law 
enforcement, reduce ownership concentration. 
Empirically, ownership concentration differs between public and non-public firms (Richter & 
Weiss, 2013). Thus, most of the small and medium firms are controlled by a limited number 
of individuals, families, or shareholder groups. However, the listed companies seem to have a 
dispersed ownership structure because of equity capital attracting several investors. 
Examining how ownership structures change when companies are listed publicly, Bebchuk 
(1999) found that the benefits from private control determine the level of ownership 
concentration. When there is an expectation of large private benefits gained from having 
control, ownership concentration tends to be high. In countries where private control benefits 
are substantial, such as in Italy, enterprise founders lock up control when their firms are 
privatised (Bianchi, Bianco, & Enriques, 1997). 
In their study on the difference of ownership structure in 12 European countries, Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1997) used the 100 largest companies and found that the degree of shareholder 
protection significantly affects the structure of ownership. They also concluded that company 
size and industry, shape the ownership structure. However, the factors influencing ownership 
concentration differed among the studied countries. 
Using Canadian firms, Daniels and Iacobucci (2000, p. 90) argued that government 
protectionism and market power help form firms’ ownership structures. They defined market 
power as ‘the ability of firms to earn supra-competitive returns in their product markets’ (p. 
90). Moreover, La Porta  et al. (1999) believed that the legal environment, particularly when 
the protection of minority shareholders is involved, plays an essential role in ownership 
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concentration. They argued that a low level of legal protection forces investors to concentrate 
their ownership on self-protection and ensure proper monitoring. 
To find how investor protection shapes the ownership structure, Wolfenzon (1999) proposed 
two organisation types – pyramidal and horizontal. He found that countries with a low level of 
investor protection more frequently have a pyramidal structure and a high ownership 
concentration. 
When examining 2,980 firms in East Asian countries, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 
found that pyramidal structures are common in this area, and they are characterised by low 
legal investor protection and a high ownership concentration. The largest shareholder controls 
more than 60% of the sample in the study. 
Van der Elst (2004) applied the rent-seeking theory, which states that company-level and 
industry-level parameters are factors that affect ownership concentration besides the level of 
owner protection. Using six European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, 
France, and Belgium), he found that the type of industry and a firm’s investment risks, 
determine both the concentration level and the ownership identity. 
Lim and Kim (2005) studied multi-firm conglomerates in Korea by using a regression model 
with 6,576 firm observations, to determine the unique structure of ownership. The authors 
discovered that the industry type and the debt size and level affect the structure of ownership 
in Koreans firms. 
Many extant literature studies have a focus on the factors that may influence firm ownership 
concentration and take a look at concentration from different perspectives. One study 
indicated that the size of the firm and the firm-specific risk, impact ownership concentration 
(Mak & Li, 2001). Moreover, regulation environments in different industry sectors may be 
related to the differences in ownership concentration between firms (Bergström & Rydqvist, 
1990). Holderness (2016) showed that a firm-level variable, such as company size, influences 
ownership concentration. However, the factors that influence ownership structure are mainly 
drawn from three levels – country, industry, and firm. The following subsections cover these 
three levels in detail, besides the summaries of empirical evidence regarding these 
perspectives. 
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3.2.1 Country level 
According to the institutional view on corporate ownership that originated from Roe’s 
political theory, the ownership structure highly depends on regulations and predominant 
institutions (Roe, 1991). Moreover, North (1990, p. 3) defined the institutional environment 
as comprising of ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’. Moreover, legislation differences among countries 
shape their financial systems and ownership structures in many ways (Pedersen & Thomsen, 
1997). For example, U.S. banks are not allowed by law to own large shares of industrial 
companies, while banks in Germany are not inhibited by this type of law. 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have used country-level factors to examine the 
determination of ownership structure, particularly ownership concentration. These studies 
included different countries, using the assumption that the firms in each country have their 
own frameworks that regulate the responsibilities and rights of ownership (Richter & Weiss, 
2013). Therefore, the country-level factors identify the protection level of minority 
shareholders and facilitate stock market development. Moreover, Doidge et al. (2007) argued 
that country-level factors have a high degree of influence on firm governance and ownership 
structures. However, the question of why public firms have different ownership 
concentrations across countries has not yet been answered (Stulz, 2005). 
Using a sample of 540 companies from 27 countries, La Porta  et al. (1999) found a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and the level of shareholder protection. By 
using 5,232 firms from Western European countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) found that 
ownership concentration reacts negatively to shareholder protection levels. In their study 
about newly privatised firms, Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005) concluded that investor 
protection has a direct effect on ownership concentration. Based on data from 304 companies 
in four Arab countries, Omran, Bolbol, and Fatheldin (2008a), reported that low investor 
protection explains the high concentration of ownership in those countries. 
Conversely, Spamann (2010) found no relationship between ownership protection and the 
degree of ownership concentration. Holderness (2016) also doubted that countries with weak 
investor protection have a greater ownership concentration. In his study, he used samples 
from 32 countries and firm-level observations, including firm size, to determine ownership 
concentration and 16 broadly accepted indexes of legal protection. Noting the inconsistencies 
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between ownership concentration and the law, he concluded that there is no relationship 
between legal protection and ownership structure. 
Moreover, in a unique study, Holderness (2017) implemented cultural factors (such as 
religion and trust) to find if these help in understanding the determination of ownership 
concentration. Using 8,076 firms from 32 countries, he did not find any relationship between 
cultural factors and ownership concentration, or between legal protection and ownership 
concentration. 
Most of the studies concerning country-level factors follow the research of (La Porta  et al., 
1999; La Porta et al., 1998), who argued that ownership concentration is highly affected by a 
countries’ legal origins. Thus, the degree of ownership protection differs between countries 
using common law and those governed by civil law. 
However, Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems, and Singh (2009) argued that the hypothesis 
regarding legal origins influencing ownership protection, should take time to be considered. 
They used panel data from developed and developing countries, covering a 10-year period 
(1995–2005), to examine the role of legal origins in ownership protection. They found that 
countries under common law have a relatively high shareholder protection, but countries ruled 
by civil law have experienced a rapid increase in shareholder protection. Therefore, legal 
origin might affect shareholder protection through the two explanation channels of 
‘adaptability’ and ‘political’ types (Hayek, 1960). 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2005) argued that regarding the ‘adaptability channel’, legal 
systems that apply common law can rapidly adapt themselves according to economic changes 
over time. However, legal systems based on civil law react slowly to economic changes 
because such systems’ codes are seldom reviewed. Accordingly, countries under common law 
are ahead in adjusting shareholder protection compared to countries governed by civil law (La 
Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998). 
Regarding the ‘political channel’, Mahoney (2001) used a sample of 102 countries from 
1960–1992 and found that countries using common law have higher legal protection for 
shareholders than countries using civil law. As a result, countries ruled by common law have 
fast economic growth because of property security and contract rights. However, concerning 
both explanation channels, Ahlering and Deakin (2007) doubted that legal origin has any 
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relation with the legal structures of any country. They believed that these structures are 
influenced more by the countries’ political and economic development. 
Moreover, Roe (2003) believed that the power given to employees in Continental European 
social democracies has had a considerable influence on corporate governance. Thus, for 
shareholders to offset these forces and ensure their interests, ownership needs to be 
concentrated. He argued that the best way to ensure their interests is by having major 
shareholders, which explains why Continental European countries have a higher ownership 
concentration than Anglo-American countries. Roe (2003) also contended that in countries 
employing common law, employee influences on firms are low, leading to diffused ownership 
structures. However, this assumption cannot be applied to ownership concentration. As 
reported by (Barca & Becht, 2001), although countries such as Germany and Austria have 
employee power in corporate governance, the ownership structure is not concentrated. 
The legal origin hypothesis of (La Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998) has gained 
empirical support from different studies. However, other studies indicate doubts about this 
assumption. Coffee Jr (1998) questioned (La Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998) findings 
that the UK and U.S. markets are characterised by diffused ownership structures because they 
have high ownership protection. He even argued that a dispersed ownership structure should 
not be considered a result of strong protection. Braendle (2006) used the United States and 
Germany as case studies to find the relationship of legal origin with shareholder protection 
and observed no significant difference between civil and common law, in the level of 
shareholder protection. Furthermore, Chirinko, Van Ees, Garretsen, and Sterken (2004) 
concluded that investor protection under the legal origin hypothesis is not sustained. They 
found that firms perform effectively in the free market. Likewise, Spamann (2010) found no 
relationship between legal origin and ownership concentration. 
Holderness (2009) used (La Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998) concept to study how it 
can be applied in the United States, a country which has high ownership protection compared 
to other countries. Using 7,842 companies from 22 countries, he found that on average, 
ownership concentration in the United States is similar to averages of other countries. 
However, (Richter & Weiss, 2013) questioned the findings of Holderness’ (2009) in two 
ways. First, a diffused ownership structure is not captured because he used only the largest 
shareholders, with 5% ownership as the measure of ownership concentration. Second, his 
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study omitted the firm sizes; most small businesses might have more ownership concentration 
than large firms. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) offered another perspective on the state-level variable; that is, 
the size and the development of a stock market in a country may have an effect on ownership 
concentration. They believed that a stock market’s development can decrease capital costs and 
consequently have a positive impact on firms seeking financing options through equity 
markets. Accordingly, more companies in the stock exchange will look for financing 
associated with larger investors and will have more investment options. As a result, more 
businesses in the market increase the portfolios of investors, and a high number of investors, 
limits the availability of shares for each firm. Therefore, more firms and owners lead to 
increased dispersion of ownership. Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) empirically supported their 
argument, finding a positive relationship between market size and ownership dispersion. 
Consequently, I expect to find a negative relationship between country variables and 
ownership concentration, as stated in our first hypothesis: 
H3a. Strong legal and investor protection have adverse effects on ownership 
concentration. 
3.2.2 Industry level 
Industry regulations are essential in controlling firms. However, in the absence of these 
regulations, larger shareholders may have controlling power over firms (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985). Thus, excessive regulations restrict larger ownership blocks from extracting firms’ 
benefits for themselves, hence limiting their options. Therefore, industry regulations have a 
negative relationship with ownership concentration. In contrast, Kole and Lehn (1999) 
investigated how governance can change the ownership structure in a business environment. 
Reviewing the case of American Airline companies over a 22-year period, they noticed an 
increase in ownership concentration after the Deregulation Act in 1978. However, Crespi-
Cladera (1996) could not find any significant relationship between regulated ownership 
concentration and the regulation of firms, when it came to Spanish public companies. 
Nevertheless, how ownership concentration changes, following changes in industry 
regulations, is still arguable on theoretical and empirical grounds (Richter & Weiss, 2013). 
Van der Elst (2004) disputed the argument that because industry regulations differ among 
nations, the changes in ownership concentration, because of regulatory revisions, vary in all 
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countries. He clarified that industry factors depend on country-level conditions that affect 
ownership concentration. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (1998) pointed out that three industry-level factors – industry life 
cycle, competition intensity, and information asymmetries, may affect ownership 
concentration. Regarding the effects of firms’ life cycles, some authors argued that industries 
at an early stage tend to have a high ownership concentration (de Jong, 2013; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 1998). However, this idea has not been empirically proven by researchers because 
of the disclosed shortage in entrepreneurial, young companies (Richter & Weiss, 2013). 
Second, regarding competition intensity, Giroud and Mueller (2010) contended that firms 
under a high level of industry competition have owners who will evaluate and monitor their 
enterprises, by comparing the performance of other companies in the same industry. 
Therefore, agency problems because of dispersed ownership are reduced by strong 
competition and allow firms to have small ownership concentration (Nickell, Nicolitsas, & 
Dryden, 1997). On the other hand, strategic decision making in a company that faces high 
competition, needs to be prompt, which can be achieved in a highly concentrated ownership 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
Concerning the third factor, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) believed that industries with 
intensive research and development (R&D) have greater information asymmetries than those 
with less R&D efforts, because it is hard to monitor such activities (Zeckhauser & Pound, 
1990). Therefore, large shareholders have low levels of efficiency in monitoring firms that 
conduct considerable research, leading to a reduced ownership concentration. Conversely, 
(Makhija & Patton, 2004) investigated the effect of information asymmetries on ownership 
structure using Czech non-financial firms and showed that firms with high disclosure 
ambiguity attract ownership concentration. They also believed that ownership structures 
respond in different ways to each disclosure policy. 
The findings of these studies seem to indicate an ambiguous relationship between the 
industry-level factors and ownership concentration. Empirical studies across countries do not 
report a significant relationship either (Richter & Weiss, 2013). 
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3.2.3 Firm level 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that although firms with significant cash flow volatility tend 
to have a high ownership concentration, this cash volatility depends on the firm size. They 
believed that as firms grow larger, they need extra cash. Increasing the firms’ equity requires 
additional investors, consequently decreasing ownership concentration in two ways. 
On the one hand, firms’ operational risks affect their ownership concentration. According to 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), shareholders who have relatively high ownership shares in a 
firm with high operational risks, have incentives to monitor its management. This monitoring 
works effectively in ensuring the firm carries out effective operations. For this reason, firms 
facing more risks have increased monitoring and a need for more ownership concentration. 
Conversely, high risks can be the reason for a low ownership concentration (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that investors tend to have low stakes in firms with 
high risks to optimise their portfolio diversification. As a result, increasing risks has a 
negative impact on investors to own large shares in risky firms, hence reducing ownership 
concentration. 
Additionally, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found a U-shaped relationship between risks and 
ownership concentration. They argued that a low risk level is associated with a high incentive 
to monitor the firm. Thus, low-level risks do not affect investor portfolio diversification, but 
instead, they positively increase ownership concentration as an incentive for effective 
monitoring. On the contrary, higher risks render a low ownership concentration. 
Using 500 Canadian firms in his study, Gedajlovic (1993) found that firm size affects 
ownership concentration, but no significant relationship exists between risk and ownership 
concentration. Similarly, based on a sample of public firms in Spain, Crespi-Cladera (1996) 
reported that firm size has a positive relationship with ownership concentration. 
In Boubakri et al. (2005) study involving 209 privatised companies from 39 countries, they 
found that firm growth and size have direct effects on ownership concentration. Hatem (2014) 
used two countries in his study, the UK with its diffused ownership structure and Germany, 
with its concentrated ownership structure. He found that firm size and R&D are linked to 
ownership structure, but ownership structure is not affected by a firm’s profitability. 
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However, Richter and Weiss (2013) doubted that using firm-level factors can determine 
ownership concentration. They argued that using a firm-level factor as the systematic variance 
is not realistic, because unsystematic variances that cannot be clarified by identifiable factors 
will exist. Consequently, using firm-level variables will possibly overstate their effects on 
ownership concentration. Consistent with these arguments, I anticipate positive effects of firm 
variables on the degree of ownership concentration, as expressed in the following hypotheses: 
H3b. The larger the company in a developing country, the smaller the number of 
investors that control it.   
H3c. The older the firm, the smaller the number of investors that control it. 
H3d. There is a positive effect of firm performance on ownership concentration. 
3.3 Empirical Approach 
The previous sections covered the literature review and the empirical evidence concerning the 
determination of ownership concentration. This section aims to present the methodology and 
results used in this study.  
3.3.1 Data  
The data was drawn from Bloomberg, DataStream, and the annual financial statements of 
companies. In order to check the validity and reliability of the data, random data which is 
gathered from both Bloomberg and DataStream, is checked with the annual financial 
statement published formally by the firms. This gives our data the assurance of its validity and 
reliability. Data consists of a sample of publicly listed companies of eight countries from the 
MENA region (Turkey, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain) for 
the period spanning from 2008 to 2014. The initial data set contains 1,263 firms from 
different sectors and 8,841 firm-year observations.  
The countries used in this study were chosen according to the availability of data in the 
database; some countries, such as Iran, have no data available in the databases. Also, because 
the recent political and economic situation has the potential to affect the credibility of the data 
and the performance of the firms, countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Palestine were excluded 
from the study. 
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Moreover, the study took into consideration broad cross-sections to cover the main parts of 
the MENA region, with at least two countries from each section used in the study. So Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain covered the Gulf States; Turkey and Jordan covered the 
Mashreq countries; Tunisia and Egypt covered the Maghreb countries. 
Companies were grouped in three types of industries: financial, manufacturing, and service 
companies. The financial group covers all financial institutions, including insurance 
companies but excluding banks. Banks are excluded because they are subject to different 
regulations and supervisions, different capital structures, and entirely different types of risks 
(liquidity, operational, capital adequacy, interest-rate, etc.), meaning their inclusion might 
distort the results. The manufacturing group comprises of all enterprises that produce goods 
for final use, including energy companies. The service group includes all businesses that 
provide services only, such as education, communications, technology, and utilities. 
After excluding any sample that neither had no performance data or ownership structure data, 
912 firms from different sectors and 5,521 firm-year observations remained. A description of 
the countries and industry data can be found in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1.  
Turkey’s data has 23% of the whole sample; this percentage is not surprising because Turkey 
has the biggest market in the area, with 468 companies (according to Bloomberg as of 
December 2014) in its exchange markets. Jordan and Egypt represent 22% and 20%, 
respectively, of the sample. Bahrain has a very low sample compared to the other countries, 
and this is because it has the smallest market. Although Tunisia has 173 companies listed in 
the exchange market (according to Bloomberg as of December 2014), these companies lack 
financial data. Saudi Arabia and Oman, representing the Gulf countries, have the largest 
exchange markets in the area and represent 28% of the complete sample data. 
Concerning the industry types, service is represented at 51.5% of the total sample while 
manufacturing is the lowest at 20.47%. However, Jordan and Bahrain have approximately the 
same number of financial and service groups.  
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Table ‎3.1  Number of observations in each country 
Country Financial Manufacturing Service Total 
Bahrain 68 13 76 157 
Egypt 303 246 569 1,118 
Jordan 502 218 549 1,269 
Oman 192 156 388 736 
Qatar 14 12 29 55 
Saudi 251 188 396 835 
Tunisia 30 11 38 79 
Turkey 190 286 796 1,272 
Total 1,550 1,130 2,841 5,521 
 
Figure ‎3.1 Data observation according to countries and industries types.  
 
 
3.3.2 Independents Variables 
As discussed earlier, almost all studies about the relationship between ownership 
concentration, firm performance, or the determining factors of ownership concentration, use 
three types of levels – firm, industry, and country. However, different variables of the three 
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levels are used in the cited studies. This section only highlights the variables used in this 
study because of limitations in the sources of other variables. 
3.3.2.1 Firm-level Variables 
The firm-level variables are firm size, firm age, financial leverage, and firm performance. 
Based on the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argument, this study has the aim of examining the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, many 
researchers measure firm size in different ways. For example, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
used total assets as the firm size measurement, but Richter and Weiss (2013) used the 
logarithm of companies’ total market capitalisation. In this study, the firms’ total assets are 
used as the measure of firm size. 
Mak and Li (2001) used firm size as an explanation factor for determining ownership 
concentration. Majumdar (1997) argued that old firms have experience that enables them to 
perform at superior levels when compared to younger firms. Moreover, Leech and Leahy 
(1991) believed that old firms have a long life cycle, enhancing their profits because of their 
years of experience and established reputations. Mueller (1972) stated that because young 
firms have uncertain life cycles, this creates barriers when trying to receive outside funds. 
Hatem (2014) also found that firm age has a significant, positive relationship with ownership 
concentration, arguing that older firms attract more investors than younger ones because they 
are better recognised. 
According to Short (1994), the capital structure depends on the ownership structure. Likewise, 
Stulz (1988) pointed out that insider ownership tends to increase its leverage in avoidance of 
other shareholders taking control over the firm; that is, inside owners can strengthen their 
voting power when they increase their equity in the firm. However, Holderness (2003) found 
no empirical evidence to support Stulz’s hypothesis. Moreover, according to both Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Stulz (1988), high-leverage firms have a high risk that is linked to a 
given stake, which negatively impacts ownership concentration. 
Causality indicates the impact direction among variables. However, many studies have shown 
that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance could 
occur in both directions. Demsetz (1983) viewed the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance as endogenous. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) also doubted 
the causality explanation because of the endogeneity of the two factors (ownership 
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concentration and firm performance). Kole (1996) considered the causality between 
ownership structure and firm performance, showing that high firm performance is a cause of 
an increase in ownership. This means that although corporate governance affects firm 
performance, high firm performance may also attract and form different corporate governance 
mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argued that corporate governance mechanisms 
depend on one another; one mechanism should not be held in isolation from other 
mechanisms. 
Different researchers used various firm performance measurements because of the unique 
characteristics that each performance has; these also depend on the purpose of the study. 
Performance measurements can be categorised into two groups: backward-looking and 
forward-looking (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Accounting ratios are considered backward-
looking and are calculated under the standard constraints of firm accounts. In contrast, the 
market ratio is forward-looking and calculated under the market constraints of the investor 
community. However, many researchers use both accounting and market ratios as 
performance measures to find the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. In this study, three ratios are used. ROA and ROE, representing the accounting 
ratio, and Tobin’s Q, representing the market ratio. 
3.3.2.2 Industry-level Variables 
Omran, Bolbol, and Fatheldin (2008b) used sectoral affiliation to determine ownership 
concentration and did not find a significant relationship between the two. However, Welch 
(2003) documented that the media and financial industries have more ownership 
concentration than other industries. Moreover, a dummy variable for industry classification 
has frequently been used in ownership studies (Richter & Weiss, 2013; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
1998; Van der Elst, 2004). Thus, this study categorises firms into three main industries: the 
financial group (FIN), the manufacturing group (MIN), and the service group (SEV). 
3.3.2.3 Country-level Variables 
In this study, a dummy variable is used to capture country differences. Also following the  
assumption of the essential ROL and ownership protection in ownership concentration, as 
argued by (La Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998), two country-level variables are 
implemented: legal environment and corruption control.  
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For the legal environment, this study uses the ROL index. According to the World Justice 
Project, there are 44 indicators across eight categories: open government, constraints on 
government powers, fundamental rights, regulatory enforcement, criminal justice, civil 
justice, order and security, and absence of corruption. Based on a score range (between -2.5 
and +2.5), a country with a high point total has a strong ROL. As a proxy for legal 
environment efficiency, the ROL index is used to replicate (La Porta et al., 1998) study.  
To capture the degree of governance, the corruption control index is used in this study; it 
ranges from +2.5 to -2.5, with +2.5 being the highest degree of corruption control. The source 
of both indexes is the Global Economy’s Web site (http.//www.theglobaleconomy.com). The 
Web site ‘provides interactive tools with economic data from multiple official sources such as 
the World Bank, the United Nations, the US Energy Information Administration, UNESCO, 
and the World Economic Forum’. Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of these indexes.  
Table ‎3.2 Average legal Environment Indexes 
Rule of Law Corruption Control
Bahrain 0.415 0.307
Egypt -0.360 -0.584
Jordan 0.335 1.742
Oman 0.606 0.211
Qatar 0.960 1.289
Saudi 0.220 -0.044
Tunisia -0.102 -0.136
Turky 0.084 0.057
Total 0.157 0.336  
Finally, for the country level, we used the Arab Spring movement to study the political effects 
on ownership concentration. The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave that started at the end 
of 2010 and changed the rule of local governments. Many factors led to this revolution, such 
as human rights violations, political corruption, economic decline, unemployment, and 
poverty. The Arab Spring movement affected the MENA region either directly or indirectly. 
The countries that were influenced by this revolution and its reshaping of the national 
governments and laws are Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. 
The effects of both macroeconomic and political uncertainty on security markets have 
attracted a great deal of research. For example, Colak, Durnev and Qian (2016) found that 
initial public offerings (IPO) in many American states fall during the time of gubernatorial 
elections because of political uncertainty surrounding these elections. Moreover, Pástor and 
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Veronesi (2013) found that political uncertainty leads to high investment risk and falling asset 
prices. They argue that countries that combine high political uncertainty and a weaker 
economy are subject to higher market volatility. 
(Mahboub & Abdou, 2012) used data from four Arab countries from 1995–2011 and 
concluded that economic conditions was the main cause of the Arab Spring movement. This 
revolution has had a negative impact on those countries, at least in the short term. Ghosh 
(2016) used 102 conventional banks and 26 Islamic banks from 12 MENA countries over a 3-
year period, to study how the Arab Spring movement affected bank profitability. They found 
Islamic banks did not see a drop in performance because of these political effects; though, 
other banks had their profits fall by 0.2%.  
Chau, Deesomsak, and Wang (2014) also examined the impact of the Arab Spring movement 
on conventional and Islamic banks. They showed there was a significant increase in the 
instability of Islamic indices and insignificant impacts on conventional banks. Moreover, 
Ghosh (2016) argued that investment risk increased because of the Arab Spring movement. 
Thus, the ownership concentration of firms were affected by investment risk (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; Stulz, 1988; Van der Elst, 2004). 
To capture the real effects of the Arab Spring movement, a dummy variable was used to 
explain the influences of this political movement. For 2011–2014, a value of 1 was assigned 
to Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain, and a value of 0 was given for the other years. 
The value of 0 was also assigned for 2011–2014 to the other countries. 
3.3.3 Ownership Concentration Measures 
The study used a 5% or more, of a firm’s equity owned by each shareholder, to define 
ownership concentration. Table 3.3 documents the descriptive statistics for ownership 
concentration in each country. Most countries in the study have more than a 50% average 
ownership concentration, except for Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This means that the MENA 
region has a large ownership concentration. This high ownership concentration has been 
reported by (Farooq & El Kacemi, 2011) and (Omran et al., 2008a).  
Egypt has the highest average ownership concentration at about 60% while Saudi Arabia has 
the lowest average ownership concentration at about 37%. Moreover, the overall average of 
42 
 
the sample data is 55%. Table 3.3 shows that all the three industry types have at least 50% 
average ownership concentration each.  
Also, the HHI is also used to capture the dispersion degree of the largest 20 shareholders. The 
index is calculated as the sum of squared ownership for each firm, and it ranges from 0 to 
10,000 points. Cubbin and Leech (1983) said it is important to use the HHI to measure the 
degree of control and in empirical tests.  
 
Table ‎3.3 Average Ownership Concentration in Each Country  
  N Mean minimum maximum SD 
Bahrain 157 59.46 7.85 99.55 22.32 
Egypt 1118 60.89 0.00 99.88 25.02 
Jordan 1269 57.57 5.52 99.75 22.31 
Oman 736 59.17 5.80 99.70 22.36 
Qatar 55 44.65 13.00 70.02 16.12 
Saudi 835 37.21 0.00 94.44 22.08 
Tunisia 79 52.12 14.69 98.52 22.72 
Turkey 1272 57.33 0.00 99.00 23.47 
Financial 1550 50.71 0.00 99.88 23.15 
Service 2841 57.58 0.00 99.70 24.18 
Manufacturing 1130 55.24 0.00 99.75 25.59 
Total / Average 5521 55.17 0.00 99.88 24.37 
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Figure ‎3.2 Theoretical Framework. Determinates of ownership concentration  
Firm levels 
Firm Size  Total assets  
Firm Age  The number of years since firms have been founded  
Financial Leverage  Total debt/Total equity  
Firm Performance  ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q  
Industry level 
Sector Affiliation  Financial, Manufacturing, and Service  
Country level 
Rule of Law  Confidence degree in the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, crime, and violence.  
Corruption 
Control  
Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Regression Model 
The current study has two dependent variables. The first one is the total ownership 
concentration (CON) for the largest shareholders who own 5% or more of a firm’s equity. 
Second is the HHI, which captures the dispersion degree of the largest shareholders; it is 
calculated as the sum of squared ownership for each firm. 
3.3.4.1 Panel data analysis  
A natural way to investigate the factors that affect ownership concentration is by using a 
model, such as the following one, which takes advantage of the panel structure of the data 
uses in this study, which are ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model and random 
effects model :  
           Ownership Concentration 
 Total Concentration (CON) 
 Herfindahl Index ( HHI) 
 
Chapter One  
Chapter Two  
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                                                                                     (7.1) 
Where the following is true: 
 Ownership concentration = Total percentage of largest shareholders (CON) and 
Herfindahl index (HHI) 
 Firm size = Total firm assets 
 Firm age = Period from a firm’s establishment up to 2008, increasing by 1 each year 
afterwards 
 Financial leverage = a firm’s total debt or total assets 
 ROL = rule of law 
 Firm performance = ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, using the previous year’s 
performance under the assumption that the performance of the current year affects the 
ownership structure of the upcoming year.  
 
3.3.4.2 Dynamic Model, the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Using panel-data regressions presents a major problem when considering controlling for 
heterogeneity (unobservable characteristics) between explanatory variables. Thus, the 
repeated observations in this study, exploit time series variations in obtaining consistent 
estimates of the variables that effects ownership concentration. Accordingly, this study 
follows the classical generalised method of moments (GMM), in estimating the parameter 
vector by the value implied, by the corresponding sample moments, in order to control 
heterogeneity between explanatory variables. This method uses assumptions about specific 
moments of the random variables instead of assumptions about the entire distribution, which 
makes the GMM more robust than panel-data regressions. 
The key in the GMM is a set of population moment conditions that are derived from the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression models as follows:  
     
 
                                                                                                                        ( 7.2a) 
Where the dependent variable     and the independent variable is                        is      
m-vector of explanatory variables and   is an m-vector of regression coefficients, and     is an 
error term.  
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The moment condition is:  
             
 
                                                                                                 (7.2b) 
Given data on the observable variables the GMM model finds values for the model 
parameters such that corresponding sample moment conditions are satisfied as closely as 
possible. In this study, the only the single moment of conditions in equation (2b) is used, 
given T observations, the implied sample moment is: 
 
 
          
 
           
 
                                                                                                (7.2c) 
Given the fact that T > m, the empirical moment condition in the study model is:  
          
 
         
           
 
   
                                                                        (7.2d) 
Where y is the dependent variable which is ownership concentration measured by Total 
percentage of largest shareholders (CON) and the Herfindahl index (HHI). X  is the 
independent variables which are: firm size,  firm age, financial leverage, corruption control, 
rule of law, Arab Spring and firm performance, measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q .  
3.3.4.2  2SLS regression model  
However, using panel-data regressions presents a major problem when considering the 
exogenous relationship among the explanatory variables. Thus, the endogeneity issue between 
ownership concentration and firm performance is not addressed in these regressions. 
However, dealing with the endogeneity problem in studying ownership structure is critical 
(Cho, 1998; Demsetz, 1983; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness, Kroszner, & Sheehan, 
1999; Morck et al., 1988).  
However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) believed that instrumental variables (IV) can control the 
endogeneity issue between ownership concentration and firm performance. So to mitigate the 
unobservable heterogeneity that may exist across firms, this study uses a 2SLS. 
In this study, the possible causality between ownership concentration and the independent 
variables in our models can be found in firm performance variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s 
Q). In many studies, ownership concentration has different impacts on firm performance. So 
this study treats firm performances as an endogenous variable. In addition, we use GDP as an 
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instrumental variable; that is, GDP has been shown in a large number of studies to have a 
positive effect on firm performance. This IV was carefully chosen; it is highly correlated with 
firm performance and has no impact on ownership concentration. We ended up with the 
following 2SLS equation. 
                                                            
                                                                           
                                                                                   (7.3a)                                                                         
                                                                                                       (7.3b)                                                                               
Where: LGDP = Log of growth rate of gross domestic product           
Given this 2SLS, first by estimating equation (3b) to obtain the value of the firm performance 
and then replacing this value in equation (3a) to examine the effects of firm performance on 
ownership concentration. However, putting a strong instrument in place is very important to 
avoid weak IV biases (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002).  
Thus, the first stage of the IV test is used to examine the weaknesses of the IV (firm 
performance = log GDP); following Stock and Yogo (2005) tabulation of the significant 
values for weak instruments test, the study rejects the null of a relative bias greater than 10%. 
The test’s results show that the instruments are not weak and are valid in the model.  
Also Table 3.4 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables used in the study, the 
correlations between ownership concentration and most of the independent variables are 
statistically significant. In addition the correlations between the independent variables are not 
high and this gives good indications that the explanatory variables are not affecting each 
other.     
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Table ‎3.4  Correlation Table 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) CON 1.0000
(2) ROA 0.0555* 1.0000
(3) ROE 0.0455* 0.8572* 1.0000
(4) TOBIN Q 0.0477* 0.1837* 0.1511* 1.0000
(5) Rule of Law -0.1069* -0.0619* -0.0506* -0.0588* 1.0000
(6) Arab Spring -0.2048* 0.0767* 0.0725* 0.1166* -0.0334 1.0000
(7) Firm Size 0.0314 0.0039 0.0571* -0.0224 -0.0353* 0.0974* 1.0000
(8) Firm Age 0.0404* 0.1452* 0.1315* 0.1119* -0.3509* 0.1014* 0.0740* 1.0000
(9) Financial leverage 0.0048 -0.0001 0.0012 -0.0018 0.0113 -0.0179 0.0004 -0.0206 1.0000
(10) Corruption Control -0.0102 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0082 0.0720 -0.0146 -0.0019 0.0099 -0.0001 1.0000
*Significant at 1% ; CON = total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity ; ROA =
Return on asset ;ROE = Return on equity ; Firm Size = Total assets ; Firm Age = The number of years since
firms have been founded ; Financial Leverage = Total debt/Total equity ; Arab Spring Dummy variable used
to explain the effects of the political movement ; Rule of Law = Confidence degree in the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, crime, and violence ; Corruption Control = Captures
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. 
 
3.3.5 Robustness Checks 
For robustness checks, to check the validity of the study models, a multicollinearity test was 
conducted by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). Table 3.5 shows the results of 
VIF test; the highest value is 1.14, which is below the suggested largest value of 10. 
Therefore, multicollinearity does not exist in the study’s regression models. 
Table ‎3.5  Multicollinearity Test by Calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  VIF 1/VIF  VIF 1/VIF  
ROA 1.07 0.933
ROE 1.03 0.968
Tobin_Q 1.03 0.973
Rule of Law 1.13 0.888 1.13 0.888 1.13 0.887
Corruption Control 1.00 0.999 1.00 0.999 1.00 0.999
Arab Spring 1.05 0.949 1.05 0.950 1.06 0.941
Firm Size 1.03 0.971 1.03 0.968 1.03 0.970
Firm Age 1.14 0.879 1.13 0.883 1.13 0.887
Financial leverage 1.06 0.944 1.02 0.977 1.01 0.985
Mean VIF 1.07 1.06 1.06  
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3.4 Results  
In order to capture different results from different regression models, the study uses a panel-
data analysis that implements five regression types: ordinary least squares, fixed effects 
model, random effects model, GMM, and 2SLS. Also because of the difference between 
countries and their varying economic environments, labour markets, and capital structures, 
capturing the country effects is important for obtaining good results. As well as controlling 
different industry effects due to product market competition which this study does. Moreover, 
year effects are controlled to find a logical explanation about how each variable is affected by 
time. So, the results in this section are showed in five subsections, subsection 3.4.1 shows the 
Results without Controlling for Country, Industry and Year Effects. Subsection 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 
and 3.4.4 illustrate the results after controlling industry effects, country effects and year 
effects respectively.  In addition to collinearity between the variables, Subsection 3.4.5 
explains the results by using firm variables separately from the other variables, and each 
country variable separately from the other variables.  
3.4.1 Results without Controlling for Country, Industry and Year Effects.  
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 show different regression results regarding the determinates of 
ownership concentration. Regarding the effects of firm performance, it seems that all ratios 
(ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) have some degree of effect on ownership concentration, as 
measured by both CON and HHI. However, not all regression models show the same 
significance levels; in table 3.6 and 3.7 ROA and ROE show a positive significance at the 1% 
level on both CON and HHI when using OLS and GMM regressions. In table 3.8 Tobin’s Q 
appears to have a significant and positive impact on CON in four regression models. 
Nevertheless, none of these performance ratios show any significance after controlling for 
endogeneity and using the 2SLS model.  
Concerning firm factors, firm size shows a different positive significance level with CON and 
HHI every model, except for in fixed effects, which shows that firm size does not have any 
impact on HHI. Also, firm age shows positive significant effects on CON and HHI. Financial 
leverage also shows some level of positive significance with ownership concentration 
indexes, but this does not occur in all regression models. These results indicate that firm level 
is an important part in determining ownership concentration.  
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Rule of law shows a 1% significant negative effect on CON and HHI in all models. However, 
corruption control shows a negative significance at the 1% level with CON in all models, 
except for OLS; it has a different level of significance in different regression models with 
HHI. These results show that rule of law plays an essential role in shaping ownership 
concentration.  
The Arab Spring variable also demonstrates a negative impact on ownership concentration in 
CON at a 1% level of significance in all five models. However, with HHI as the dependent 
variable, the significance level of the Arab Spring variable is different between the models, 
and 2SLS shows the Arab Spring variable having no effect on HHI.  
In conclusion, it is apparent that the different independent variables affect ownership 
concentration at different significance levels. However, these results do not capture the effects 
of industry, country, and year-fixed effects, which may change the results after controlling for 
them. So the next three sections investigate the impact of controlling for industry, country, 
and year.  
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Table ‎3.6   Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎without‎an‎industries,‎countries‎and‎years‎effects.‎ 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROA 0.178*** 0.026 0.03 0.178*** 0.182 0.125*** 0.049 0.053* 0.125*** 0.136
(5.23) (1.05) (1.25) (5.30) (0.48) (4.18) (1.83) (2.02) (4.24) (0.41)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.53) (2.28) (3.92) (4.41) (5.08) (5.05) (1.22) (2.86) (4.66) (5.17)
Firm Age 0.040* 0.094** 0.062* 0.040*  0.032* 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.082*  
(2.00) (3.19) (2.48) (1.92) (0.86) (3.93) (3.46) (3.94) (3.90) (2.50)
Financial leverage 0.302** 0.068 0.028 0.302** 0.392 0.360*** 0.022 0.036 0.360*** 0.216
(2.84) (0.78) (0.34) (2.79) (1.36) (3.87) (0.29) (0.48) (3.97) (0.86)
Rule of Law -4.981*** -25.252*** -19.931*** -4.981*** -4.425*** -8.141*** -10.132*** -9.936*** -8.141*** -8.371***
(-4.93) (-12.35) (-12.38) (-5.15) (-4.25) (-9.21) (-7.36) (-7.87) (-8.99) (-8.64)
Corruption Control -0.01 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.84) (-14.29) (-14.96) (-14.17) (-15.38) (-0.10) (-2.60) (-2.36) (-1.77) (-1.87)
Arab Spring -10.542*** -4.372*** -5.191*** -10.542*** -11.301*** -1.411* -1.419*** -1.425*** -1.411* -1.423
(-15.53) (-9.03) (-10.63) (-15.91) (-13.01) (-2.38) (-4.02) (-4.05) (-2.43) (-1.86)
Intercept 59.845*** 58.792*** 58.703*** 59.845*** 60.204*** 19.182*** 21.171*** 20.824*** 19.182*** 20.036***
(74.59) (57.58) (51.92) (74.70) (46.51) (27.33) (35.79) (24.66) (26.58) (17.38)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.057 0.146 0.144 0.057 0.064 0.055 0.120 0.056 0.054 0.043
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model does not capture the effects of industries, countries and
years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
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Table ‎3.7   Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance measure, without industries, countries and years effects . 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROE 0.076*** 0.02 0.022 0.076*** 0.091 0.048** 0.027 0.029 0.048** 0.068
(3.97) (1.32) (1.51) (3.98) (0.48) (2.85) (1.74) (1.89) (2.92) (0.41)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.38) (2.27) (3.88) (4.23) (4.01) (4.94) (1.16) (2.76) (4.56) (4.83)
Firm Age 0.045* 0.093** 0.062* 0.045* 0.036* 0.073*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.080** 
(2.23) (3.18) (2.47) (2.14) (1.10) (4.15) (3.44) (3.93) (4.14) (2.86)
Financial leverage 0.226* 0.066 0.028 0.226* 0.317*  0.305*** 0.019 0.032 0.305*** 0.271*  
(2.16) (0.77) (0.33) (2.18) (2.03) (3.32) (0.25) (0.43) (3.39) (1.99)
Rule of Law -5.038*** -25.279*** -19.967*** -5.038*** -4.459*** -8.188*** -10.105*** -9.913*** -8.188*** -8.346***
(-4.98) (-12.38) (-12.39) (-5.21) (-4.36) (-9.26) (-7.35) (-7.85) (-9.05) (-8.78)
Corruption Control -0.01 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*  
(-0.84) (-14.27) (-14.93) (-14.13) (-15.38) (-0.09) (2.74) (2.51) (-1.68) (-2.01)
Arab Spring -10.465*** -4.391*** -5.207*** -10.465*** -11.253*** -1.345* -1.428*** -1.432*** -1.345* -1.459*  
(-15.41) (-9.03) (-10.62) (-15.77) (-13.85) (-2.27) (-4.04) (-4.08) (-2.31) (-2.04)
Intercept 60.041*** 58.773*** 58.685*** 60.041*** 60.355*** 19.342*** 21.195*** 20.848*** 19.342*** 19.924***
(74.95) (57.55) (51.91) (75.01) (56.31) (27.61) (35.97) (24.72) (26.74) (20.81)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.055 0.146 0.144 0.055 0.062 0.044 0.110 0.056 0.054 0.044
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model does not capture the effects of industries, countries and
years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
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Table ‎3.8   Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’ performance measure, without industries, countries and years effects. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
TOBIN_Q 1.322*** 0.596** 0.614** 1.322*** 2.454 1.420*** 0.251 0.300* 1.420*** 1.83
(4.99) (2.63) (2.86) (4.79) (0.48) (6.14) (1.84) (2.32) (5.16) (0.41)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.79) (2.27) (3.93) (4.75) (4.17) (5.35) (1.18) (2.85) (4.96) (4.02)
Firm Age 0.045* 0.092** 0.061* 0.045*  0.032* 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.083*  
(2.25) (3.13) (2.41) (2.15) (0.77) (3.96) (3.38) (3.86) (3.96) (2.38)
Financial leverage 0.189 0.073 0.036 0.189 0.267*  0.282** 0.004 0.017 0.282** 0.309** 
(1.82) (0.85) (0.43) (1.84) (2.38) (3.10) (0.05) (0.22) (3.15) (3.14)
Rule of Law -4.906*** -25.270*** -19.935*** -4.906*** -4.145** -8.003*** -9.969*** -9.797*** -8.003*** -8.580***
(-4.85) (-12.38) (-12.39) (-5.09) (-3.10) (-9.07) (-7.17) (-7.71) (-8.90) (-7.04)
Corruption Control -0.01 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.82) (-14.30) (-14.94) (-13.75) (-8.03) (-0.07) (2.65) (2.44) (-1.20) (-1.37)
Arab Spring -10.702*** -4.451*** -5.270*** -10.702*** -11.820*** -1.670** -1.404*** -1.412*** -1.670** -1.037
(-15.70) (-9.20) (-10.78) (-16.11) (-6.72) (-2.81) (-4.09) (-4.14) (-2.86) (-0.68)
Intercept 58.874*** 58.155*** 58.031*** 58.874*** 57.978*** 17.951*** 21.037*** 20.620*** 17.951*** 21.695***
(69.28) (55.03) (49.76) (69.05) (10.17) (24.20) (34.54) (23.92) (23.06) (4.36)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.056 0.148 0.146 0.056 0.059 0.045 0.101 0.056 0.053 0.042
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model does not capture the effects of industries, countries and
years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
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3.4.2 Results Controlling for Industry Effects.  
Different regression results for determinates of ownership concentration, after controlling for 
industry effects are shown in Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11. Concerning the effects on firm 
performance, it seems that even after controlling for the effects the different industry types 
could have, all ratios (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) have some degree of effect on ownership 
concentration, as measured by both CON and HHI. However, like the results above, not all 
the regression models show the same significance level. The results in table 3.9 and 3.10 
demonstrate that ROA and ROE show positive significance both in CON and HHI only by 
using OLS and GMM regressions. While the results in table 3.11 shows that Tobin’s Q 
appears to have a significant positive impact on CON in four regression models. Nevertheless, 
none of these performance ratios show any significance after controlling for endogeneity by 
using the 2SLS model.  
Regarding firm factors, even using a model that accounts for the effects of different industry 
types, firm size shows different positive significance levels with CON and HHI. Also firm age 
shows positive significant effects on ownership concentration indexes in some regression 
models and does so at different significance levels. Also, financial leverage shows some level 
of positive significance with CON and HHI, but not in all regression models. These results 
support the findings above and indicate that firm size is an important part in determining 
ownership concentration.  
There is no change in the results regarding the rule of law. The rule of law negatively 
correlates with CON and HHI at the 1% significance level in all models. Also, corruption 
control shows a negative significance at the 1% level with CON in all models, except for 
OLS, and shows a different level of significance in different regression models with HHI. It 
seems that controlling for the industry effect does not change how rule of law and corruption 
control affects ownership concentration.  
The significance of the Arab Spring movement in this model does not change as before, 
making it obvious that it has a negative impact on ownership concentration, as measured by 
CON and HHI. Thus, controlling for industry effects does not affect the significance of Arab 
Spring movement on ownership concentration.  
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Table ‎3.9  Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎industries‎effects‎only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROA 0.132*** 0.026 0.026 0.132*** 0.2 0.081** 0.049 0.051 0.081** 0.118
(3.85) (1.05) (1.09) (3.89) (0.54) (2.68) (1.83) (1.93) (2.68) (0.37)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.13) (2.28) (3.79) (3.91) (4.59) (4.72) (1.22) (2.76) (4.34) (4.83)
Firm Age 0.015 0.094** 0.056* 0.015 0.005 0.044* 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.044* 0.049
(0.75) (3.19) (2.23) (0.72) (0.16) (2.50) (3.46) (3.71) (2.53) (1.81)
Financial leverage 0.311** 0.068 0.027 0.311** 0.444 0.370*** 0.022 0.037 0.370*** 0.275
(2.94) (0.78) (0.32) (2.70) (1.60) (4.00) (0.29) (0.49) (3.94) (1.16)
Rule of Law -4.993*** -25.252*** -19.798*** -4.993*** -4.353*** -8.168*** -10.132*** -9.883*** -8.168*** -8.313***
(-4.98) (-12.35) (-12.31) (-5.18) (-4.21) (-9.31) (-7.36) (-7.85) (-9.09) (-8.69)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.68) (-14.29) (-14.62) (-11.05) (-9.64) (-0.09) (-2.60) (-2.56) (-1.47) (-1.43)
Arab Spring -10.814*** -4.372*** -5.234*** -10.814*** -11.633*** -1.665** -1.419*** -1.446*** -1.665** -1.796*  
(-16.03) (-9.03) (-10.71) (-16.48) (-14.28) (-2.82) (-4.02) (-4.11) (-2.89) (-2.50)
Intercept 56.390*** 58.792*** 54.810*** 56.390*** 56.903*** 15.960*** 21.171*** 16.788*** 15.960*** 16.350***
(63.44) (57.58) (35.82) (64.45) (61.17) (20.54) (35.79) (13.95) (20.36) (19.54)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.070 0.146 0.144 0.070 0.076 0.051 0.055 0.056 0.051 0.043
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of industries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.10   Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎industries‎effects‎only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROE 0.056** 0.02 0.021 0.056** 0.1 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.059
(2.94) (1.32) (1.40) (2.96) (0.54) (1.73) (1.74) (1.83) (1.78) (0.37)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.01) (2.27) (3.76) (3.77) (3.61) (4.65) (1.16) (2.66) (4.28) (4.53)
Firm Age 0.018 0.093** 0.056* 0.018 0.007 0.046** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.046** 0.048
(0.87) (3.18) (2.22) (0.83) (0.26) (2.61) (3.44) (3.69) (2.64) (1.96)
Financial leverage 0.256* 0.066 0.026 0.256* 0.364*  0.334*** 0.019 0.033 0.334*** 0.322*  
(2.46) (0.77) (0.30) (2.31) (2.35) (3.67) (0.25) (0.44) (3.61) (2.45)
Rule of Law -5.036*** -25.279*** -19.830*** -5.036*** -4.390*** -8.201*** -10.105*** -9.862*** -8.201*** -8.291***
(-5.02) (-12.38) (-12.32) (-5.23) (-4.32) (-9.35) (-7.35) (-7.83) (-9.14) (-8.81)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.67) (-14.27) (-14.60) (-10.94) (-11.67) (-0.09) (-2.74) (-2.71) (-1.63) (-1.60)
Arab Spring -10.767*** -4.391*** -5.253*** -10.767*** -11.594*** -1.627** -1.428*** -1.453*** -1.627** -1.819** 
(-15.96) (-9.03) (-10.71) (-16.40) (-14.91) (-2.76) (-4.04) (-4.14) (-2.82) (-2.65)
Intercept 56.422*** 58.773*** 54.792*** 56.422*** 56.930*** 15.988*** 21.195*** 16.771*** 15.988*** 16.333***
(63.44) (57.55) (35.83) (64.59) (62.19) (20.57) (35.97) (13.94) (20.38) (19.79)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.069 0.146 0.144 0.069 0.074 0.050 0.055 0.056 0.050 0.046
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of industries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.11 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s‎Q‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎industries‎effects‎only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
TOBIN_Q 1.181*** 0.596** 0.603** 1.181*** 2.707 1.287*** 0.251 0.294* 1.287*** 1.594
(4.48) (2.63) (2.83) (4.43) (0.54) (5.60) (1.84) (2.27) (4.68) (0.36)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.35) (2.27) (3.80) (4.20) (3.80) (4.98) (1.18) (2.75) (4.59) (3.76)
Firm Age 0.016 0.092** 0.055* 0.016 0.002 0.042* 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.042* 0.051
(0.80) (3.13) (2.16) (0.76) (0.06) (2.37) (3.38) (3.62) (2.40) (1.64)
Financial leverage 0.229* 0.073 0.033 0.229* 0.309** 0.320*** 0.004 0.018 0.320*** 0.354***
(2.21) (0.85) (0.39) (2.09) (2.59) (3.54) (0.05) (0.24) (3.46) (3.55)
Rule of Law -4.904*** -25.270*** -19.798*** -4.904*** -4.042** -8.014*** -9.969*** -9.749*** -8.014*** -8.496***
(-4.89) (-12.38) (-12.32) (-5.11) (-3.05) (-9.15) (-7.17) (-7.69) (-8.98) (-7.06)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.65) (-14.30) (-14.60) (-10.57) (-7.69) (-0.12) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-1.97) (-0.74)
Arab Spring -11.005*** -4.451*** -5.318*** -11.005*** -12.221*** -1.946** -1.404*** -1.436*** -1.946*** -1.45
(-16.25) (-9.20) (-10.87) (-16.75) (-7.21) (-3.29) (-4.09) (-4.21) (-3.35) (-0.99)
Intercept 55.303*** 58.155*** 54.150*** 55.303*** 54.285*** 14.719*** 21.037*** 16.483*** 14.719*** 17.891***
(59.61) (55.03) (35.04) (60.90) (10.44) (18.18) (34.54) (13.55) (17.90) (3.96)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.071 0.148 0.145 0.071 0.070 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.045
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of industries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
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3.4.3 Results Controlling for Country Effects.  
Tables 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 illustrate the different regression results regarding the 
determinates of ownership concentration after controlling for country effects. The effects on 
firm performance remain unchanged; all performance ratios have some degree of effect on 
CON and HHI. In addition, like the results in the last two sections, the significance level on 
the effect on firm performance and ownership concentration differ in the five regression 
models; thus, using only OLS and GMM regressions, as seen in, in tables 3.12 and 3.13, 
prove that ROA and ROE have a positive and significant relationship with CON and HHI. 
However, Tobin’s Q as shown in table 3.14, have a significant and positive impact on CON in 
four regression models. Also, after endogeneity was accounted for using the 2SLS model, the 
ratios did not show any significant effects on ownership concentration.  
Furthermore, firm size and firm age have the same positive effects on ownership 
concentration after considering the country differences. However, the financial leverage 
shows no significant relationship with CON in the models that previously showed 
significance. This finding can be seen as supporting the discovery in the last two sections and 
indicates that only firm size and firm age are essential parts in the determination of ownership 
concentration.  
The effects of the country-level variables stay the same, even after controlling for country-
fixed effects. That is, rules of law and corruption control negatively correlate with CON at the 
1% significance level. However, only rules of law negatively affect this significance level on 
HHI, while corruption control has a different significance level on HHI, depending on the 
regression model used. These results maintain the findings that rules of law and corruption 
control are key parts in the determination of ownership concentration. 
The Arab Spring variable remains unchanged. This result proves the important effects of this 
factor in ownership concentration measured by CON and HHI. Thus, even when controlling 
for country effects, the Arab Spring has a negative and significant relationship with ownership 
concentration.  
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Table ‎3.12 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎countries‎effects‎only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROA 0.210*** 0.026 0.043 0.210*** 0.391 0.139*** 0.049 0.054* 0.139*** 0.441
(6.30) (1.05) (1.79) (6.30) (0.66) (4.72) (1.83) (2.09) (4.63) (0.85)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(6.30) (2.28) (4.66) (5.04) (5.46) (6.47) (1.22) (3.04) (4.30) (4.52)
Firm Age 0.101*** 0.094** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.084 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.077*** 0.051
(5.04) (3.19) (3.93) (4.82) (1.92) (4.33) (3.46) (4.08) (4.33) (1.36)
Financial leverage 0.264* 0.068 0.039 0.264* 0.469 0.268** 0.022 0.033 0.268** 0.522
(2.56) (0.78) (0.44) (2.37) (0.99) (2.93) (0.29) (0.44) (2.94) (1.29)
Rule of Law -24.240*** -25.252*** -25.204*** -24.240*** -24.171*** -11.130*** -10.132*** -10.191*** -11.130*** -11.942***
(-8.40) (-12.35) (-12.34) (-8.07) (-6.38) (-4.36) (-7.36) (-7.40) (-4.03) (-3.49)
Corruption Control -0.009 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002*  
(-0.84) (-14.29) (-15.48) (-21.70) (-10.90) (-0.15) (-2.60) (-2.34) (-3.63) (-2.40)
Arab Spring -4.541*** -4.372*** -4.377*** -4.541*** -5.433*** -1.651* -1.419*** -1.409*** -1.651* -2.231*  
(-5.32) (-9.03) (-9.03) (-5.34) (-4.77) (-2.19) (-4.02) (-3.99) (-2.27) (-2.28)
Intercept 66.587*** 58.792*** 68.106*** 66.587*** 65.851*** 17.848*** 21.171*** 19.110*** 17.848*** 16.740***
(30.23) (57.58) (15.46) (29.97) (20.64) (9.16) (35.79) (6.62) (10.73) (6.41)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.142 0.146 0.147 0.142 0.150 0.104 0.055 0.056 0.104 0.093
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of countries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.13 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance measure, with countries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROE 0.083*** 0.02 0.028 0.083*** 0.212 0.048** 0.027 0.029 0.048** 0.239
(4.42) (1.32) (1.87) (4.26) (0.65) (2.87) (1.74) (1.92) (2.81) (0.85)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(6.10) (2.27) (4.63) (4.92) (4.32) (6.34) (1.16) (2.95) (4.23) (3.75)
Firm Age 0.106*** 0.093** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.088*  0.081*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.081*** 0.056
(5.27) (3.18) (3.92) (5.05) (2.30) (4.55) (3.44) (4.06) (4.56) (1.71)
Financial leverage 0.171 0.066 0.04 0.171 0.327 0.201* 0.019 0.028 0.201* 0.362
(1.69) (0.77) (0.47) (1.61) (1.22) (2.25) (0.25) (0.38) (2.21) (1.58)
Rule of Law -23.937*** -25.279*** -25.208*** -23.937*** -23.958*** -10.880*** -10.105*** -10.155*** -10.880*** -11.698***
(-8.29) (-12.38) (-12.35) (-7.95) (-6.62) (-4.26) (-7.35) (-7.38) (-3.93) (-3.58)
Corruption Control -0.009 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002** 
(-0.82) (-14.27) (-15.43) (-21.36) (-13.44) (-0.14) (-2.74) (-2.49) (-3.39) (-2.73)
Arab Spring -4.496*** -4.391*** -4.394*** -4.496*** -5.500*** -1.600* -1.428*** -1.417*** -1.600* -2.308*  
(-5.25) (-9.03) (-9.03) (-5.27) (-4.53) (-2.12) (-4.04) (-4.01) (-2.19) (-2.21)
Intercept 67.016*** 58.773*** 68.141*** 67.016*** 66.395*** 18.166*** 21.195*** 19.184*** 18.166*** 17.353***
(30.39) (57.55) (15.46) (30.24) (24.92) (9.32) (35.97) (6.65) (10.93) (8.19)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.139 0.146 0.147 0.139 0.144 0.102 0.055 0.056 0.102 0.085
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of countries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.14 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s‎Q‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎countries‎effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
TOBIN_Q 2.408*** 0.596** 0.761** 2.408*** 4.041 2.168*** 0.251 0.341** 2.168*** 4.553
(9.40) (2.63) (3.09) (5.55) (0.65) (9.59) (1.84) (2.67) (6.99) (0.85)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(6.92) (2.27) (4.70) (5.40) (4.01) (7.10) (1.18) (3.05) (4.63) (3.84)
Firm Age 0.102*** 0.092** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.090*  0.075*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.058
(5.12) (3.13) (3.88) (4.86) (2.50) (4.26) (3.38) (3.99) (4.26) (1.88)
Financial leverage 0.125 0.073 0.051 0.125 0.183 0.177* 0.004 0.013 0.177 0.200*  
(1.24) (0.85) (-0.60) (1.18) (1.57) (2.00) (0.05) (0.17) (1.94) (1.97)
Rule of Law -23.692*** -25.270*** -25.180*** -23.692*** -23.089*** -10.834*** -9.969*** -10.026*** -10.834*** -10.720***
(-8.26) (-12.38) (-12.34) (-7.87) (-7.41) (-4.28) (-7.17) (-7.22) (-3.93) (-3.75)
Corruption Control -0.009 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001
(-0.78) (-14.30) (-15.47) (-20.04) (-7.93) (-0.09) (2.65) (2.42) (-2.31) (-0.60)
Arab Spring -4.661*** -4.451*** -4.463*** -4.661*** -5.595*** -1.824* -1.404*** -1.403*** -1.824* -2.414*  
(-5.48) (-9.20) (-9.22) (-5.50) (-4.25) (-2.43) (-4.09) (-4.09) (-2.53) (-2.13)
Intercept 65.366*** 58.155*** 67.661*** 65.366*** 63.926*** 16.558*** 21.037*** 19.066*** 16.558*** 14.571** 
(29.71) (55.03) (15.35) (29.01) (11.26) (8.53) (34.54) (6.61) (9.79) (3.02)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.150 0.148 0.148 0.150 0.153 0.116 0.054 0.055 0.116 0.100
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of countries fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
61 
 
3.4.4 Results Controlling for Year Effects.  
Results of the determination of ownership concentration after controlling for year effects are 
illustrated in tables 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17. ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q have some degree of 
effects on ownership concentration, as measured by both CON and HHI, even after 
controlling for year effects. Like the other results, tables 3.15 and 3.16 illustrate that both 
ROA and ROE have a positive significance in both CON and HHI, but only when using OLS 
and GMM regressions; there is no significance with the other regressions. However, as shown 
in table 3.17 Tobin’s Q appears to have a significant and positive impact on CON in three 
regression models. None of the firm performance ratios show any significance after using the 
2SLS model.  
Firm size shows no significant relationship with CON and HHI in the fixed and random 
regression models. Moreover, firm age and financial leverage have no significant effects on 
CON. However, firm age still positively affects HHI in all regression models, save for the 
fixed effects model. These results show that controlling the year effects in the regression 
model has an impact on the significance of the relationship, between firm factors and 
ownership concentration.  
Controlling year effects does not change how rule of law and corruption control affect CON 
and HHI. That is, the rule of law still has a negative relationship at the 1% significance level 
with ownership concentration. Also, the effects of corruption control on CON and HHI do not 
change after controlling for year effects. The effects of both rule of law and corruption control 
on ownership concentration are constant in these different situations. The significant 
relationship with the Arab Spring variable and its effect on CON does not change after 
controlling for year effects; there is also no significant effect on HHI.  
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Table ‎3.15   Different Regressions Results using ROA as firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎year‎effects‎only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROA 0.172*** -0.005 0.004 0.172*** 0.171 0.122*** 0.037 0.042 0.122*** -0.133
(5.10) (-0.23) (0.19) (5.12) (0.47) (4.10) (1.42) (1.67) (4.15) (-0.42)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.12) (0.67) (1.52) (4.01) (4.68) (4.86) (-0.28) (1.15) (4.51) (5.00)
Firm Age 0.03 0.022 0.017 0.03 0.021 0.065*** 0.026 0.035** 0.065*** 0.076*  
(1.51) (0.89) (0.76) (1.44) (0.57) (3.70) (1.84) (2.67) (3.68) (2.40)
Financial leverage 0.268* 0.102 0.077 0.268* 0.343 0.347*** 0.008 0.02 0.347*** 0.198
(2.55) (1.37) (1.05) (2.51) (1.23) (3.73) (0.11) (0.26) (3.83) (0.81)
Rule of Law -3.561*** -10.694*** -9.250*** -3.561*** -3.176** -7.574*** -4.216** -4.956*** -7.574*** -7.828***
(-3.54) (-5.13) (-5.67) (-3.72) (-3.08) (-8.51) (-2.94) (-3.78) (-8.32) (-8.05)
Corruption Control -0.006 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(-0.49) (-7.85) (-6.87) (-7.42) (-7.88) (-0.07) (-11.08) (-10.95) (-1.02) (-0.94)
Arab Spring -8.037*** -0.42 -0.826* -8.037*** -8.679*** -0.418 -0.175 -0.195 -0.418 -0.296
(-11.20) (-1.00) (-1.99) (-11.60) (-9.59) (-0.66) (-0.48) (-0.54) (-0.68) (-0.37)
Intercept 50.619*** 46.953*** 46.234*** 50.619*** 51.133*** 15.480*** 16.332*** 15.973*** 15.480*** 16.537***
(40.05) (43.18) (37.11) (38.45) (31.97) (13.83) (22.35) (17.36) (14.17) (11.70)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.083 0.369 0.370 0.083 0.090 0.073 0.150 0.151 0.072 0.080
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of years fixed effects; z-statistics
are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.16 Different Regressions Results using ROE as firms’‎performance‎measure, with year effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
ROE 0.075*** 0.01 0.014 0.075*** 0.085 0.047** 0.023 0.025 0.047** -0.066
(3.96) (0.71) (1.06) (3.96) (0.47) (2.83) (1.55) (1.75) (2.89) (-0.42)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.96) (0.67) (1.50) (3.83) (3.72) (4.74) (-0.32) (1.05) (4.41) (4.70)
Firm Age 0.034 0.021 0.016 0.034 0.024 0.069*** 0.025 0.035** 0.069*** 0.074** 
(1.72) (0.88) (0.74) (1.64) (0.75) (3.91) (1.82) (2.65) (3.90) (2.71)
Financial leverage 0.195 -0.094 -0.07 0.195 0.273 0.292** 0.008 0.018 0.292** 0.253
(1.89) (-1.26) (-0.96) (1.91) (1.77) (3.19) (0.10) (0.24) (3.26) (1.87)
Rule of Law -3.606*** -10.801*** -9.322*** -3.606*** -3.202** -7.613*** -4.204** -4.937*** -7.613*** -7.808***
(-3.58) (-5.20) (-5.72) (-3.77) (-3.15) (-8.55) (-2.94) (-3.77) (-8.37) (-8.14)
Corruption Control -0.006 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(-0.48) (7.86) (6.89) (-7.30) (-7.90) (-0.07) (-11.20) (-11.08) (-1.13) (-0.80)
Arab Spring -7.950*** -0.456 -0.860* -7.950*** -8.620*** -0.344 -0.164 -0.186 -0.344 -0.342
(-11.07) (-1.08) (-2.06) (-11.46) (-10.33) (-0.54) (-0.46) (-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.46)
Intercept 50.763*** 46.892*** 46.178*** 50.763*** 51.240*** 15.608*** 16.323*** 15.966*** 15.608*** 16.454***
(40.15) (43.06) (37.03) (38.54) (34.38) (13.94) (22.29) (17.34) (14.26) (12.68)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.081 0.369 0.370 0.081 0.088 0.076 0.150 0.152 0.071 0.076
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of years fixed effects; z-statistics
are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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Table ‎3.17 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s‎Q‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure, with years effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   2SLS
TOBIN_Q 1.111*** 0.296 0.324* 1.111*** 2.425 1.340*** 0.127 0.18 1.340*** -1.88
(4.24) (1.80) (2.05) (4.23) (0.47) (5.79) (0.89) (1.35) (4.83) (-0.42)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.36) (0.68) (1.52) (4.34) (3.63) (5.15) (-0.31) (1.13) (4.80) (3.72)
Firm Age 0.036 0.021 0.016 0.036 0.019 0.066*** 0.025 0.035** 0.066*** 0.077*  
(1.80) (0.86) (0.71) (1.73) (0.48) (3.77) (1.80) (2.63) (3.77) (2.26)
Financial leverage 0.159 -0.097 -0.076 0.159 0.227*  0.270** -0.006 0.003 0.270** 0.288** 
(1.55) (-1.31) (-1.05) (1.56) (2.01) (2.97) (-0.07) (0.04) (3.02) (2.91)
Rule of Law -3.548*** -10.842*** -9.327*** -3.548*** -2.969*  -7.488*** -4.068** -4.835*** -7.488*** -7.990***
(-3.53) (-5.21) (-5.71) (-3.72) (-2.40) (-8.43) (-2.77) (-3.62) (-8.28) (-6.97)
Corruption Control -0.006 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(-0.47) (7.81) (6.84) (-7.21) (-6.70) (-0.08) (-11.21) (-11.09) (-1.27) (-0.53)
Arab Spring -8.195*** -0.496 -0.896* -8.195*** -9.344*** -0.73 -0.202 -0.219 -0.73 -0.22
(-11.34) (-1.16) (-2.13) (-11.77) (-4.44) (-1.14) (-0.57) (-0.62) (-1.17) (0.12)
Intercept 50.087*** 46.628*** 45.894*** 50.087*** 49.487*** 14.615*** 16.300*** 15.889*** 14.615*** 17.813***
(39.04) (43.32) (36.96) (37.47) (10.81) (12.89) (22.20) (17.23) (13.16) (4.36)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.082 0.369 0.370 0.082 0.083 0.072 0.149 0.150 0.069 0.070
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; To avoid collinearity this
model use one firm’s performance with other country and industry variables. This model captures only the effects of years fixed effects; z-statistics
are within parentheses. 
 
65 
 
3.4.5 Testing The Determinates of Ownership Concentration Using the Random Effects 
Model. 
To control the collinearity between the variables, this study used each firm variable separately 
from the other variables, and each country variable separately from the other variables. 
However, because of the size of the data sample, this test uses CON as the measure of 
ownership constraint and one regression model only. The Housman test and the Breach-Pagan 
test are applied and show that the random effects model is the best one for explaining the 
determination of ownership structure.  
Tables 3.18 demonstrates the effects of firm-level variables on CON and show that firm age 
and firm size are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. However, 
after controlling for year effects, none of those variables have a significant relationship with 
ownership concentration. There is no effect regarding financial leverage on CON when using 
this methodology. Regarding the country variables, Table 3.19 shows the relationship 
between rule of law, corruption control, Arab Spring and ownership concentration. The results 
show that all country variables are statistically significant at the 1% level with CON, even 
after controlling for country, industry, and year-fixed effects. 
In conclusion, this study uses different methodologies and different regression models to 
show the factors that may influence ownership concentration in the MENA region. The study 
indicated that firm performance (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q), firm age, and firm size have 
positive effects on ownership concentration. However, rule of law, corruption control, and the 
Arab Spring movement have significantly negative relationships with ownership 
concentration.  
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Table ‎3.18 Random Regressions Results using Total Concentration (CON) as dependent viable with single firm variable. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001***                0.001*** 0.001                
(3.75) (3.64)                (4.41) (1.41)                
Firm Age 0.064* 0.057*                0.100*** 0.016                
(2.53) (2.27)                (3.93) (0.75)                
Financial leverage -0.025 -0.022 -0.037 -0.074
(-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.42) (-1.00)
Rule of Law -20.067*** -19.780*** -19.975*** -19.896*** -19.641*** -19.798*** -24.865*** -24.890*** -24.791*** -9.241*** -9.154*** -9.200***
(-12.43) (-12.25) (-12.37) (-12.35) (-12.19) (-12.28) (-12.08) (-12.19) (-12.04) (-5.65) (-5.60) (-5.62)
Corruption Control -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-15.18) (-15.00) (-15.21) (-14.84) (-14.64) (-14.86) (-15.20) (-15.48) (-15.29) (7.05) (6.95) (7.06)
Arab Spring -5.237*** -5.141*** -5.253*** -5.282*** -5.195*** -5.299*** -4.549*** -4.347*** -4.592*** -0.820* -0.790* -0.827*  
(-10.75) (-10.60) (-10.75) (-10.83) (-10.70) (-10.83) (-9.39) (-9.02) (-9.45) (-1.98) (-1.90) (-1.99)
constant 60.518*** 59.070*** 60.984*** 56.077*** 54.955*** 56.392*** 71.026*** 68.441*** 71.334*** 46.489*** 46.146*** 46.812***
(71.92) (54.67) (70.16) (39.85) (36.57) (39.46) (16.43) (15.53) (16.41) (44.50) (37.91) (44.42)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.141 0.141 0.138 0.141 0.14 0.138 0.143 0.143 0.14 0.369 0.369 0.369
Industry effect NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
This table presents Random regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; this model test the effects of each firm level with other 
country variables ; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1 – 3 : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years  effects
Models  4 – 6 : only capture industries effects
Models  7 – 9 : only capture countries  effects
Models  10 – 13 : only capture years  effects 
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Table ‎3.19 Random Regressions Results using Total Concentration (CON) as dependent viable with single country variable. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Rule of Law -24.583*** -24.498***                -29.859*** -9.683***                
(-14.61) (-14.59)                (-14.17) (-5.69)                
Corruption Control -0.004*** -0.004***                -0.004*** -0.002***                
(-27.33) (-26.09)                (-30.76) (-7.91)                
Arab Spring -7.061*** -7.105*** -6.761*** -1.277** 
(-13.05) (-13.14) (-12.19) (-2.86)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.90) (3.63) (3.68) (3.77) (3.48) (3.54) (4.72) (4.57) (4.48) (1.44) (1.08) (1.19)
Firm Age 0.090*** 0.126*** 0.082** 0.085** 0.121*** 0.075** 0.131*** 0.143*** 0.093*** 0.02 0.024 0.02
(3.47) (4.27) (3.10) (3.26) (4.06) (2.82) (4.94) (4.72) (3.47) (0.92) (1.10) (0.88)
Financial leverage -0.01 0.038 -0.019 -0.007 0.041 -0.016 -0.034 0.033 -0.022 -0.076 -0.062 -0.069
(-0.12) (0.47) (-0.24) (-0.08) (0.50) (-0.19) (-0.39) (0.41) (-0.27) (-1.04) (-0.88) (-0.97)
constant 55.350*** 50.699*** 56.591*** 51.826*** 47.011*** 52.328*** 67.789*** 55.037*** 59.051*** 45.530*** 43.114*** 44.398***
(50.73) (45.14) (51.83) (33.89) (31.63) (35.87) (15.47) (12.74) (13.69) (38.73) (38.33) (38.59)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.122 0.11 0.103 0.122 0.11 0.103 0.123 0.12 0.104 0.37 0.358 0.359
Industry effect NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
This table presents Random regressions results to find the determents of ownership concentration in the MENA region; this model test the effects of each country level 
with other 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1 – 3 : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  4 – 6 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  7 – 9 : only capture countries  fixed effects
Models  10 – 13 : only capture years  fixed effects 
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3.5 Other robustness checks 
            In order to ensure the robustness of our model in this chapter and like the previous empirical 
chapters (5 and 6), this chapter also completes seven robustness tests as shown in tables 3.20, 
3.21 and 3.22. Each table use single firm performance: ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
respectively. Column (1) shows the regression results when industry is replaced with firm 
fixed effects. Column (2) presents the results using Year-level clustering. Column (3) reports 
the results using two-way clustering by industry and year. As shown in table 4.1 in chapter 
four, Turkey and Egypt represents respectively, 23% and 20% of the total study sample. In 
order to validate the results and to ensure that one country does not affect the results, columns 
(4 and 5) report the results model after excluding Turkey and Egypt. In addition, to eliminate 
the biases of effect of firms’ market capitalisation, firms are divided into two groups, Group A 
with high market capitalisation (above firm size mean) and Group B with low market 
capitalisation (below firm size mean). Results are presented in Columns (6 and 7) by running 
regression for each group only. As noticed in the different regressions outcomes, the results 
are mostly constant in the seven tests, and this strongly supports the robustness of the study 
results.  
3.6 Quantile Regressions 
As an additional test, in this chapter I compare the results of classical least squares (OLS) on 
the effects of different firms performance on two ownership concentration indexes (CON = 
Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity, HHI = Herfindahl 
Index, the squared sum of the largest ownership) by using different quantile distributions and 
using quantile regression outcomes. The purpose of regression is to test the effects of firm 
performance in each ownership concentration quantile, distributed by (10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 
90
th
 percentile). The results are shown in tables 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25 – each table use single 
firm performance: ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q respectively.   
69 
 
 
Table ‎3.20 Robustness‎tests,‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ROA 0.132*** 0.172*** 0.190*** 0.152*** 0.178*** 0.284*** 0.216*** 0.081** 0.122*** 0.131*** 0.098** 0.157*** 0.037*** 0.206***
(3.85) (9.47) (4.30) (3.94) (4.69) (5.14) (4.89) (2.68) (10.24) (3.77) (3.10) (4.93) (0.71) (5.67)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(3.13) (5.40) (3.17) (5.36) (3.78) (4.47) (2.16) (4.72) (14.74) (2.62) (9.43) (5.12) (4.82) (0.26)
Firm Age 0.015 0.03 0.092*** 0.064** 0.045** 0.022** 0.140*** 0.044* 0.065** 0.073*** -0.031 0.070*** 0.028 0.137***
(0.75) (2.02) (4.79) (-2.67) (1.93) (0.85) (4.45) (2.50) (4.64) (3.76) (-1.59) (3.63) (1.13) (5.28)
Financial leverage 0.311** 0.268*** 0.231* 0.239* 0.211* 0.493*** 0.449** 0.370*** 0.347** 0.254** 0.269** 0.264* 0.131 0.678***
(2.94) (6.67) (2.07) (2.00) (1.70) (3.41) (2.78) (4.00) (5.46) (3.02) (2.74) (2.54) (0.97) (5.12)
Rule of Law -4.993*** -3.561 -9.918*** -4.564*** 1.175*** -29.025*** 3.699** -8.168*** -7.574*** -5.231** -7.050*** -9.991*** -27.766*** -2.535*  
(-4.98) (-2.27) (-3.61) (-4.43) (-0.63) (-12.23) (2.60) (-9.31) (-9.82) (-2.90) (-8.35) (-6.35) (-12.50) (-2.17)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.011 -0.011 16.820*** -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 16.689*** -0.002
(-0.68) (-8.72) (-5.73) (-0.92) (-0.91) (7.55) (-1.01) (-0.09) (-1.29) (-0.86) (-0.21) (-0.14) (8.00) (-0.24)
Arab Spring -10.814*** -8.037** -0.419 -13.666*** -10.972*** -11.185*** -9.297*** -1.665** -0.418 0.021 -5.853*** -1.845** -1.113 -2.489***
(-16.03) (-5.74) (-0.38) (-18.30) (-13.27) (-10.56) (-10.14) (-2.82) (-0.65) (0.02) (-9.56) (-2.66) (-1.12) (-3.31)
Intercept 56.390*** 50.619*** 49.369*** 62.583*** 59.185*** 62.079*** 57.667*** 15.960*** 15.480*** 10.632*** 21.790*** 20.345*** 24.591*** 16.349***
(63.44) (31.19) (30.59) (71.89) (49.39) (44.85) (48.50) (20.54) (17.15) (5.72) (30.54) (20.22) (18.98) (16.78)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.083 0.18 0.09 0.065 0.103 0.089 0.093 0.08 0.113 0.062 0.067 0.066 0.073
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
z-statistics are within parentheses
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON)
Firm FE
Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
Firm FE
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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Table ‎3.21 Robustness‎tests,‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ROE 0.056** 0.075*** 0.075** 0.061** 0.076*** 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.029 0.047** 0.044* 0.032 0.060*** 0.032*** 0.094***
(2.94) (6.62) (2.87) (2.76) (3.57) (4.19) (4.48) (1.73) (3.80) (2.30) (1.79) (3.36) (1.23) (4.15)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(3.01) (4.97) (3.05) (5.27) (3.64) (4.27) (2.10) (4.65) (13.69) (2.54) (9.37) (4.99) (4.78) (0.46)
Firm Age 0.018 0.034 0.096*** -0.059* 0.049* 0.027 0.144*** 0.046** 0.069** 0.077*** -0.027 0.075*** 0.028 0.142***
(0.87) (2.19) (4.99) (-2.47) (2.11) (1.00) (4.57) (2.61) (4.95) (3.96) (-1.39) (3.86) (1.12) (5.50)
Financial leverage 0.256* 0.195** 0.146 0.168 0.133 0.319* 0.439** 0.334*** 0.292** 0.191* 0.221* 0.191 0.114 0.641***
(2.46) (4.55) (1.42) (1.43) (1.09) (2.30) (2.71) (3.67) (4.44) (2.16) (2.29) (1.87) (0.88) (4.82)
Rule of Law -5.036*** -3.606 -9.533** -4.615*** -1.206 -28.938*** 3.830** -8.201*** -7.613*** -4.906** -7.093*** -9.957*** -27.877*** -2.508*  
(-5.02) (-2.31) (-3.47) (-4.48) (-0.64) (-12.17) (2.68) (-9.35) (-9.82) (-2.72) (-8.39) (-6.31) (-12.54) (-2.14)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.011 -0.011 16.644*** -0.012 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 16.738*** -0.002
(-0.67) (-8.82) (-5.52) (-0.91) (-0.90) (7.46) (-1.00) (0.09) (1.42) (1.01) (-0.20) (-0.13) (8.03) (-0.22)
Arab Spring -10.767*** -7.950** -0.345 -13.580*** -10.894*** -11.043*** -9.275*** -1.627** -0.344 0.096 -5.778*** -1.755* -1.099 -2.457** 
(-15.96) (-5.76) (-0.31) (-18.18) (-13.17) (-10.41) (-10.11) (-2.76) (-0.55) (0.11) (-9.44) (-2.52) (-1.11) (-3.26)
Intercept 56.422*** 50.763*** 49.654*** 62.762*** 59.381*** 62.679*** 57.621*** 15.988*** 15.608*** 10.850*** 21.926*** 20.513*** 24.513*** 16.334***
(63.44) (31.51) (30.87) (72.22) (49.51) (45.70) (48.42) (20.57) (16.96) (5.80) (30.78) (20.36) (19.13) (16.71)
AdjR-sqr 0.096 0.081 0.1756 0.089 0.065 0.107 0.102 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.061 0.065 0.067 0.065
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
z-statistics are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
Firm FE Firm FE
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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Table ‎3.22 Robustness‎tests,‎using‎TOBIN_Q‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TOBIN_Q 1.181*** 1.111** 2.200*** 1.221*** 1.371*** 1.896*** 1.292*** 1.287*** 1.340*** 2.084*** 1.198*** 1.095*** 1.215** 1.660***
(4.48) (5.92) (5.30) (4.01) (3.95) (3.85) (4.10) (5.60) (8.12) (7.68) (4.81) (3.75) (2.65) (6.45)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(3.35) (5.74) (3.45) (5.54) (4.05) (4.55) (-1.38) (4.98) (14.82) (2.87) (9.64) (5.38) (4.94) (1.25)
Firm Age 0.016 0.036 0.093*** -0.060* 0.049* 0.024 0.141*** 0.042* 0.066** 0.071*** -0.032 0.075*** 0.024 0.133***
(0.80) (2.44) (4.93) (-2.51) (2.14) (0.89) (4.47) (2.37) (5.03) (3.80) (-1.63) (3.88) (0.97) (5.15)
Financial leverage 0.229* 0.159** 0.104 0.149 0.097 0.310* 0.267 0.320*** 0.270** 0.169 0.209* 0.163 0.124 0.497***
(2.21) (4.06) (1.10) (1.27) (0.80) (2.23) (1.68) (3.54) (4.07) (1.92) (2.18) (1.60) (0.96) (3.83)
Rule of Law -4.904*** -3.548 -9.696*** -4.431*** 3.355*** -28.615*** 3.854** -8.014*** -7.488*** -5.277** -6.873*** -9.281*** -27.978*** -2.204
(-4.89) (-2.27) (-3.48) (-4.30) (-0.19) (-12.05) (2.70) (-9.15) (-9.38) (-2.84) (-8.14) (-5.91) (-12.63) (-1.89)
Corruption Control -0.008 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.01 -0.01 16.473*** -0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 16.807*** -0.002
(-0.65) (-8.78) (-5.51) (-0.89) (-0.88) (7.39) (-0.97) (0.12) (1.65) (1.43) (-0.18) (-0.11) (8.08) (-0.18)
Arab Spring -11.005*** -8.195** -0.59 -13.900*** -11.036*** -11.491*** -9.704*** -1.946** -0.73 -0.225 -6.167*** -1.870** -1.396 -3.041***
(-16.25) (-5.79) (-0.53) (-18.44) (-13.29) (-10.76) (-10.48) (-3.29) (-1.09) (-0.25) (-10.00) (-2.68) (-1.40) (-4.02)
Intercept 55.303*** 50.087*** 48.660*** 61.613*** 57.808*** 61.596*** 56.348*** 14.719*** 14.615*** 9.831*** 20.720*** 19.257*** 23.426*** 14.620***
(59.61) (29.06) (30.59) (66.49) (45.93) (42.20) (45.45) (18.18) (14.65) (5.17) (27.32) (18.21) (17.20) (14.43)
AdjR-sqr 0.071 0.082 0.187 0.091 0.065 0.106 0.089 0.089 0.075 0.123 0.065 0.063 0.068 0.63
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
z-statistics are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Firm FE Firm FE
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
 Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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Table ‎3.23 Results of using standard quantile regression,‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
ROA 0.178** 0.128** 0.214** 0.166** 0.204** 0.108** 0.125** 0.019* 0.064** 0.125** 0.157** 0.344**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11)
Firm Size .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001** .001**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.04** -0.025 0.001 0.098** 0.073** -0.014  0.069** 0.004 0.004 0.081** 0.154** 0.202**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Financial leverage 0.302** 0.198 0.355** 0.268* 0.491** 0.035  0.36** 0.148** 0.151** 0.374** 0.465** 0.709**
(0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.35)
Rule of Law -4.981** 1.896 -4.186** -6.957** -8.101** -4.427** -8.141** 0.143 -1.195** -4.513** -8.635** -26.473**
(1.01) (1.45) (1.56) (1.44) (1.23) (1.21) (0.88) (0.33) (0.45) (0.95) (1.28) (3.30)
Corruption Control -0.01 0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.016 -0.025* -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.013  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Arab Spring -10.542** -13.882** -15.816** -11.299** -8.598** -6.273** -1.411** -1.821** -2.179** -2.289** -0.872 -3.266  
(0.68) (0.98) (1.05) (0.97) (0.83) (0.81) (0.59) (0.22) (0.30) (0.64) (0.86) (2.22)
Intercept 59.845** 29.889** 45.834** 60.571** 72.305** 91.002** 19.182** 2.923** 6.459** 11.902** 19.627** 47.623**
(0.80) (1.15) (1.24) (1.14) (0.98) (0.96) (0.70) (0.27) (0.36) (0.75) (1.02) (2.62)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
 Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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Table ‎3.24 Results of using standard quantile regression, using ROE as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
ROE 0.076** 0.085** 0.097** 0.097** 0.063** 0.043* 0.048** 0.015** 0.03** 0.063** 0.069** 0.043  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.045** -0.03 0.012 0.101** 0.076** -0.009  0.073** 0.003 0.007 0.091** 0.159** 0.233**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Financial leverage 0.226** 0.165 0.265 0.143 0.377** -0.04  0.305** 0.147** 0.134** 0.276** 0.323** 0.434  
(0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.34)
Rule of Law -5.038** 0.982 -4.22** -7.015** -8.385** -4.605** -8.188** 0.435 -1.106** -4.509** -8.993** -25.989**
(1.01) (1.43) (1.57) (1.40) (1.28) (1.19) (0.88) (0.33) (0.44) (0.96) (1.32) (3.31)
Corruption Control -0.01 0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.016 -0.025* -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.013  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Arab Spring -10.465** -13.675** -15.874** -11.256** -8.285** -6.232** -1.345** -1.822** -2.2** -2.253** -0.902 -3.176  
(0.68) (0.96) (1.05) (0.94) (0.86) (0.80) (0.59) (0.22) (0.29) (0.65) (0.89) (2.22)
Intercept 60.041** 29.996** 46.107** 60.785** 72.777** 91.169** 19.342** 2.845** 6.402** 11.927** 20.066** 48.341**
(0.80) (1.13) (1.24) (1.11) (1.02) (0.94) (0.70) (0.26) (0.35) (0.76) (1.05) (2.62)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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Table ‎3.25 Results of using standard quantile regression,‎using‎TOBIN_Q‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
TOBIN_Q 1.322** 0.172 1.367** 1.96** 2.352** 1.459** 1.42** 0.038 0.112 0.996** 1.7** 3.849**
(0.27) (0.36) (0.42) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35) (0.23) (0.09) (0.12) (0.25) (0.33) (0.83)
Firm Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.045** -0.011 0.012 0.095** 0.088** -0.004  0.07** 0.004 0.005 0.097** 0.172** 0.205**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Financial leverage 0.189* 0.201 0.168 0.086 0.377** -0.064  0.282** 0.135** 0.146** 0.216** 0.313** 0.404  
(0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.33)
Rule of Law -4.906** 1.748 -3.542** -7.652** -7.752** -3.6** -8.003** 0.331 -0.982** -3.949** -8.397** -24.535**
(1.01) (1.37) (1.62) (1.44) (1.32) (1.35) (0.88) (0.34) (0.44) (0.95) (1.26) (3.16)
Corruption Control -0.01 0.004 -0.003 -0.01 -0.016 -0.025  -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.013  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Arab Spring -10.702** -14.078** -15.838** -11.279** -8.574** -6.515** -1.67** -1.868** -2.257** -2.109** -0.691 -3.972* 
(0.68) (0.93) (1.09) (0.97) (0.89) (0.91) (0.60) (0.23) (0.30) (0.64) (0.85) (2.13)
Intercept 58.874** 29.616** 44.963** 59.24** 69.765** 89.066** 17.951** 2.967** 6.456** 10.652** 17.878** 43.934**
(0.85) (1.15) (1.36) (1.21) (1.11) (1.13) (0.74) (0.29) (0.37) (0.80) (1.06) (2.66)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON) Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
 Variables Explanation in Table 7.3
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3.7 Tobit Regression Model 
This study applies the Tobit Regression Model (TRM) as an additional technique of data 
analysis, because of the nature of the dependent variable. In this study the dependent variables 
(CON and HHI) have limited values, i.e. ownership concentration percentage range from 0 to 
99% only. TRM is more appropriate for the study estimation, because it allows to account for 
the specific distribution of the limited dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2010). In addition, 
Tobit regression is more powerful than other regressions because it make use of all 
observations regardless of whether they are at the limit or above (Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & 
Stratling, 2014). Also, in order to address endogeneity issues, this study use IV-Tobit and the 
Postestimation technique in IV-Tobit.  
Tables 3.26 and 3.27 presents the results of Tobit, IV-Tobit and Postestimation IV-Tobit. 
These results confirm the same results found previously using random effects and 2SLS 
regressions. The results show that country- and firm-level factors partially explain the 
significant segment of ownership concentration. Regarding the country-level factors, ROL 
and has negative effects on both the CON and the HHI. The Arab Spring shows a negative 
relationship with both the CON and the HHI. Firm-level factors play an essential role in the 
degree of ownership concentration. Both firm size and firm age have significantly positive 
relations with ownership concentration. Concerning financial performance, like the results 
found when using random regressions, only Tobin’s Q has a significant positive effect on 
increasing ownership concentration in both the CON and the HHI.  However, because of the 
nature of Tobit regression, the coefficient doesn’t reflect the concrete effects of independent 
variables. Therefore, the study runs Tobit marginal effects in order to understand the effects 
of independent variables using Tobit regression. The coefficient results are different between 
Tobit regression and Tobit marginal effects, however the significance of independent 
variables doesn’t change in both regression models.  
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Table ‎3.26   Different Tobit regressions results, Dependent variables. Total Concentration (CON) 
IV-Tobit   IV-Tobit   IV-Tobit   
Postestimation Postestimation Postestimation
ROA 0.193 0.002 0.001
(4.45) (0.00) (0.00)
ROE 0.089 0.005 0.038
(3.69) (0.02) (0.02)
TOBIN_Q 1.119** 0.406 0.174
(2.90) (0.07) (0.07)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.29) (4.48) (4.48) (4.17) (4.29) (4.29) (4.45) (4.24) (4.24)
Firm Age 0.056*** 0.067** 0.008** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.008** 0.070*** 0.073** 0.009**
(1.26) (0.92) (0.92) (1.42) (1.05) (1.05) (1.53) (0.80) (0.80)
Financial leverage 0.242 0.267 0.114 0.161 0.259 0.069 0.115 0.246 0.015
(1.67) (0.75) (0.75) (1.14) (1.24) (1.24) (0.82) (1.52) (1.52)
Rule of Law -4.602*** -3.979** -1.703** -4.640*** -3.943** -1.981** -4.553*** -3.862*  -1.654*
(-3.41) (-2.74) (-2.74) (-3.44) (-2.76) (-2.76) (-3.37) (-2.17) (-2.17)
Corruption Control -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
(-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.92)
Arab Spring -13.309*** -14.092*** -6.033*** -13.233*** -14.102*** -5.651*** -13.418*** -14.259*** -6.109***
(-14.80) (-12.26) (-12.26) (-14.72) (-12.99) (-12.99) (-14.78) (-6.63) (-5.63)
Intercept 63.017*** 63.868*** 63.205*** 63.867*** 62.364*** 63.499***
(56.77) (38.39) (57.02) (45.11) (53.08) (9.39)
AdjR-sqr N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,522 5,523 5,524 5,522 5,523 5,524 5,522 5,523 5,524
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Tobit IV-Tobit   Tobit IV-Tobit   Tobit IV-Tobit   
Dependent variable :  Total Concentration (CON)
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Table ‎3.27  Different Tobit regressions results, Dependent variables.  Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
IV-Tobit   IV-Tobit   IV-Tobit   
Postestimation Postestimation Postestimation
ROA 0.11 0.115 0.0138
(4.51) (0.44) (0.44)
ROE 0.044 0.057 0.056
(3.23) (0.44) (0.44)
TOBIN_Q 0.913*** 1.503 0.189
(4.53) (0.42) (0.42)
Firm Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(6.01) (6.52) (6.52) (5.88) (6.07) (6.07) (6.25) (5.08) (5.08)
Firm Age 0.069*** 0.078** 0.009** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.009** 0.071*** 0.079** 0.010**
(4.75) (3.03) (3.03) (4.97) (3.46) (3.46) (4.95) (2.87) (2.87)
Financial leverage 0.322*** 0.204 0.041 0.271*** 0.247*  0.034* 0.249** 0.277** 0.035**
(4.06) (1.01) (1.01) (3.50) (2.18) (2.18) (3.23) (3.29) (3.29)
Rule of Law -6.076*** -6.305*** -0.763*** -6.117*** -6.286*** -0.768*** -6.024*** -6.485*** -0.819***
(-8.39) (-8.05) (-8.05) (-8.44) (-8.18) (-8.18) (-8.31) (-6.54) (-6.54)
Corruption Control -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.10)
Arab Spring -1.200* -1.208 -0.151 -1.147* -1.238*  -0.144* -1.324** -0.891 -0.113
(-2.47) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-2.36) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.71) (-0.72) (-0.72)
Intercept 17.411*** 18.133*** 17.549*** 18.045*** 16.706*** 19.492*** 19.492***
(30.19) (19.68) (30.50) (23.58) (27.14) (4.91) (4.91)
AdjR-sqr N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,522 5,523 5,524 5,522 5,523 5,524 5,522 5,523 5,524
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Tobit IV-Tobit   Tobit IV-Tobit   Tobit IV-Tobit   
Dependent variable :   Herfindahl Index ( HHI )
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3.8 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study seeks to provide a logical explanation of the factors that determine ownership 
concentration in firms in the MENA region. Exclusively, the study contains a look at the 
importance of three main factors (country, industry, and firm levels) in shaping ownership 
structure in this region. There has been a consideration of the two main lines of thought that 
can influence the degree of ownership concentration within countries: their laws and cultures 
(Holderness, 2017).  
The results show that country- and firm-level factors partially explain the significant segment 
of ownership concentration. Regarding the country-level factors, ROL and corruption control 
have negative effects on both CON and HHI as proposed in the hypothesis (H3a). These 
results align with (La Porta  et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998) theory, which states the degree 
of the law that protects investors in public firms and is negatively related to the level of 
ownership concentration. These results give clear evidence that shareholders are not confident 
with the law and legalisation that protects their investment in MENA region; accordingly, 
shareholders increase their voting right in the firms they are invested in. Thus, shareholders 
will have the ability and the power to protect their investment from a firms’ management and 
mitigate agency problems. This can explain why public firms in MENA countries are 
characterised by high level of ownership concentration.   
Moreover, the Arab Spring movement has a negative relationship with both the CON and 
HHI. Thus, the average ownership concentration is decreased by the MENA nations’ 
revolutions. This may be caused by the investment risk of the affected countries. That is, 
countries that combine high political uncertainty and weaker economy are subject to higher 
market volatility (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). Owners who have doubts about the legal system 
want to protect their investments, so it is possible that when investors face high investment 
risk in this situation, the shareholders decrease their investments. This finding supports that of 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997), who argued that the degree of shareholder protection affects 
the ownership structure.  
This study also indicates that firm-level factors play an essential role in affecting the degree of 
ownership concentration. Both firm size and firm age affect significantly and positively 
ownership concentration, as stated in the hypothesis (H3b and H3c). Thus, this study’s results 
are in line with other research found in U.S and Europe (e.g. Gedajlovic (1993) and Crespi-
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Cladera (1996)), showing that industry and firm size affect ownership structure and provide 
the first evidence of these effects in MENA region. 
Concerning financial performance, all firm performances have positive effects but in different 
degrees of significance as proposed in hypothesis (H3d). Tobin’s Q has a significant positive 
effect on increasing ownership concentration in both the CON and HHI. This may explain 
why future market performance attracts investors more than past performance does (ROA and 
ROE). In addition, according to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) in their Q-theory of mergers, 
the rate of a firm’s investment is increased by a high Q ratio. In addition, Shim and Okamuro 
(2011) believed that firms with a high Tobin’s Q value have positive impacts on other firms 
regarding merger probability. Duggal and Millar (1999) believed that investors search for 
efficient firms to invest in, thus Tobin’s Q is the measure of efficiency utilised (Lang, Stulz, 
& Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991).  
The effects of firm performances show contradictory results when using the random effects 
and 2SLS models. This indicates that firm performance may have some degree of influence 
on ownership structure. However, the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance can be endogenous, which was supported by Demsetz (1983).  
In conclusion, the study has investigated the determinants of ownership concentration in the 
MENA region and employed three types of levels, comprising of firm-, industry- and country-
level. It has found the endogenous relationship between firm performance and ownership 
structure. Moreover, the ownership structure in the public firms in MENA countries is highly 
affected by the degree of law in this region. Finally, this study confirms that the revolution 
called the Arab Spring has an effect on the degree of ownership concentration. 
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Chapter Four : The Effects of Ownership Concentration on 
Firm Performance. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The agency theory is about the problems between two main parties in the firms (owner and 
manager). A conflict of interest between them is defined as the ‘agency cost’, and there are 
mechanisms that mitigate these costs (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, many researchers argued 
that agency relations and agency costs are the basis of corporate governance.  
Adam Smith (1776) stated the following: 
The directors of such (joint stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. 
The agency problem starts when there is someone who acts on behalf of somebody to 
accomplish something (Thomsen, 2008). Specifically, it is the relation between the owner of a 
property, called the principal, who gives another person the authority to run that property, 
called the agent. Because both parties (the principal and the agent) have different goals and 
different behaviours and decisions, this creates differences in the way work is done and the 
attitude taken toward risks.  
This issue was discussed many centuries ago and was first highlighted by Adam Smith. In his 
book, Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Adam Smith realized that when one or more 
groups of people act on behalf of the owner to run the firm, they either do not achieve the 
principal goals or the objectives are likely to be diluted. After recognising this agency 
problem, other, more recent theories have been developed.  
Berle and Means (1932) stated that agency problem starts when there is a separation between 
ownership and control. Later, the idea was followed up in depth by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). They came up with a more in-depth concern of ownership-control separation that is 
related to the economic theory of the firm. They first identified the manager as the ‘agent’ 
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who is hired by the owner of the firm (principal) to increase the owner’s wealth. However, 
because the agent does not own the firm’s resources, the agent may try to find a way to use 
the firm’s resources for his or her personal benefit. Also, an agency problem occurs because 
agents intend to hide some important information from the owner for their own benefit 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
One way of preventing agents from misusing the resources of the firm for their personal gain 
is by closely monitoring their actions. Nevertheless, shareholders with a small portion of firm 
equity either have no incentive or no power to monitor the firm. A larger shareholder works 
effectively in this matter. This chapter shows the role of ownership concentration in the 
agency problem by empirically investigating the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.  
The relation between the structure of ownership and firm performance has been debated over 
in corporate governance literature. In fact, this topic has received a considerable amount of 
research (Jiang, 2004). Thus, there are many pieces of literature on this topic that have 
different results and opinions. However, the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance can be affected by different factors among countries, like prevailing institutional, 
legal and economic (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Moreover, (Karaca & Ekşi, 2012) argued 
that there are two implications in ownership structure: ownership identity and ownership 
concentration. 
This topic was first discussed by Berle and Means (1932), who suggested that there is a 
connection between negative firm performance and the broad dispersion of shareholdings, 
because of the agency problem. According to (Tsegba & Ezi-Herbert, 2011), ownership 
structure is a part of corporate governance that ensures the ethical behaviour of managers. 
Equally important, Turki and Sedrine (2012) believed that ownership structure works as a 
controlling mechanism of corporate governance and enhances firm performance and the 
wealth of shareholders. Furthermore, Zhuang (1999) argued that ownership structure is a 
critical factor of corporate governance. Similarly, Fazlzadeh et al. (2011) believed that 
ownership structure has major effects on enhancing firm performance and the corporate 
governance system. The ownership structure is a mechanism that can be used to minimise the 
asymmetric flow of information in the markets between insiders and outsiders (Shah & 
Hussain, 2012).  
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However, Demsetz (1983) stated that the ownership structure of a firm should be viewed as 
endogenous, that ownership concentration is an outcome of trading of shares on the market. 
Similarly, Lee (2008) argued that an ownership structure is formed by market forces as a 
result of profit-maximising incentives. Also, ownership structure is modified when the 
company’s owner decides to sell part of the company to the public (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001).  
Lee (2008) argued that if there is no endogenous relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance, then the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance 
should be systematic, and there should be no mixed evidence in this relation. Also, Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) believed that there is no relationship between variations in ownership 
structure and variations in firm performance. Likewise, Demsetz (1983) disagreed that there is 
a relationship between ownership concentration and firm profit. 
The roles of ownership structure in enhancing firm performance were addressed in theoretical, 
practical, and empirical studies. Corporate ownership structures include the dominant or 
largest shareholder, concentrated ownership, insider (board or managerial) ownership, foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, and government ownership (Tsegba & Ezi-Herbert, 
2011).  
Some studies indicated that blockholders play an essential role in reducing agency costs; 
however, other studies showed different results. Nyman and Silberston (1978) argued that 
control should be viewed from a power standpoint rather than a structural one. Thus, 
concentrated ownership will give the power to shareholders and allow them to control 
managers’ activities, enhancing the efficiency in management and improving firm 
performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In the same way, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
believed that ownership concentration is an essential element of the corporate governance 
mechanism, one that blockholders have the control over in their invested firms. Moreover, 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) stated that manager behaviour cannot be 
controlled in a diffused ownership structure and that managers with no direct supervision 
from owners enable them to work toward benefitting themselves.  
Moreover, Zhuang (1999) argued that ownership concentration shows the distribution of 
power between the shareholders and managers. He believed that shareholder monitoring 
becomes weak if the ownership is diffused, and this results in low control over the firm. 
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Furthermore, blockholder monitoring reduces agency problems between shareholders and 
managers (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership 
concentration gives owners an effective way to monitor managerial performance. 
Accordingly, larger shareholders are likely to put pressure on managers to act towards 
maximising the firm’s value (Pivovarsky, 2003). Additionally, Ehikioya (2009) argued that 
the best way to safeguard the shareholders’ wealth in markets with weak legal systems is by 
having concentrated ownership.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) believed that shareholders will target their interests if the 
ownership is concentrated and consequently, there will be agency costs involved. 
Nevertheless, very high ownership concentration gives the opportunity for dominant 
shareholders to have the power to prevent expropriation from minority shareholders (La Porta  
et al., 1999). Furthermore, according to Zhuang (1999), the main issue with concentrated 
ownership is the conflict between the major shareholders and the minority ones. He argued 
that large shareholders may use their power over the firm to get what they want at the expense 
of the minority shareholders.  
However, blockholders’ roles differ over time and places, according to the legal system and 
different regulations available in each country (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). Also, according to 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), ownership structure varies across corporations because of 
different situations facing firms, such as economic scale and environment stability. In 
addition, the governance needed for each corporation is affected by the presence or absence of 
a dominant or largest shareholder with a material interest in the firm (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). 
Also, Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011) argued that large shareholders reduce the 
market liquidity of a firm’s publicly traded shares. 
This chapter investigates the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance in the MENA region. This study contributes to the existing literature in two 
ways. Firstly, to the best knowledge of the author, it is the first study to comprehensively 
examine this matter in the MENA region. Also, this research is the first of its kind to examine 
the effects of political factors, including the Arab revolution (Arab Spring), on firm 
performance of companies in the MENA region.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. There is a review of the existing literature that 
considers firm, industry, and country factors. Next, the variables and methodology used in 
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this study are explored. The results are given. And finally, there is a discussion of the results 
and a conclusion.  
4.2 Review of Existing Literature and Hypotheses Development 
In the UK, Leech and Leahy (1991) investigated the relationship between ownership 
concentration and company behaviour and performance. They believed that this relationship 
depends of the definition used to identify the ownership concentration – whether it is the total 
percentage of equity owned by largest shareholder or if it is the degree of control by 
blockholders. Regardless of the ownership concentration identification types, they found that 
ownership concentration has significant effects on firm performance. The study indicated that 
control is exogenous, but ownership concentration is endogenous; ownership concentration 
depends on firm size, diversifiable risk, and product diversification, while the control 
classification is independent of the size of the firm.  
Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) studied the causes and the effects of concentration ownership 
and firm performance in European countries. They found that both economics and national 
systems have a significant effect on ownership concentration. Thus, the size of the firms 
decrease the concentration of ownership, but profit volatility increases it. Furthermore, 
institutional differences, such as financial market size and the size of the banks involved, have 
a strong effect on ownership concentration. The study also showed that institutions, law, and 
culture have an important role in shaping ownership structure and corporate governance. This 
study did not show any relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
when measuring the relationship by return on asset (ROE). The authors believed a causal 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance exists within national 
boundaries. Knowing these causal mechanisms may help firms find the best ownership 
structure.  
In another study done by Becker et al. (2011), the authors examined the relationship between 
non-managerial individual shareholders and firm performance, and they looked at this 
relationship using the geographic criteria of firm location in publicly traded U.S. firms. They 
found that blockholders are systematically allocated to firms rather than randomly allocated, 
and this is based on where the blockholders can increase their monitoring for more significant 
benefits. The authors found that large shareholders have significant economical and statistical 
effects. They influence firm policies and reduce both the firm’s investments and corporate 
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cash holdings, increase the payments for shareholders and reduce total top-executive pay. But 
the authors pointed out that large shareholders can be a disadvantage to firms because they 
reduce firm liquidity by lowering firms’ shares trading in exchange markets.  
Ellili (2011) conducted research in the United Sates and found that blockholders have 
negative effects on firm performance. He found that blockholders do not attempt to have 
ownership in firms with high level of debt because of the high risk of bankruptcy. (Demsetz 
& Villalonga, 2001), using 2SLS regression to control for endogeneity, conducted research in 
the United States and documented no significant relationship between the largest shareholder 
and firm performance. They used a previous data sample from a study done by (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985) who concluded a negative effect of large shareholder on firm performance by 
using OLS and without taking endogeneity between ownership concentration and firms 
performance  into consideration. 
Francia, Porter, and Sobngwi (2011) studied 302 U.S. trucking firms to find how public and 
private equity influence the financial performance (ROA) of these firms. The study found that 
ownership structure had no role in determining the profitability difference in the trucking 
industry. However, they found that growth of public firms is faster than private firms. In 
addition, they also found that private firms stop growing after reaching a positive growth 
point, while public firms keep growing.  
In Greece, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) used data from 175 firms to investigate the 
relationship between concentration ownership and firm performance. They used two firms 
performance measures: Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit rate. They found that ownership 
concentration lead to more discipline in management behaviour, which leads to better 
performance. When they used the Herfindahl index as a proxy of concentration degree, they 
found no significant relationship between concentration ownership and firm performance. 
However, Hamadi (2010) investigated the relationship between powerful controlling 
shareholders and firm performance using Belgian-listed firms. The author used Tobin’s Q to 
measure how controlling shareholders in family-owned firms and non-family-owned firms 
can influence firm performance. He found that the largest shareholders have a negative 
relation with firm performance and the second largest shareholder has no impact on 
performance. However, large shareholders have positive effects on family-owned firms. But 
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when large shareholders have more control over these firms, the effect turns out to be 
negative.  
To control ownership endogeneity and to reduce any unobservable heterogeneity, De Miguel, 
Pindado, and De La Torre (2004) used the generalised method of moments (GMM) to 
investigate the relationship between concentration ownership and the value of Spanish firms; 
they did this using the market value of equity as the value proxy. The researchers found that 
ownership between 0–87% has positive effects on firm value, and beyond this percentage, it 
affects a firm negatively. However, the researchers also found that a high level of ownership 
concentration in Spanish firms has the power to expropriate the minority shareholders’ 
wealth. They concluded that despite controlling endogeneity, ownership structure matters, and 
there are different relationships between ownership structure and firm value across countries. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) conducted a comparative study and examined the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm profitability, as measured by ROA. The 
researchers used five countries (Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) to find how different institutions and economies affect corporate governance. 
They found a negative relation in both the United States and Germany. In the UK, there was a 
positive relationship, and managers in concentrated firms were found to be more effective in 
resolving agency problems. In both France and Canada, there was no relationship found 
between ownership concentration and firm profitability. The researchers documented that the 
type of institution plays a major role in forming corporate governance and strategic behaviour. 
The researchers also concluded that there are different relationships between ownership 
concentration and firm profitability across countries, because of the different constraints 
facing managers in different institutional contexts.  
Thomsen et al. (2006) conducted another comparative study and used the Granger test to 
examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and firm value in the European 
Union and the United States. The researchers found that a relationship exists when 
blockholder ownership is more than 10%. They found no relationship between blockholder 
ownership and firm value either in the United States or the UK. But there is a negative 
relationship in the other countries of the EU. The researchers suggested conflicts of interest 
between blockholders and minority investors. Although blockholders have the power to 
monitor management behaviour, which benefits the firm and the other shareholders, the 
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blockholders use this power to take advantage of the firm’s resources for their own benefit at 
the expense of other shareholders.  
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2017) used non-listed firms in 28 Central and Eastern European 
countries. They found significant effects of ownership concentration on firm performance; 
however, this was found to be a U-shape relationship. They gave evidence that supported the 
agency problem regarding the distribution of ownership concentration that leads to the 
problem of ‘private benefits of control’ with the increase of ownership concentration. 
Contrary to the previous studies, Krivogorsky (2006) found that concentration positively 
affects firm profitability (ROE, ROA, and MTB). The author used 87 European firms acting 
as foreign U.S. registrants between 2000-2001; the author’s goal was to understand the 
harmonisation of accounting practices. Also, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) used 435 
companies from 12 European countries to examine the relationship between ownership 
concentration and company economic performance. To control any other factors that may 
influence corporate control, the researchers took into consideration the capital structure, 
industry, and nation effect. The study found a bell-shape relationship of ownership 
concentration on the asset returns and market-to-book values. They believed that ownership 
identities (family, bank, institutional investor, or government) have an important role in a 
firm’s strategy and performance. That is, the market-to-book values have a positive relation 
with institutional ownership and a negative relation with family ownership or government 
ownership. On the other hand, family ownership has a positive effect on sales growth. 
Although this study addressed the ownership endogeneity and causal effects, the study did not 
have a definite answer about the direction of causality.  
In Croatia, Dzanic (2012) used 119 firms and their data from between 2003–2009, to examine 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The researcher 
found that ownership concentration has negative effects on Tobin’s Q when blockholders own 
more than 30% of the firm’s equity, but there is no relationship with ROE. However, 
Tomicic, Coric, and Calopa (2012) examined the effects of ownership concentration on 
Croatian banks. The researchers used 32 banks and chose return on average assets (ROAA) 
and return on average equity (ROAE) as the banks’ performance indicators. Banks in Croatia 
have a very high concentration of ownership, and 89% of the banks’ equity is controlled by 
the top 10 largest owners. The first largest owner controlled, on average, 60% of the bank’s 
equity. The researchers found a significant relationship between ownership structure and the 
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banks’ performance. The authors believed that other corporate governance factors, such as 
innovation rate, market share, and time to market, should be studied further.  
Cabeza-Garcia and Gomez-Anson (2011) tried to find the link between ownership 
concentration in post-privatisation firms and the efficiency levels of ownership concentration. 
They used 126 Spanish firms and set controls for market competitiveness, economic cycle, 
firm size, and prior performance, to control any endogeneity between firms’ performance and 
ownership concentration. They believed that ownership structure in a post-privatisation 
company could be endogenously determined by other factors such as public information that 
comes out during the process of the privatisation. The study found a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and the firm’s efficiency measure, which was measured by 
real sales relative to the number of employees. However, the researchers also found that the 
way a company is privatised, industry type, the size of the firm, and level of risk, determine 
the differences of ownership concentration. 
Setia-Atmaja (2009) studied the effects of ownership concentration on board and audit 
committee independence, and how this influenced the studied Australian firms’ performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q. The researcher found that there is no significant relation between 
ownership concentration and audit committee independence, but there is a negative relation 
with board independence. The author argued that large shareholders may not want any 
interruption from independent boards, which is the ‘the rent extraction argument’. In addition, 
the power that concentrated ownership has in monitoring management may substitute for the 
need for independent directors on the board, which is ‘the substitution argument’. Moreover, 
Gaur, Bathula, and Singh (2015) used firms listed in New Zealand between the years 2004–
2007 and found that firms with a high ownership concentration perform better than firms 
lacking this concentration.  
Furthermore, Fauzi and Locke (2012) argued that a higher level of blockholders increases the 
agency problem because of the power they have to influence decisions made by the board. 
They used the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity control and found there is no 
endogeneity between corporate governance and firm performance for the studied firms in 
New Zealand. They concluded that a higher proportion of blockholder ownership decreases 
firm performance.  
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On the other hand, Reyna, Vázquez, and Valdés (2012) examined the relationship between 
concentration ownership and firm performance in Mexico. They used a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) analysis and generalised the method of moments (GMM) to control the 
ownership structure endogenously, and to give the suitable environment characteristics in 
which the company operates. They reported that 44% of Mexican firms are concentrated in 
families. However, this family concentration increased the Mexican firm’s use of additional 
governance mechanisms, such as debt or board structure, to protect their interests. The 
researchers concluded that high levels of ownership concentration, especially when it involves 
families, have a positive relationship with firm performance.  
In Japan, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) found a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance; they used 334 Japanese corporations between 1986–
1991. The researchers suggested that ownership concentration in Japanese firms can enhance 
firm performance in two ways. Blockholders have the effectiveness to monitor top 
management. Also, they have the ability to shift financial resources from profitable firms to 
poorly performing firms The authors also found that investors play a big role in firm 
performance. However, this identity depends on the investment objectives and the capacity to 
control firm behaviour. 
Hu and Izumida (2009) used the Granger causality test on Japanese manufacturing firms to 
examine the causal relationship between the concentration of ownership and firm 
performance. The researchers used Tobin’s Q and ROA as the performance indicators, and 
both investment and leverage were used as transmission mechanisms. They found U-shaped 
effects of ownership concentration on firm performance, but no effect on performance 
regarding the concentration of ownership. The authors believed that ownership concentration 
is exogenous to a firm’s performance, and that in a market with non-liquid securities, large 
shareholders are not willing to change their portfolios as a change in firm performance. They 
also argued that in a weak regulated market, powerful shareholders take action to establish the 
‘rules of the game’.   
Harada and Nguyen (2011) used a large sample of Japanese firms to find the link between the 
concentration of ownership and firm dividend policy. They used the dividends-to-book value 
of equity (DIVEQT) and dividends to operating income (DIVTOI) as the measures of this 
relationship; ownership endogeneity was taken into consideration. The researchers found that 
ownership concentration has significantly lower dividends in both the variables used in the 
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study. This relationship even exists with high-earning firms that have less debt. The authors 
suggested that a free-cash-flow problem is not controlled using a dividends policy in firms 
with a high ownership concentration. Moreover, the agency problem exists when there are 
conflicts of interest between large (majority) and small (minority) shareholders.   
Z. Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) analysed 412 publicly listed Hong Kong firms, 
using data between 1995–1998, to find if concentrated family ownership affects firm 
operating performance and value. They did not show any positive relationship between family 
ownership and ROA, ROE, or Tobin's Q. They documented that concentration ownership has 
no connection to better firm value or performance. In fact, they found that in family-
controlled firms, there is more CEO duality, and this duality has a negative impact on firm 
performance. In addition, they concluded that in small firms, a significant negative 
relationship exists between family ownership and dividend pay-outs when the family has less 
than 10% of the firm’s equity, and there is a positive relationship when the family has 10–
35% equity.  
In South Korea, Lee (2008) used 579 firms’ panel data from between 2000–2006, and he 
found that when ownership concentration increases, it positively affects firm financial 
performance, which was measured by the net income to total assets ratio (NIA) and ordinary 
income to total assets ratio (OIA). However, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance was found to be a hump-shaped relationship. Thus, the 
best firm financial performance was recorded when the ownership concentration was at the 
intermediate level.  
Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) studied the effects of concentration ownership and the quality of 
the auditors in firm information, and how this information affects share price, as measured by 
stock price synchronicity in the Chinese market. The researchers found that synchronicity 
increases when ownership concentration increases to some level, and beyond that level, it 
starts to decrease. They found that the big four auditors mitigate synchronicity and that these 
auditing firms ensure reliable and accurate financial reports. The authors believed that 
information from a firm’s capitalisation can be maintained by reducing ownership 
concentration. However, K. Li, Lu, Mittoo, and Zhang (2015) used 1,241 Chinese firms, and 
they chose ROA and Tobin’s Q as the performance measures. They found that ownership 
concentration is positively related to corporate performance. The authors argued that 
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ownership structure is an efficient corporate governance mechanism that enhances Chinese 
firms’ performance.  
Also in China, Shiguang, Naughton, and Tian (2010) investigated the effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance by categorising concentration ownership as tradable or 
non-tradable. Thus, in China’s new emerging market, approximately 67% of the shares are 
non-tradable. Because of this, shareholders cannot sell their shares, and so they have an 
incentive to monitor management. However, they do not have the power to control 
management’s behaviour. Tradable shareholders can influence management behaviour 
because they have the right to sell their shares, which leads to a decrease in share prices and 
increase in capital costs. Furthermore, 10 large shareholders in most chain firms control about 
90% of the firms’ shares. The researchers found that both total ownership and tradable 
ownership concentration positively affect firm performance. The authors argued that tradable 
and non-tradable shareholders are complementary to each other in monitoring and controlling 
management’s behaviour.  
Wang and Shailer (2015) used meta-analytical techniques for analysing 28 studies that were 
conducted in 18 developing countries; their goal was to find the effects of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. After they adjusted for the differences in the sample 
studies, such as modelling choices and endogeneity problems, they found a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
In Taiwan, Yang, Chen, Kweh, and Chen (2013) used electronics firms to find if there was 
any relationship between separation of control and ownership in firm efficiency; they used 
total sale and market value as the performance measures. The researchers found that both 
discrepancy between voting rights and cash flow rights have significantly negative effects on 
firm efficiency. They believed that factors across countries, such as regulatory and economic 
environments, may affect the relationship between separation of control and ownership in 
firm efficiency.  
Also in Taiwan, Lo, Chiu, and Shih (2016) used the electronic industry and data between 
1997–2013. They found that ownership concentration has a positive effect on ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. However, Hoang, Nguyen, and Hu (2016) used manufacturing firms from 
Vietnam and employed a GMM regression to address the relationship between the 
92 
 
endogeneity of ownership concentration and firm performance. The researchers did not find 
any significant correlations between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
Hanafi, Santi, and Muazaroh (2013) investigated the impacts of ownership concentration and 
commissioners on Indonesian banks’ risk-taking and profitability. They found that ownership 
concentration has a significant effect on reducing bank risk (standard deviation of return on 
equity) and increases both the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and ROA. The researchers also 
found that large commissioners reduce bank risks and improve profitability accordingly. They 
believed that large commissioners help to increase bank managers’ power, so managers tend 
to be risk averse; types of commissioners have important impacts on bank risk. They argued 
that having fewer shareholders works effectively in monitoring bank activities and leads to 
good firm performance, as well as helping to regulate firm size and duality.  
Vemala and Nguyen (2013) used 136 Indian firms’ data from between 2005–2007, to find 
how ownership concentration, agency costs (expense ratio), and liquidity (share turnover) 
interacted with each other and affected firm value. They believed these three factors are 
related to each other and cannot be separated when studying the corporate control. In this 
study, they used a partial least squares regression (PLS) to control for multicollinearity and to 
gain a greater generalisability. They argued that a PLS regression better accounts for 
correlated comparing with (OLS) regression that increases standard error of estimated 
coefficients. The researchers found a significant relationship between the three factors and the 
firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. The authors argued that firms could achieve high firm 
value by adopting a balance of ownership concentration while reducing agency costs and 
increasing liquidity. 
Haldar and Rao (2011) analysed an unbalanced panel of BSE-500 Index firms to empirically 
examine the relationship between concentration ownership and firm performance. They found 
that when the founders of the firm have the majority of the shares, there is a positive and 
significant effect on the firm’s performance. Also, Ganguli and Guha Deb (2016) investigated 
the impact of the structure of ownership on firm performance by using Indian firms’ data 
between 2009–2013. They found that ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm 
performance, as measured by market and accounting ratios.  
However, Javid and Iqbal (2008) found that Pakistani firms have high ownership 
concentration, and the endogenous response of a poor legal environment seems to have a 
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significant effect on firm performance. Although they found that the concentration of 
ownership positively affects firm profitability, it negatively affects information disclosures 
and transparency. The researchers found that the type of ownership plays a major role in 
Pakistani firms. Thus family, foreign, and management ownership are positively related with 
firm performance, but there is no relationship when there is individual ownership.  
Abbas, Naqvi, and Mirza (2013) studied 100 non-financial Pakistani firms and the 
relationship between large shareholders and firm performance. The researchers used ROA and 
ROE as the performance indicators and the total percentage of ownership as the ownership 
concentration. They found a significant positive relationship between concentrated ownership 
and firm performance because of active monitoring by large shareholders. This relationship 
exists when owners have more than 10% of the firm’s equity. However, when the 
concentration goes beyond the controlling level (over 50% of the firm’s equity), there are 
adverse effects. According to the authors, this is because large owners may take advantage of 
their positions, using their power to receive private benefits at the expense of the firm. 
In addition, Chandrapala (2013) examined the effect of ownership concentration and firm size 
on Pakistani firms’ value; the author used two accounting variables: earnings and book value. 
The researcher found that a firm with a higher ownership concentration has a greater value 
than a firm with a non-concentrated ownership. Also, large firms show higher earnings and 
book value than small firms. Furthermore, the author found that the size of the firms play a 
major role in accounting for information quality and size. In addition, by controlling 
ownership structure and firm size, book earnings information is less than earnings 
information. However, Afgan, Gugler, and Kunst (2016) used Pakistani-listed firms to study 
how investment performance is affected by ownership concentration. They controlled for the 
endogeneity problem and reverse causality by using panel-data econometrics, and they found 
that ownership concentration negatively affects Tobin’s Q.  
Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) used 73 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and 
their data from between 2001–2007. They found that there is a negative but not significant 
relationship that exists between concentrated ownership and firm performance. There are no 
relationships between the dominant shareholder and firm performance. Moreover, Mollah, Al 
Farooque, and Karim (2012) studied the impact between ownership identity and Botswana 
firm performance. They used Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and market capitalisation (LnMktCap) 
for firm performance. The researchers found that only LnMktCap performance measures fit 
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the prescribed OLS model. They found a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. The authors argued that dispersed ownership can control 
the agency problem and improve firm performance in markets such as Botswana. 
Karaca and Ekşi (2012) investigated the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate performance of 50 manufacturing companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Using both Tobin's Q and profit before tax dividends by total assets, they found that 
concentration of ownership has a positive effect on PBT and no relation to Tobin's Q.  
In Turkey, Mandacı and Gumus (2010b) examined the relationship of concentration on non-
financial firm performance. After controlling for size, growth, leverage, and investment 
intensity, the researchers found a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm value. The study supported Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who argued that in countries 
where investor protection is low, ownership concentration can be an active corporate 
governance mechanism that solves the agency problem. They argued that firms in Turkey 
could improve firm performance by having more ownership concentration.  
In Iran, Fazlzadeh et al. (2011) used 137 firms on the Tehran stock exchange to find the effect 
of ownership concentration and institutional ownership concentration on firm performance. 
The researchers found that ownership concentration has no impact on firm performance while 
concentrated institutional ownership has a negative relationship. The researchers stated that 
although institutional ownership can improve firm performance, more share equity in an 
institutional ownership structure can lead to an adverse reaction. The authors argued that large 
blocks of institutional investors use their power to pursue their own benefits at the expense of 
other shareholders. They argued that when institutional shareholders have the majority of the 
firm’s equity, management only work towards satisfying the institutional shareholders, which 
leads to poor firm performance. 
In the MENA region, Omran et al. (2008a) used 304 firms from four countries to examine the 
effect of ownership concentration on firm performance; they used ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s Q. 
They concluded that there is no significant relationship between the concentration of 
ownership and firm performance when using the accounting ratios, neither does the separation 
between the CEO and chairperson position have any significant relationship to these ratios. 
They found that ownership concentration has a positive relationship with a market-based 
measure (Tobin’s Q). 
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In the MENA region again, Farooq and El Kacemi (2011) used data from eight countries to 
find the effect of ownership concentration on selecting firms’ auditors and how this selection 
affects firm performance. Although they documented that there is no significant relationship 
between the concentrations of ownership and firm performance, they found that the firms with 
a high ownership concentration appointed one of the largest four auditors as their external 
auditors. They argued that firms with high ownership concentrations realised the agency 
problem and hence chose a well-known auditor to secure highly reliable information. 
Further study of the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance in the MENA 
region was done by Samir (2013), who investigated how risks in banks (conventional and 
Islamic) was affected by ownership structure. He used two measures of risk: Z-score and the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. The researcher found that ownership 
concentration has a negative effect on risk, however different ownership identity has different 
effects in banks’ risks.    
In Egypt, Omran (2009) examined how ownership structure in the post-privatisation market 
affects firm performance. After controlling for ownership endogeneity and based on return on 
sales (ROS), ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, the researcher found that ownership concentration, 
especially foreign ownership, had a positive impact on firm performance.  
Turki and Sedrine (2012) examined the causal relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance using data from 23 non-financial companies listed on the Tunisian Stock 
Exchange. The researchers found that ownership concentration has a negative relationship 
with firm performance when measuring by market-to-book value (MTB). Firm performance 
negatively affects MTB, but this is dependent on ownership concentration. Therefore, the 
researchers proved that endogeneity exists in the Tunisian Stock Exchange, and there is a 
reverse causation between ownership structure and firm performance. The authors believed 
that blockholders have conflicts of interest with minority shareholders, and ownership 
concentrations increase this conflict, leading to a reduction in the liquidity of the firms.  
Zeitun (2009) examined the relationship between ownership structure and the performance 
firms in Jordan. The researcher found that a high concentration ownership has a negative 
impact on the ROA but has a positive effect on firm performance, as measured by MBVR. 
Contrary to this, Zeitun and Tian (2007) used Jordanian publicly traded firms and found that 
the concentration of ownership has a positive and significant relationship with firm 
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performance, as measured by ROE and ROA. They clarified that ownership concentration has 
the power to influence management behaviour, and this kind of power does not exist with 
individual shareholders.  
Najjar (2013), using data from Bahrain insurance companies, found no significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, they found that better 
performance was achieved in large-size firms. On the contrary, Almudehki and Zeitun (2012) 
used 29 non-financial firms listed on the Qatar Exchange and used Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE 
as firm performance measures. The researchers found that ownership concentration has a 
positive and significant effect on ROA and ROE. 
Having reviewed the existing empirical evidence, there are contradictory results regarding the 
relationship between ownership concentrations and firm performance. However, these 
conflicting results make sense when considering the different characteristics between 
countries, such as culture, legal system, economic development, and financial market 
development.  Accordingly and based on the agency theory, the first hypothesis to examine 
effects of ownership concentration on firm performance in this study is:  
H1: Ownership concentration in MENA region has positive effects on firm performance.  
4.3 Methodology 
The previous sections covered the literature review and the empirical evidence concerning the 
effects of ownership concentration on firm performance. This section aims to present the 
methodology and results used in this study.  
4.3.1 Data  
Like the previous chapter (chapter three), this chapter also uses the same data sample (see 
section 3.3.1 in chapter three for more details); the study’s data consists of 912 firms from 
different sectors and 5,521 firm-year observations from eight countries from the MENA 
region. The period within which the data were collected is between 2008–2014. The industries 
were categorised into three main areas. a financial group that covers all financial institutions 
in addition to insurance companies, save for banks, a manufacturing group that covers all 
enterprises that are producing goods for final use, save for service and energy companies, and 
the service group covers all businesses that provide services only such as education, 
communication, technology, and utilities. 
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4.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Different researchers used various firm performance measures because of the characteristics 
of these measures. However, performance measures can be categorised into two groups: 
backward-looking and forward-looking (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Thus, accounting 
ratios are considered to be backward-looking and are calculated under the standard constraints 
of firms’ accounts. Tobin’s Q is forward-looking and is calculated under the market 
constraints of investor perceptions.  
Beside of this, it is very important to choose the appropriate financial measures to achieve the 
objective of this research. This section will cover the two main groups of firm performance 
measures: accounting measures and market measures. 
4.3.2.1 Accounting Ratios 
Accounting measures can be applied to all firms, even if they are not listed in the financial 
markets, because these measures do not require market value. The advantage of this method is 
that it can be used for small and private firms. Moreover, accounting-related profitability 
ratios are not affected by market expectations. 
In the literature on ownership structures, ROA and ROE are mostly used as the accounting 
performance measures. ROA is the percentage of profit (after tax and interest expenses) on 
the total assets of the firm. It shows how efficient firms are in using their assets to generate 
earnings. ROE is the percentage of return (after tax and interest expenses) on the total 
shareholders’ equity; it helps to point out how efficient firms are in investing shareholders’ 
money. However, ROA is a widely used proxy because it is not affected by extraordinary 
items and leverage (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006).  
Many studies in corporate governance have used both accounting measures and indicated the 
same results for firm performance. However, other studies showed different results by 
applying both measures. In addition, return on investment (ROI) and earnings per share (EPS) 
are also used in some literature to measure ownership structures, but this was not frequently 
done.   
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4.3.2.2 Market Ratio (Tobin’s‎Q) 
Tobin’s Q was first introduced in 1969 by James Tobin and William Brainard. It is a 
replacement value of a firm’s assets by the ratio of the market value. Tobin’s Q combines 
both accounting information and market information to measure the ability of a firm’s 
reproduction. Dybvig and Warachka (2010) believed that Tobin’s Q is the best performance 
proxy when studying the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance.  
However, finding Tobin’s Q is not that easy and needs complex procedures to calculate the 
‘Q’ value (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). Also, it is more complicated to use Tobin’s Q for 
companies that record assets as a purchase value instead of a current value. Eventually, both 
(Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Lindenberg & Ross, 1981) came up with new approaches to avoid any 
practical problems when calculating Tobin’s Q. 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) represented the market value of the firm by using common stock, 
preferred stock, and the sum of the market value of the outstanding debt. They also 
represented the total replacement costs of the firm’s production capacity by using the sum of 
the replacement values for both fixed assets and inventories, and the book values of the other 
assets. Although this approach generates highly accurate estimates of the ‘Q’ value, it is not 
easy to implement because it needs a large data input and sophisticated programming 
(DaDalt, Donaldson, & Garner, 2003). 
(Chung & Pruitt, 1994) also introduced a new method for calculating Tobin’s Q, which only 
needs basic financial and accounting information. They assumed that the replacement costs of 
the equipment, plant, and inventory are equal with their book values. For the market value, 
they used debt as the book value for both long- and short-term, less the book value of short-
term assets. Even though this approach is easy to use, applying it to high-leverage firms may 
lead to deceptive results (DaDalt et al., 2003). 
Both measures appear to be used widely in different studies. However, it seems that there is 
no definite answer for the best measurement to use when finding the relationship between 
firm performance and corporate governance. Tobin’s Q is a future profitability evaluation 
whereas accounting ratios are past performance measures (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Accounting measures depend on the accounting standards that are affected by accounting 
practices, and they assess tangible and intangible methods and different methods of 
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depreciation. Similarly, Tobin’s Q is also affected by investor psychology and how they 
estimate future events (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). 
Although it is true that accounting ratios are affected by different accounting practices, 
Tobin’s Q is also affected by these practices (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Thus, for 
example, different depreciation methods create different book values of fixed assets, 
consequently distorting the ‘Q’ value that is used for the book value of total assets in the 
denominator of the proxy ‘Q’ (Tsai & Zheng, 2007). In addition, intangible assets that 
investors have no control over, affect the estimation of Tobin’s Q (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). 
According to (Himmelberg et al., 1999), firms that do not record intangible assets report a low 
book value of assets, leading to an overestimation of Tobin’s Q. Therefore, they show an 
invalid correlation between Tobin’s Q and ownership structure. Furthermore, it is not easy to 
appraise replacement costs (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007).  
Both measures have advantages and disadvantages. However, a considerable number of 
researchers used both accounting and market ratios as performance measures to find the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. So three performance 
ratios, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, are used in the current study, table 4.1 give statistics 
information about these ratios.   
Table ‎4.1    Descriptive Data of Firms’‎Performance  
mean min max sd mean min max sd mean min max sd
Bahrain 6.30 -13.25 24.65 6.13 9.47 -21.64 42.08 9.14 1.07 0.39 2.33 0.39
Egypt 6.01 -29.45 62.82 9.48 11.05 -52.16 76.00 16.09 1.51 0.10 40.77 1.76
Jordan 0.53 -46.70 82.53 9.54 0.19 -59.83 78.15 14.90 1.14 0.07 11.38 0.72
Oman 4.46 -46.43 43.41 9.28 10.15 -59.99 73.07 16.95 1.27 0.29 5.32 0.58
Qatar 8.45 0.39 26.72 7.37 21.55 0.44 51.38 12.25 1.68 0.95 2.96 0.60
Saudi 4.85 -43.20 51.27 10.03 7.65 -53.25 60.93 17.24 1.97 0.63 12.94 1.22
Tunisia 6.64 -1.44 24.72 6.62 15.64 -5.24 52.21 11.10 2.02 0.46 5.78 1.30
Turkey 4.19 -46.70 57.12 9.61 7.57 -60.97 78.98 18.18 1.43 0.25 13.78 1.26
Financial 0.95 -46.70 54.99 8.39 3.15 -57.67 76.00 15.13 1.27 0.25 12.94 0.99
Service 4.91 -46.43 82.53 9.79 8.54 -60.97 78.98 17.49 1.49 0.07 40.77 1.32
Manufacturing 5.85 -32.11 41.65 10.02 9.61 -54.28 75.78 16.95 1.56 0.14 22.54 1.22
Average 3.99 -46.70 82.53 9.66 7.24 -60.97 78.98 16.94 1.44 0.07 40.77 1.22
ROA ROE Tobin’s Q
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4.3.3 Ownership Concentration Measures 
Most previous studies defined the concentration ownership variables as the total ownership 
percentage of the largest number of shareholders. The study used 5% or more of a firm’s 
equity owned by each shareholder as ownership concentration. Table 4.2 documents the 
descriptive statistics for ownership concentration in each country. Most countries in the study 
have more than 50% average ownership concentration, except for Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
This means that the MENA region has a large ownership concentration. This high ownership 
concentration was reported by (Farooq & El Kacemi, 2011) and (Omran et al., 2008a).  
Egypt has the highest average ownership concentration of about 60% while Saudi Arabia has 
the lowest average ownership concentration of about 37%. Moreover, the overall average of 
the sample data is 55%. The three types of industry have at least 50% average ownership 
concentration each. 
 
Table ‎4.2  Average Ownership Concentration in Each Country  
  N Mean minimum maximum SD 
Bahrain 157 59.46 7.85 99.55 22.32 
Egypt 1118 60.89 0.00 99.88 25.02 
Jordan 1269 57.57 5.52 99.75 22.31 
Oman 736 59.17 5.80 99.70 22.36 
Qatar 55 44.65 13.00 70.02 16.12 
Saudi 835 37.21 0.00 94.44 22.08 
Tunisia 79 52.12 14.69 98.52 22.72 
Turkey 1272 57.33 0.00 99.00 23.47 
Financial 1550 50.71 0.00 99.88 23.15 
Service 2841 57.58 0.00 99.70 24.18 
Manufacturing 1130 55.24 0.00 99.75 25.59 
Total / Average 5521 55.17 0.00 99.88 24.37 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Statistics of the Number of Ownership Concentration 
Table 4.3 shows the number of owners who have at least 5% of the firm’s equity (largest 
shareholders). Only 30 observations show no ownership concentration, which represents less 
than 1% of the total sample. However, firms that have only two owners owning 5% or more 
of the firm’s equity are a quarter of the total sample. Also, firms with one, two, and three 
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owners represent approximately 70% of the total sample, and this gives an indication that the 
MENA region not only has a high ownership concentration, but also that there a few large 
owners who control these firms.  
Nevertheless, the data show that the maximum largest ownership in the entire sample does not 
exceed 12 owners. However, only one firm in Egypt has 12 owners (largest ownership), and 
companies that have the six largest owners do not reach 4% of the total sample. This 
percentage gives a strong indication that a small number of owners dominate firms in the 
MENA region.  
Most of the companies in Turkey are controlled by a maximum of the three largest owners. 
This means that 90% of Turkey’s firms are controlled by one, two, and three owners only. 
However, Jordan has a good distribution of the largest ownership in its firms.  
Table ‎4.3  Parentage of Largest Owner With 5% of More of Firm’s‎Shares.  
  Number of Largest owners  
  0 1 2 3 4 to 6 7 to 12 
Bahrain 0.00 5.10 29.30 17.20 39.49 8.91 
Egypt 0.54 24.15 21.02 17.89 32.47 3.94 
Jordan 0.00 8.75 18.12 26.16 40.97 5.99 
Oman 0.00 19.43 28.26 19.02 28.53 4.76 
Qatar 0.00 63.64 25.45 10.91 0.00 0.00 
Saudi 2.63 20.36 31.02 20.72 21.67 3.60 
Tunisia 0.00 6.33 22.78 46.84 24.05 0.00 
Turkey 0.16 48.19 30.74 12.11 8.25 0.55 
Financial 0.45 19.74 23.81 19.23 32.33 4.44 
Manufacturing 0.71 27.17 23.36 21.86 22.57 4.33 
Service 0.53 26.12 27.03 18.44 24.78 3.10 
 Total 0.54 24.54 25.38 19.36 26.44 3.73 
 
4.3.3.2 Concentration Percentage Statistics  
For statistics purpose only and to give overview of ownership concentration in MENA region, 
this study classified the largest ownership into four groups according to the percentage of 
shares the largest owner has in a firm. Less than 25% of the companies’ shares, between 25–
50%, between 50–75%, and exceeds (>) 75%. Table 4.4 summarises these variables. 
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Table ‎4.4  Definitions variables using total ownership concentration  
Variable  Description 
DC1 firm has total concentration percentage (<) 25% 
DC2 firm has total concentration percentage between ( 26 - 50% ) 
DC3 firm has total concentration percentage between ( 51 - 75% ) 
DC4 firm has total concentration percentage exceeds (>) 75% 
 
Table 4.5 shows the percentage of firms that have different ownership concentrations. It is 
worth noting that over 65% of the sample has the largest owner, owning over 50% of the 
firm’s shares. Moreover, 37% of the samples are companies that have the largest owner 
owning between 50–75% of the firm’s shares. Also, 23% of the companies controlled by the 
largest owner have over 75% of the shares controlled by that owner.  
Individually, Egypt and Bahrain have the highest percentage of firms where the largest owner 
has more than 50% of the firm’s equity, with this percentage appearing in approximately 70% 
of the samples. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which has only 28% of its firms are concentrated by 
owners owning over 50% of firm’s equity. Turkey and Jordan have a high percentage of 
companies where the largest owner owns between 50–75% of the firm’s equity, with this 
percentage occurring approximately 42% of the time for both countries.  
Table ‎4.5  Percentage of ownership concentration group in each county   
  Percentage of observation 
  DC1 DC2 DC3 DC4 DC3 + DC4 
Bahrain 8.28 22.93 48.41 20.38 68.79 
Egypt 11.09 18.78 35.6 33.99 69.59 
Jordan 8.59 26 42.63 22.77 65.4 
Oman 6.39 28.13 36.14 29.35 65.49 
Qatar 10.91 52.73 36.36 0 36.36 
Saudi 34.37 34.61 22.63 5.75 28.38 
Tunisia 8.86 35.44 37.97 17.72 55.69 
Turkey 12.19 20.68 42.22 24.76 66.98 
Total 13.55 25.21 37.26 23.44 60.7 
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Other ownership concentration index used in the study is HHI because it captures the 
dispersion degree of the largest shareholders. The index, calculated as the sum of squared 
ownership for each firm, ranges from 0–10,000 points and represents the monopoly power of 
ownership concentration. Cubbin and Leech (1983) argued the importance of using HHI to 
measure the degree of control and how this measure is critical in empirical tests. They also 
developed a variable that measures the controlling power of ownership; thus, HHI is defined 
as the following: 
      
 
   
 
Where N equals the number of shareholders and Pi is the percentage of shareholder equity 
holdings in a firm. 
According to the United States Department of Justice, companies with a HHI between 1,000 
and 1,800 have moderate concentration, while an excess of 2,500 points is highly 
concentrated. Ownership percentage can be measured using the Herfindahl index. The study 
follows the classification of the United States Department of Justice regarding the HHI degree 
concentration. There are three degrees of concentration: unconcentrated HHI of less than 
1,000 points, moderately concentrated HHI of between 1,000–1,800 points, and highly 
concentrated HHI of over 1,800 points. Table 4.6 summarises the different statistics using 
HHI. 
Table ‎4.6   Definitions variables using Herfindahl index  
Variable  Description 
HHI1 firm has a total Herfindahl index (<) 1,000  
HHI 2 firm has a total Herfindahl index between (1,000–1,800 )  
HHI 3 firm has a total Herfindahl index that exceeds (>) 1,800 
 
The degree of concentration that is measured using the Herfindahl index is shown in Table 4.7 
Overall, the averages highlighted a critical issue for this study, showing that 40% of the firms 
have HHIs exceeding 1,800 points. These companies are classified as having highly 
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concentrated ownership. Also 17.6% of them have a moderate concentration ownership. 
However, only 41% of the firms are unconcentrated firms.  
Individually, Turkey has the highest percentage of companies that are highly concentrated, 
with around 60% of its firms having an HHI that exceeds 1,800 points. Also, 58% of Qatar's 
firms are highly concentrated. However, 70% of businesses in Saudi Arabia are 
unconcentrated firms. 
Table ‎4.7  Percentage of Ownership Concentration Group in Each County Using 
Herfindahl Index 
  HHI 1 HHI 2 HHI 3 
Bahrain 37.58 33.76 28.66 
Egypt 34.79 18.52 46.69 
Jordan 46.18 20.8 33.02 
Oman 38.59 22.42 38.99 
Qatar 30.91 10.91 58.18 
Saudi 70.06 12.34 17.6 
Tunisia 49.37 15.19 35.44 
Turkey 27.36 12.89 59.75 
 Total 41.79 17.64 40.57 
 
In addition, the largest shareholders may play one of two roles, both of which can either 
positively or negatively affect firm performance. Maury and Pajuste (2005) claimed that the 
existence of multiple large shareholders checks the largest owner’s dominance over the firm. 
Thus, firm performance is improved. On the other hand, this means that the largest 
shareholders can potentially form a coalition that gives them the power to control the firm. 
This power could help them extract private benefits at the expense of the company. 
Consequently, the existence of a large shareholder clout could also negatively affect firm 
performance. 
Therefore, Maury and Pajuste (2005) recommended two indexes to measure the power gained 
by the largest shareholders’ coalition. The first is H_DIFF, which is the squared difference 
between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to the squared difference 
of the second and third largest ownership percentages. The second is H_CON, which is 
calculated by adding the squared ownership percentage of the three largest owners.  
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In addition a dichotomous-type variable is also used in this study; many previous studies on 
ownership concentration used fixed rules to classify ownership concentration. However, 
different criteria were applied in those studies depending on the researchers’ points of view. 
In this study, the dichotomous variable is used to classify the power of the largest three 
owners who have voting percentage of at least 51% of the common stock. This ownership 
concentration index is symbolised as CON51, and it is a dummy variable that uses 1 for a firm 
that has at most three owners owning at least 51% of the firm’s equity. Table 4.8 summarises 
these measurements. 
Figure 4.1 shows the average C51 in each country. Overall, approximately 40% of the 
companies are controlled by the three largest owners only. However, Turkey has 
approximately 60% of its firms owned by a maximum of its three largest owners. These 
percentages give another indication that the MENA region does not only have a high 
ownership concentration as shown previously (see Table 4.5), but it also shows that only a 
few owners control this concentration. 
Figure ‎4.1  Percentage‎ of‎maximum‎ of‎ three‎ owners‎ having‎ 51%‎ or‎more‎ the‎ firm’s‎
equity 
 
Bahrain Egypt Jordan Oman Qatar Saudi Tunisia Turkey Total 
33.76 
40.97 
29.94 
35.6 36.36 
17.96 
46.84 
60.53 
38.58 
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Table ‎4.8 Definitions of Ownership Concentration Measures 
Variable  Description 
CON  = Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity 
HHI = Herfindahl Index, the squared sum of the largest ownership.  
H_diff                          
H_con      +           
 CON51  = Three owners or less owning 51% or more of the firm’s equity .  
LS1. Largest shareholder; LS2. Second largest shareholder; LS3. Third largest shareholder 
 
4.3.4 Independent Variables 
Almost all the studies about the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance used three types: firm, industry, and country levels. However, different variables 
of the three types are used in the cited studies. This section only highlights the variables used 
in the current study because of the limitations in the sources of the other variables. 
4.3.4.1  Firm-level variables  
The current study uses firm size as a control variable, which is, the total assets of the firm. It 
is very important to control firm size when studying the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance (Krivogorsky, 2006; Leech & Leahy, 1991). That is, large 
firms have the ability to diversify both risk and products, which enables them to operate 
smoothly and make large profits (Leech & Leahy, 1991). Fama and French (1995) 
documented that large firms have a higher ROE than small firms. Moreover, Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1999) found direct and positive effects of firm size in relation to firm performance.  
According to Short and Keasey (1999), the size of firm can have a positive impact on firm 
performance because of two reasons. First, large firms can internally gain sufficient funds to 
run their projects without any external intervention. Consequently, firms can reduce any 
financial constraints and generate more profit. Second, entry barriers can be created by 
economies of scale that large firms have, leading to positive effects in firm performance. 
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Moreover, large firms can provide information at a lower cost compared to small firms (Basu, 
1977). Also, large firms have a better flow of information than small firms, which allows for 
better quality information (Mueller, 1972).  
Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) argued that economies of scale may have a negative impact on 
firm performance and that the firm’s large size reduces growth because of the reduction of 
managerial benefits. Banz (1981) argued that there is a negative relationship between firm 
size and firm performance. He found that small firms have higher common stock returns than 
large firms. Contrary to this, Donald (1983) found no relation between firm size and common 
stock returns. Moreover, it seems that firm size has a negative impact on ownership 
concentration (Gugler & Weigand, 2003). Thus, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) pointed out, it is 
more difficult to own a given portion of the firm when the firm is big and has large capital 
resources. 
Also, firm age is used as a firm control variable; firm age is the number of years between the 
observation year and the firm’s establishment. There is a debate among researchers about the 
critical role firm age plays regarding firm performance. Majumdar (1997) argued that old 
firms have experience that enables them to perform at superior levels when compared to 
young firms. Furthermore, older firms have information history and a reputation, which 
ensures access to bank loans (Diamond, 1991). These firms have the sufficient liquidity to run 
effectively.  
On the other hand, Mueller (1972) stated that because young firms have uncertain life cycles, 
this creates barriers when trying to receive outside funds. As a result, both managers and 
owners align their interests to gain trust and reputation, which enables them to receive outside 
loans. Consequently, firms improve their performance by reducing their agency costs. In 
addition, some literature indicates that when firms grow older, the ownership concentration is 
reduced, leading to loss of individual control. This has a negative impact on ownership 
control (Leech & Leahy, 1991).  
Another firm-control variable is the financial leverage ratio; it is calculated by dividing long-
term debt by total assets. Jensen (1986) argued that a firm with high financial leverage has 
good performance. This is because of the incentive debt holders have to monitor the firm’s 
activities, leading to reduced agency costs. Likewise, Stiglitz (1985) suggested that banks 
have more power to control management behaviour than shareholders. Jensen (1986) also 
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argued that more debt forces managers to put more effort into repaying the debt by 
maximising profits. 
According to Grossman and Hart (1982), firms that have high debt levels have positive firm 
value and management. This is because the firms have the trust of external debtors and the 
appropriate cash flows to run the firms effectively and meet the interest owed. In addition, 
Ross (1977) argued that debt is related to a firm’s market value because of the increased 
market perception when the firm leverage is increased, which mean that the firms should have 
high credibility in order to secure high debts.  
On the other hand, Myers (1977) argued that firms should have low financial leverage and 
should depend on their internal funds. That is, controlling leverage is important because both 
financial risks and a firm’s credit risks are increased by increasing the firm’s borrowing 
(Krivogorsky, 2006). According to both Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Stulz (1988), firms 
with high leverage have a high risk and this has a negative impact on the firm’s market ratios. 
Moreover, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argued that firms with high debt have to pay high 
interest rates, which reduce profits. 
The firm’s independent variable in this study is the type of external auditors, because I believe 
it is important when studying ownership effects in firm performance we need to take into 
consideration the type of auditors hired by firms for many reasons. Fan and Wong (2005) 
claimed that using one of the four biggest auditors increases the monitoring efficiency and 
reduces agency conflicts. Also, Farooq and El Kacemi (2011) argued that well-known 
auditors are one of the mechanisms in corporate governance that reduces agency conflicts. 
Fan and Wong (2005) found that most East Asian firms that have high ownership rights are 
most likely to use one of the largest four auditors. Likewise, Farooq and El Kacemi (2011) 
found that firms with high ownership concentrations in the MENA region are more likely to 
appoint one of the largest four auditors. Mitton (2002) found that having one of the largest 
four auditors is linked to superior performance in stock price and returns. He clarified that 
firms audited by one of the largest four auditors have higher disclosure qualities, this 
increases transparency and mitigating expropriation. In addition, firms that hire one of the 
largest four auditors are showing the market that they are disclosing reliable information 
(Farooq & El Kacemi, 2011). 
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Michaely and Shaw (1995) stated that these large auditors do not want to lose their 
reputations. As result, they will ensure transparency and try to eradicate any mistakes in a 
firm’s financial statements. These auditors are more independent than other auditing firms and 
also are more likely to have greater legal liabilities if they make a mistake (Dye, 1993). In 
addition, Farooq and El Kacemi (2011) believed that the independency of the big auditors 
improves their audit performance when compared to smaller auditors. Moreover, big auditors 
may give assurance to investors regarding the reports’ disclosure quality (Rahman, 1998). 
4.3.4.2 Industry-level variables  
An industry dummy variable is an important factor to control for because of the possible 
correlation between firm performance and ownership structure, that occurs because of 
industry impacts (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). According to Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), there 
is a significant influence of type of industry in firms performance because of the Life Cycle in 
different industries, and the accounting methods used in different industries. In addition, firm 
performance may be affected by the macroeconomic sensitivity of some industries and 
affected by industry specific political factors (Short & Keasey, 1999).   
Moreover, Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) argued that firms choose different governance 
structures, and this has causal links between governance and performance. Welch (2003) 
documented that media and financial industries have more ownership concentration than other 
industries. Also, Omran et al. (2008a) found that industrial firms have better performance 
when compared to other industries. However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that the 
construction sector has better performance than other sectors.  
 
4.3.4.3 Country -level variables 
The study samples were from different countries and times, which meant they were affected 
by varying economic cycles; the current study used GDP growth rate in the empirical models 
to control for the impact of economic cycles. According to the neoclassical investment theory, 
GDP growth rate influences investments positively (Fielding, 1997; Greene & Villanueva, 
1991). This is because countries with a high level of income have high domestic savings that 
are normally used in investments (Greene & Villanueva, 1991). The source of GDP growth 
came from the World Bank .  
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Finally, for the country-level variables, the study uses Arab Spring data to study the political 
effects on ownership concentration. To capture the real effects of the Arab Spring on the 
study sample, a dummy variable is used to explain the effects of this political movement. For 
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordon, Oman, and Bahrain, we assigned a 1 for the years 2011–2014 and a 0 
for the other years; for the other countries, we assigned a 0 for the years 2008–2014. (The 
Arab Spring movement is covered in chapter three.) Table 4.9 summarises these controlling 
variables. 
Table ‎4.9 Independent variables summary  
Control variables  
Firm Size  Total assets  
Firm Age  The number of years since firms have been founded  
Financial Leverage  Total debt/Total equity  
Sector Affiliation  Financial, manufacturing, and service  
GDP Growth rate of gross domestic product  
Auditor 1 if firms’ external auditors is one of the big four auditors 
and 0 otherwise.  
Arab Spring  Dummy variable used to explain the effects the political 
movement.  
 
4.3.5 Regression Model 
As mentioned in previous sections, the study uses three dependent variables to measure firm 
performance. Accounting ratios, which are ROA and ROE, and market ratio, which is Tobin’s 
Q. For ownership concentration, the study uses five indexes (CON, HHI, H_DIFF, H_CON, 
and CON51). In addition, the study uses many independent variables as explained in section 
4.3.4 above. 
4.3.5.1 Panel data analysis  
A natural way to investigate the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is to 
use a model such as the following one, which takes advantage of the panel structure of the 
data it uses in this study, which are ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model and 
random effects model:  
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 8 IndustryDummy  + 9CountryDummy  +  10YearDummys  +                             
(5.1) 
Where the following is true: 
 Firm performance = ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q.  
 Ownership concentration = CON, HHI, H_DIFF, H_CON, and CON51 (As explained 
in Table 4.8 ) 
 Firm size = total firm assets 
 Firm age = period from a firm’s establishment up to 2008, increasing by one each year 
afterward 
 Financial leverage = a company’s total debt / total assets 
 Auditors. Dummy variable taking 1 if a big four auditor is the firm’s external auditors 
and 0 otherwise 
 Arab Spring: Dummy variable used to explain the effects the political movement. 
 GDP = Growth rate of gross domestic product 
 
4.3.5.1 Dynamic Model, the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Using panel-data regressions presents a major problem when considering controlling for 
heterogeneity (unobservable characteristics) between explanatory variables. Thus, the 
repeated observations in this study, exploit time series variations in obtaining consistent 
estimates of the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance. Accordingly, this 
study follows the classical generalised method of moments (GMM) in estimating the 
parameter vector, by the value implied by the corresponding sample moments, in order to 
control heterogeneity between explanatory variables. This method uses assumptions about 
specific moments of the random variables instead of assumptions about the entire distribution, 
which makes the GMM more robust than panel-data regressions. 
The key in the GMM is a set of population moment conditions that are derived from the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression models as follow:  
     
 
                                                                                                                        (5.2a) 
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Where the dependent variable     and the independent variable is                        is      
m-vector of explanatory variables and   is an m-vector of regression coefficients, and     is an 
error term.  
The moment condition is:  
             
 
                                                                                                 (5.2b) 
Given data on the observable variables the GMM model finds values for the model 
parameters such that corresponding sample moment conditions are satisfied as closely as 
possible. In this study, the only the single moment of conditions in equation (2b) is used, 
given T observations, the implied sample moment is: 
 
 
          
 
           
 
                                                                                                (5.2c) 
Given the fact that T > m, the empirical moment condition in the study model is:  
          
 
         
           
 
   
                                                                        (5.2d) 
Where y is the dependent variable which is firm performance measure by ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s Q. X is the independent variables which are: ownership concentration, firm size,  firm 
age, financial leverage, auditors, Arab Spring and GDP.  
Table 4.10 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables used in the study; the 
correlations between firm performance indexes and ownership concentration are statistically 
significant. In addition the correlations between the independent variables are not high and 
this gives good indications that the explanatory variable are not affecting each other.     
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Table ‎4.10  Correlation Table  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) CON 1.00
(2) HHI 0.73* 1.00
(3) H_Con 0.67* 0.94* 1.00
(4) H_Diff 0.49* 0.89* 0.94* 1.00
(5) CON51 0.44* 0.72* 0.68* 0.66* 1.00
(6) ROA 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 1.00
(7) ROE 0.04* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.85* 1.00
(8) Tobin_Q 0.04* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.06* 0.18* 0.15* 1.00
(9) Firm Size 0.01 0.07* 0.07* 0.09* 0.02 0.05* 0.13* -0.02 1.00
(10) Firm Age 0.04* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.11* 0.14* 0.13* 0.10* 0.14* 1.00
(11)  leverage 0.02 0.04* 0.04 0.04* 0.03 -0.2* -0.0* -0.01 0.17* 0.01 1.00
(12) Auditor -0.05* -0.10* -0.11* -0.11* -0.08* 0.04* 0.08* 0.04 0.17* 0.01 0.05* 1.00
(13) GDP -0.08* -0.06* -0.04* -0.03 -0.04 0.06* 0.07* 0.06* 0.08* -0.04* 0.01 0.11* 1.00
(14)  Arab Spring -0.20* -0.03 -0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.07* 0.07* 0.11* 0.17* 0.08* -0.01 -0.03 0.30* 1.00
*Significant at 1% ; CON = total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity ; HHI is
Herfindahl index = the sum of squared largest shareholders ; H_CON measure the power gained by the largest
shareholders calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners ; H_ DIFF
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders which is the square difference between the largest and
second largest ownership percentage added to the square difference of the second and third largest ownership
percentages ; CON51 measure the power gained by the largest shareholders which is a dummy variable of taking
1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity ; Firm Size = Total assets ; Firm Age = The
number of years since firms have been founded ; Financial Leverage = Total debt/Total equity ; GDP = Growth rate
of gross domestic product ; Auditor = 1 if firms’ external auditors is one of the big four auditors and 0 otherwise.
Arab Spring  Dummy variable used to explain the effects of the political movement. 
 
 
4.3.6 Robustness checks 
For robustness checks, to measure the validity of the study’s model, a multicollinearity test 
was conducted by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). The test uses one ownership 
concentration index, which is (CON), with only one firm performance. Table 4.11 shows the 
results of the VIF test, and the highest value is 1.2, which is below the suggested largest value 
of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity does not exist in the study’s regression models. 
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Table ‎4.11 Multicollinearity Test by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF     VIF 1/VIF     VIF 1/VIF     VIF 1/VIF   
Con 1.06 0.95                   
HHI       1.04 0.97             
H_Con             1.03 0.97       
H_Diff                   1.04 0.96 
Firm Size 1.12 0.89   1.13 0.88   1.13 0.88   1.13 0.88 
Firm Age 1.04 0.97   1.04 0.96   1.04 0.96   1.04 0.96 
Financial leverage 1.04 0.97   1.04 0.97   1.04 0.97   1.04 0.97 
Auditor 1.06 0.94   1.07 0.93   1.07 0.93   1.07 0.93 
GDP 1.13 0.88   1.13 0.88   1.13 0.88   1.13 0.88 
Arab Spring 1.20 0.83   1.16 0.87   1.15 0.87   1.15 0.87 
 Average  1.09   1.09   1.09   1.09 
 
4.4 Results  
The study follows the argument of Wang and Shailer (2015) who argue that studying 
ownership concentration can be bias depending on how ownership concentration is calculated 
and the type of regression model used. So in order to make clear understanding of the effect 
of ownership concentration on firm performance, this study uses five concentration indexes 
(CON, HHI, H_Con, H_Diff, and CON51) as described in table 4.8 above, and use panel-data 
analysis that implements four regression types: ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects 
model, random effects model, and generalised method of moments (GMM). To capture the 
different characteristics between countries and industries among different times, the study 
uses a different approach to control for country, industry, and year effects. So, the results in 
this section are illustrated in six subsections; subsection 4.4.1 shows the Results without 
controlling for country, industry and year effects. Subsection 4.4.2, 4.4.3, and 4.4.4 illustrate 
the results after controlling industry effects, country effects and year effects respectively, and 
subsection 4.4.5 shows the Results when controlling for country, industry and year effects.   
4.4.1 Results Without Controlling for Country, Industry and Year effects.  
Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 show the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, and the tables use five concentration indexes separately (CON, HHI, H_Con, 
H_Diff, and CON51). Tables 4.13 show that CON has significant effects on firm performance 
at 10% and 1% level of significance when using OLS and GMM regression models 
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respectively. Ownership concentration measured by HHI as shown in table 4.13 demonstrates 
a significant effect on firm performance on both ROA and Tobin’s Q at 1 % level of 
significance. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show that both H_Con and H_Diff have some degrees of 
effect on ROA and ROE when using random and fixed regression models. Regarding the 
ownership index (CON51), table 4.16 demonstrates that his index has a positive significant 
effect on firm performance at  1 % level of significance when using the GMM model.  
Regarding firm factors, firm size shows a different significance level in all firm performance 
measures in all the models. It has significant positive effects on ROA when using OLS and 
GMM at 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Also, firm size has a significant 
positive relationship with ROE at a 1% significance level in all regression models except for 
the fixed effect model. However, the size of the company has significant negative effects on 
Tobin’s Q at the 1% significance level when using OLS, GMM, and random effects.  
Firm age shows 1% significance for positive effects on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q in all 
regressions models except for the fixed effect model. However, financial leverage affects both 
ROA and ROE negatively at the 1% level of significance using all regression models. Also, it 
has negative effects on Tobin’s Q, yet this effect is not significant. Moreover, the largest four 
auditors are shown to have a positive relationship with firm performance, as measured by 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. This relationship is at the 1% and 10 % levels of significance in 
GMM and OLS, respectively.  
GDP growth has positive impacts on all firm performance measures; it has a 1% level of 
significance in all the regression models. Also, the Arab Spring demonstrates that GDP 
growth has a positive impact on all firm performance measures at the different levels of 
significance, depending on the regression model. However, most of the regression results of 
the Arab Spring factor are at the 1% level of significance.  
In summary, it is clear that the different levels of the independent variables affect firm 
performance at different significance levels. However, these results do not capture the 
consequences of industry, country, and year effects that may have some implications after 
controlling for them. So the next three sections investigate the impact of controlling for 
industry, country, and year effects. 
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Table ‎4.12  Results - Different Regressions Results using CON as ownership concentration index without controlling industries, 
countries and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON 0.029** 0.003 0.013 0.029*** 0.041** 0.001 0.025 0.041*** 0.004** 0.003 0.004** 0.004***
(3.27) (0.24) (1.72) (5.58) (2.64) (0.02) (1.77) (4.40) (2.91) (1.92) (2.84) (4.71)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.025 0.016 0.018*** 0.071*** 0.099 0.082*** 0.071*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003***
(2.34) (0.78) (1.92) (4.36) (4.08) (1.58) (4.49) (8.54) (-4.60) (-0.69) (-3.25) (-8.56)
Firm Age 0.817*** 0.163 0.514*** 0.817*** 1.216*** 0.345 0.778*** 1.216*** 0.078*** 0.029 0.051** 0.078***
(5.76) (1.07) (4.62) (10.55) (5.04) (1.10) (3.66) (9.08) (3.84) (1.18) (2.66) (5.98)
Financial leverage -0.688*** -0.425*** -0.498*** -0.688*** -0.623* -0.662*** -0.649*** -0.623*** 0.001 -0.01 -0.007 0.001
(-5.49) (-4.48) (-4.77) (-6.50) (-2.55) (-3.75) (-3.89) (-4.21) (-0.08) (-1.16) (-1.21) (-0.14)
Auditor 1.019* 0.521 0.212 1.019*** 2.362** 0.788 0.746 2.362*** 0.149** 0.017 0.093* 0.149***
(2.18) (1.22) (0.61) (3.83) (2.84) (0.90) (1.12) (4.87) (2.67) (0.40) (2.32) (4.83)
GDP 0.161*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 0.161*** 0.326*** 0.215*** 0.244*** 0.326*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.39) (3.37) (3.87) (3.71) (4.66) (3.43) (3.98) (4.07) (3.38) (3.46) (3.62) (2.65)
Arab Spring 1.108** 1.417*** 1.467*** 1.108*** 1.318* 2.862*** 2.632*** 1.318** 0.323*** 0.205*** 0.230*** 0.323***
(3.00) (4.21) (4.78) (3.91) (2.07) (5.05) (5.17) (2.66) (6.69) (3.86) (4.82) (9.73)
constant 1.996* 3.704** 0.191 1.996** 3.763* 2.976 0.707 3.763*** 0.597*** 0.984*** 0.861*** 0.597***
(2.00) (3.23) (0.23) (3.29) (-2.23) (1.25) (-0.46) (-3.69) (4.23) (6.12) (6.61) (6.52)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON  = total percentage 
of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  .  This model does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.13  Results - Different Regressions Results using HHI as ownership concentration index without controlling industries, countries 
and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
HHI 0.029** 0.036 0.031* 0.029*** 0.038* 0.061 0.048* 0.038*** 0.006** 0.003 0.005* 0.006***
(2.72) (1.35) (2.42) (4.72) (2.05) (1.27) (2.12) (3.53) (2.66) (1.05) (2.32) (4.21)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.029 0.014 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.094 0.081*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.004***
(2.24) (0.89) (1.75) (4.19) (4.04) (1.51) (4.36) (8.45) (-4.58) (-0.36) (-3.23) (-8.36)
Firm Age 0.807*** 0.143 0.495*** 0.807*** 1.206*** 0.315 0.752*** 1.206*** 0.075*** 0.03 0.050** 0.075***
(5.64) (0.94) (4.46) (10.37) (4.98) (1.00) (3.54) (8.99) (3.84) (1.24) (2.63) (6.00)
Financial leverage -0.690*** -0.425*** -0.500*** -0.690*** -0.626* -0.662*** -0.652*** -0.626*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.50) (-4.47) (-4.78) (-6.56) (-2.55) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.24) (-0.21) (-1.19) (-1.25) (-0.35)
Auditor 1.063* 0.579 0.252 1.063*** 2.409** 0.882 0.801 2.409*** 0.165** 0.016 0.098* 0.165***
(2.25) (1.35) (0.72) (3.96) (2.88) (1.02) (1.19) (4.93) (3.04) (0.36) (2.44) (5.55)
GDP 0.164*** 0.108*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.330*** 0.213*** 0.245*** 0.330*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015** 
(4.50) (3.34) (3.89) (3.79) (4.72) (3.41) (4.00) (4.12) (3.51) (3.44) (3.64) (2.80)
Arab Spring 0.846* 1.513*** 1.434*** 0.846** 0.943 2.996*** 2.546*** 0.943 0.294*** 0.191*** 0.214*** 0.294***
(2.30) (4.60) (4.74) (3.00) (1.47) (5.39) (5.03) (1.92) (6.26) (3.69) (4.73) (9.27)
constant 0.768 2.960** 0.392 0.768 1.986 1.93 0.145 1.986*  0.723*** 1.087*** 0.971*** 0.723***
(0.91) (2.67) (0.54) (1.48) (1.43) (0.84) (0.11) (2.36) (5.99) (7.21) (8.18) (9.09)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.07
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; HHI is Herfindahl index   
= the sum of squared  largest shareholders  .  This model does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.14  Results - Different Regressions Results using H_CON as ownership concentration index without controlling industries, 
countries and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Con 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(2.81) (1.88) (2.84) (4.86) (2.22) (2.01) (2.72) (3.78) (2.54) (0.29) (1.88) (4.01)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.033 0.014 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.086 0.079*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.004***
(2.23) (1.01) (1.66) (4.16) (4.01) (1.38) (4.27) (8.40) (-4.56) (-0.28) (-3.14) (-8.32)
Firm Age 0.807*** 0.146 0.494*** 0.807*** 1.203*** 0.317 0.745*** 1.203*** 0.075*** 0.032 0.051** 0.075***
(5.63) (0.94) (4.41) (10.36) (4.96) (1.00) (3.49) (8.95) (3.86) (1.30) (2.70) (6.03)
Financial leverage -0.689*** -0.421*** -0.497*** -0.689*** -0.625* -0.653*** -0.648*** -0.625*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.50) (-4.49) (-4.79) (-6.57) (-2.55) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.24) (-0.17) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-0.27)
Auditor 1.081* 0.533 0.296 1.081*** 2.446** 0.807 0.891 2.446*** 0.166** 0.021 0.100* 0.166***
(2.28) (1.25) (0.85) (4.02) (2.92) (0.93) (1.35) (5.00) (3.04) (0.48) (2.49) (5.57)
GDP 0.163*** 0.105** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.328*** 0.207*** 0.241*** 0.328*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.45) (3.23) (3.82) (3.75) (4.68) (3.30) (3.94) (4.10) (3.45) (3.43) (3.58) (2.74)
Arab Spring 0.823* 1.483*** 1.404*** 0.823** 0.917 2.956*** 2.508*** 0.917 0.288*** 0.184*** 0.207*** 0.288***
(2.24) (4.50) (4.63) (2.92) (1.43) (5.18) (4.88) (1.86) (6.21) (3.76) (4.74) (9.20)
constant 0.761 2.727* 0.3 0.761 2.018 1.333 0.41 2.018*  0.733*** 1.132*** 0.990*** 0.733***
(-0.91) (2.51) (0.41) (-1.47) (-1.46) (0.57) (-0.31) (-2.40) (6.13) (7.74) (8.38) (9.30)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_CON measure the 
power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners   .  This model does not capture the effects 
of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.15  Results - Different Regressions Results using H_ DIFF as ownership concentration index without controlling industries, 
countries and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Diff 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(2.28) (1.77) (2.41) (3.88) (1.89) (1.99) (2.41) (3.20) (2.32) (0.27) (1.82) (3.62)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.031 0.014 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.089 0.079*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.004***
(2.27) (0.95) (1.66) (4.22) (4.03) (1.44) (4.26) (8.43) (-4.47) (-0.26) (-3.10) (-8.10)
Firm Age 0.816*** 0.16 0.501*** 0.816*** 1.213*** 0.345 0.755*** 1.213*** 0.076*** 0.032 0.052** 0.076***
(5.64) (1.03) (4.46) (10.42) (4.98) (1.09) (3.54) (9.01) (3.89) (1.30) (2.74) (6.09)
Financial leverage -0.688*** -0.421*** -0.498*** -0.688*** -0.625* -0.654*** -0.649*** -0.625*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.51) (-4.51) (-4.80) (-6.58) (-2.55) (-3.77) (-3.92) (-4.25) (-0.20) (-1.18) (-1.20) (-0.32)
Auditor 1.046* 0.545 0.283 1.046*** 2.407** 0.833 0.879 2.407*** 0.164** 0.021 0.099* 0.164***
(2.21) (1.28) (0.82) (3.89) (2.87) (0.96) (1.33) (4.93) (3.03) (0.48) (2.48) (5.55)
GDP 0.163*** 0.106** 0.122*** 0.163*** 0.328*** 0.207*** 0.243*** 0.328*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.46) (3.25) (3.85) (3.75) (4.69) (3.31) (3.96) (4.10) (3.46) (3.45) (3.60) (2.76)
Arab Spring 0.758* 1.437*** 1.357*** 0.758** 0.824 2.866*** 2.423*** 0.824 0.275*** 0.183*** 0.202*** 0.275***
(2.06) (4.28) (4.43) (2.69) (1.28) (5.05) (4.73) (1.67) (6.07) (3.86) (4.79) (9.01)
constant 0.481 2.932** 0.579 0.481 1.644 1.629 0.036 1.644*  0.776*** 1.137*** 1.016*** 0.776***
(0.59) (2.79) (0.82) (0.95) (-1.22) (0.72) (0.03) (-2.01) (6.90) (8.00) (8.95) (10.56)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.07
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_ DIFF  measure the 
power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to the square difference of 
the second and third largest ownership percentages  .  This model does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.16 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON51 as ownership concentration index without controlling industries, 
countries and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON51 1.438** 0.483 0.963 1.438*** 2.563** 0.516 1.655 2.563*** 0.187* 0.05 0.125 0.187***
(2.68) (0.52) (1.70) (4.74) (2.67) (0.38) (1.87) (4.66) (2.19) (0.45) (1.53) (3.59)
Firm Size 0.019* 0.027 0.016 0.019*** 0.072*** 0.098 0.083*** 0.072*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.003***
(2.47) (0.83) (1.95) (4.58) (4.16) (1.57) (4.53) (8.70) (-4.36) (-0.28) (-3.06) (-8.28)
Firm Age 0.803*** 0.159 0.506*** 0.803*** 1.183*** 0.343 0.768*** 1.183*** 0.077*** 0.032 0.052** 0.077***
(5.58) (1.04) (4.52) (10.28) (4.87) (1.09) (3.59) (8.78) (3.83) (1.29) (2.68) (5.96)
Financial leverage -0.689*** -0.424*** -0.497*** -0.689*** -0.627* -0.661*** -0.649*** -0.627*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.47) (-4.48) (-4.78) (-6.55) (-2.55) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.24) (-0.11) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-0.19)
Auditor 1.021* 0.523 0.235 1.021*** 2.406** 0.786 0.787 2.406*** 0.149** 0.021 0.094* 0.149***
(2.17) (1.23) (0.68) (3.82) (2.89) (0.90) (1.18) (4.97) (2.72) (0.49) (2.36) (4.93)
GDP 0.164*** 0.109*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.332*** 0.215*** 0.244*** 0.332*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.46) (3.36) (3.87) (3.76) (4.74) (3.42) (3.99) (4.14) (3.40) (3.48) (3.65) (2.70)
Arab Spring 0.774* 1.446*** 1.383*** 0.774** 0.843 2.873*** 2.467*** 0.843 0.280*** 0.184*** 0.205*** 0.280***
(2.10) (4.35) (4.54) (2.75) (1.31) (5.07) (4.81) (1.71) (6.10) (3.81) (4.74) (9.07)
constant 0.424 3.494*** 0.779 0.424 1.605 2.902 0.431 1.605*  0.801*** 1.138*** 1.037*** 0.801***
(0.52) (3.37) (1.11) (0.84) (1.21) (1.35) (0.35) (1.99) (7.40) (8.70) (9.61) (11.55)
AdjR-sqr 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON51   measure the 
power gained by the largest shareholders  which is a dummy variable of taking 1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity  .  This model does not 
capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.4.2 Results Controlling for Industry effects.  
Different regression results regarding the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, after controlling for industry effects are covered in this section. The results in 
tables 4.17 and  4.21 show that CON and CON51  have a significant positive effects on ROA, 
ROE, and Tobin’s Q in two regression models only: OLS and GMM. However,  tables 4.18, 
4.19 and 4.20, which use  HHI, H_Con and H_Diff respectively, demonstrate that ownership 
concentration affect ROA and ROE and Tobin’s Q  5% significance level.  
Regarding firm factors, even using a model that accounts for the effects of different industry 
types, firm size shows a different significance level in all firm performance measures in all 
the models. It shows a significant positive relationship with ROA and ROE and a negative 
significant relationship with Tobin’s Q. The age of the company also shows a 1% level of 
significant positive effects on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q in all regression models, save for 
the fixed effect model. 
The same as before controlling for the industry effects, financial leverage has negative effects 
on both ROA and ROE at a 1% level of significance, when using all regression models. 
However, this effect is not significant with Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the big four auditors have 
the same results; this variable has a positive relationship with all the firms’ performance 
levels.  
The effects of GDP growth on firm performance does not change after taking into 
consideration industry effects. It has a positive impact at the 1% level of significance in all 
firm performance measures. Also, the importance of the Arab Spring movement remains 
unchanged; this shows that it has a positive impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
level of significance, in most of the regression results.  
In short, it is obvious that controlling for industry effects does not change firm performance. 
Thus, the level of significance remains the same, yet there are small variations in the 
coefficient value of some variables. 
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Table ‎4.17 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON as ownership concentration index by controlling industries effects  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON 0.022* 0.003 0.01 0.022*** 0.032* 0.001 0.02 0.032*** 0.003** 0.003 0.003** 0.003***
(2.55) (0.24) (1.29) (4.31) (2.06) (0.02) (1.44) (3.43) (2.63) (1.92) (2.70) (4.30)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.025 0.014 0.017*** 0.070*** 0.099 0.080*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.22) (0.78) (1.79) (4.17) (4.00) (1.58) (4.39) (8.38) (-4.66) (-0.69) (-3.35) (-8.61)
Firm Age 0.608*** 0.163 0.401*** 0.608*** 0.936*** 0.345 0.629** 0.936*** 0.068** 0.029 0.046* 0.068***
(4.26) (1.07) (3.65) (7.87) (3.74) (1.10) (2.95) (6.80) (3.13) (1.18) (2.32) (4.96)
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.425*** -0.493*** -0.663*** -0.590* -0.662*** -0.639*** -0.590*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.53) (-4.48) (-4.81) (-6.60) (-2.44) (-3.75) (-3.89) (-4.09) (-0.13) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-0.21)
Auditor 1.364** 0.521 0.424 1.364*** 2.825*** 0.788 1.018 2.825*** 0.166** 0.017 0.102* 0.166***
(2.94) (1.22) (1.22) (5.19) (3.41) (0.90) (1.53) (5.88) (2.97) (0.40) (2.57) (5.42)
GDP 0.157*** 0.110*** 0.124*** 0.157*** 0.320*** 0.215*** 0.246*** 0.320*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013** 
(4.27) (3.37) (3.90) (3.62) (4.60) (3.43) (4.01) (4.01) (3.32) (3.46) (3.64) (2.62)
Arab Spring 0.877* 1.417*** 1.365*** 0.877** 1.008 2.862*** 2.496*** 1.008*  0.312*** 0.205*** 0.226*** 0.312***
(2.36) (4.21) (4.41) (3.08) (1.57) (5.05) (4.86) (2.03) (6.50) (3.86) (4.72) (9.40)
constant 3.063** 3.704** 1.671* 3.063*** 5.195** 2.976 3.107* 5.195*** 0.545*** 0.984*** 0.770*** 0.545***
(3.16) (3.23) (2.01) (5.02) (3.15) (1.25) (2.07) (5.08) (3.96) (6.12) (6.00) (6.03)
AdjR-sqr 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  .  This model captures only the effects of   industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5
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Table ‎4.18 Results - Different Regressions Results using HHI as ownership concentration index by controlling industries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
HHI 0.021* 0.036 0.025 0.021*** 0.027 0.061 0.04 0.027*  0.005* 0.003 0.005* 0.005***
(1.97) (1.35) (1.95) (3.38) (1.46) (1.27) (1.77) (2.51) (2.44) (1.05) (2.18) (3.90)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.029 0.013 0.017*** 0.069*** 0.094 0.079*** 0.069*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.16) (0.89) (1.64) (4.05) (3.98) (1.51) (4.29) (8.33) (-4.63) (-0.36) (-3.33) (-8.37)
Firm Age 0.601*** 0.143 0.388*** 0.601*** 0.929*** 0.315 0.611** 0.929*** 0.065** 0.03 0.045* 0.065***
(4.20) (0.94) (3.55) (7.77) (3.71) (1.00) (2.87) (6.76) (3.12) (1.24) (2.30) (4.94)
Financial leverage -0.664*** -0.425*** -0.495*** -0.664*** -0.590* -0.662*** -0.642*** -0.590*** 0.001 -0.01 -0.007 0.001
(-5.52) (-4.47) (-4.82) (-6.65) (-2.44) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.10) (-0.01) (-1.19) (-1.20) (-0.01)
Auditor 1.394** 0.579 0.453 1.394*** 2.854*** 0.882 1.059 2.854*** 0.181*** 0.016 0.106** 0.181***
(2.98) (1.35) (1.30) (5.26) (3.44) (1.02) (1.57) (5.90) (3.32) (0.36) (2.68) (6.10)
GDP 0.159*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.159*** 0.322*** 0.213*** 0.247*** 0.322*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.36) (3.34) (3.92) (3.68) (4.64) (3.41) (4.03) (4.04) (3.45) (3.44) (3.65) (2.76)
Arab Spring 0.671 1.513*** 1.345*** 0.671*  0.706 2.996*** 2.428*** 0.706 0.286*** 0.191*** 0.210*** 0.286***
(1.81) (4.60) (4.41) (2.37) (1.10) (5.39) (4.76) (1.43) (6.10) (3.69) (4.64) (9.01)
constant 2.113** 2.960** 1.507* 2.113*** 3.798** 1.93 2.601* 3.798*** 0.662*** 1.087*** 0.879*** 0.662***
(2.58) (2.67) (2.09) (4.02) (2.82) (0.84) (2.02) (4.49) (5.69) (7.21) (7.61) (8.52)
AdjR-sqr 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; HHI is 
Herfindahl index   = the sum of squared  largest shareholders  .  This model captures only the effects of   industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.19 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_CON as ownership concentration index by controlling industries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Con 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(2.09) (1.88) (2.39) (3.58) (1.66) (2.01) (2.39) (2.83) (2.33) (0.29) (1.73) (3.71)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.033 0.012 0.017*** 0.069*** 0.086 0.077*** 0.069*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.004***
(2.14) (1.01) (1.55) (4.02) (3.96) (1.38) (4.20) (8.28) (-4.61) (-0.28) (-3.24) (-8.33)
Firm Age 0.601*** 0.146 0.387*** 0.601*** 0.926*** 0.317 0.606** 0.926*** 0.065** 0.032 0.046* 0.065***
(4.19) (0.94) (3.51) (7.75) (3.69) (1.00) (2.83) (6.73) (3.13) (1.30) (2.35) (4.96)
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.421*** -0.493*** -0.663*** -0.590* -0.653*** -0.639*** -0.590*** 0.001 -0.01 -0.007 0.001
(-5.53) (-4.49) (-4.84) (-6.66) (-2.44) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.11) (0.04) (-1.18) (-1.14) (0.07)
Auditor 1.410** 0.533 0.49 1.410*** 2.889*** 0.807 1.137 2.889*** 0.181*** 0.021 0.108** 0.181***
(3.01) (1.25) (1.41) (5.31) (3.48) (0.93) (1.71) (5.97) (3.33) (0.48) (2.73) (6.13)
GDP 0.158*** 0.105** 0.123*** 0.158*** 0.321*** 0.207*** 0.244*** 0.321*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.32) (3.23) (3.86) (3.65) (4.62) (3.30) (3.97) (4.03) (3.39) (3.43) (3.60) (2.70)
Arab Spring 0.657 1.483*** 1.324*** 0.657*  0.694 2.956*** 2.402*** 0.694 0.280*** 0.184*** 0.204*** 0.280***
(1.78) (4.50) (4.34) (2.33) (1.08) (5.18) (4.65) (1.41) (6.07) (3.76) (4.66) (8.96)
constant 2.115** 2.727* 1.584* 2.115*** 3.837** 1.333 2.818* 3.837*** 0.670*** 1.132*** 0.894*** 0.670***
(2.60) (2.51) (2.21) (4.04) (2.86) (0.57) (2.19) (4.55) (5.81) (7.74) (7.78) (8.70)
AdjR-sqr 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_CON 
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners   .  This model 
captures only the effects of   industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.20 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_ DIFF as ownership concentration index by controlling industries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Diff 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*  0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(1.66) (1.77) (2.05) (2.82) (1.43) (1.99) (2.16) (2.40) (2.15) (0.27) (1.70) (3.39)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.031 0.012 0.017*** 0.069*** 0.089 0.077*** 0.069*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.004***
(2.17) (0.95) (1.55) (4.06) (3.97) (1.44) (4.17) (8.29) (-4.53) (-0.26) (-3.20) (-8.12)
Firm Age 0.605*** 0.16 0.392*** 0.605*** 0.931*** 0.345 0.612** 0.931*** 0.066** 0.032 0.046* 0.066***
(4.20) (1.03) (3.54) (7.79) (3.70) (1.09) (2.86) (6.75) (3.15) (1.30) (2.38) (4.99)
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.421*** -0.493*** -0.663*** -0.590* -0.654*** -0.640*** -0.590*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.54) (4.51) (-4.85) (-6.67) (-2.44) (-3.77) (-3.92) (-4.12) (-0.02) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-0.03)
Auditor 1.389** 0.545 0.483 1.389*** 2.868*** 0.833 1.133 2.868*** 0.181*** 0.021 0.108** 0.181***
(2.97) (1.28) (1.39) (5.24) (3.46) (0.96) (1.71) (5.93) (3.34) (0.48) (2.73) (6.15)
GDP 0.158*** 0.106** 0.124*** 0.158*** 0.321*** 0.207*** 0.245*** 0.321*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.33) (3.25) (3.89) (3.65) (4.63) (3.31) (4.00) (4.03) (3.39) (3.45) (3.62) (2.73)
Arab Spring 0.608 1.437*** 1.283*** 0.608*  0.623 2.866*** 2.326*** 0.623 0.268*** 0.183*** 0.199*** 0.268***
(1.66) (4.28) (4.16) (2.16) (0.97) (5.05) (4.51) (1.26) (5.94) (3.86) (4.71) (8.79)
constant 1.928* 2.932** 1.376* 1.928*** 3.585** 1.629 2.466* 3.585*** 0.707*** 1.137*** 0.916*** 0.707***
(2.41) (2.79) (1.96) (3.74) (2.74) (0.72) (1.96) (4.36) (6.50) (8.00) (8.26) (9.83)
AdjR-sqr 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  .  This model captures only the effects of   industries fixed effects; z-statistics are 
within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.21 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON51 as ownership concentration index by controlling industries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON51 1.157* 0.483 0.796 1.157*** 2.188* 0.516 1.44 2.188*** 0.173* 0.05 0.117 0.173***
(2.19) (0.52) (1.42) (3.84) (2.29) (0.38) (1.63) (3.99) (2.01) (0.45) (1.42) (3.31)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.027 0.014 0.018*** 0.071*** 0.098 0.080*** 0.071*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.003***
(2.32) (0.83) (1.80) (4.32) (4.06) (1.57) (4.42) (8.49) (-4.47) (-0.28) (-3.20) (-8.41)
Firm Age 0.594*** 0.159 0.394*** 0.594*** 0.903*** 0.343 0.619** 0.903*** 0.066** 0.032 0.046* 0.066***
(4.13) (1.04) (3.58) (7.64) (3.60) (1.09) (2.89) (6.55) (3.10) (1.29) (2.33) (4.90)
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.424*** -0.493*** -0.663*** -0.593* -0.661*** -0.639*** -0.593*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.51) (-4.48) (-4.82) (-6.65) (-2.44) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.12) (-0.11) (-1.18) (-1.14) (-0.19)
Auditor 1.378** 0.523 0.445 1.378*** 2.882*** 0.786 1.058 2.882*** 0.168** 0.021 0.104** 0.168***
(2.96) (1.23) (1.28) (5.23) (3.49) (0.90) (1.58) (6.01) (3.06) (0.49) (2.63) (5.59)
GDP 0.159*** 0.109*** 0.124*** 0.159*** 0.325*** 0.215*** 0.246*** 0.325*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014** 
(4.34) (3.36) (3.91) (3.67) (4.68) (3.42) (4.02) (4.08) (3.34) (3.48) (3.66) (2.66)
Arab Spring 0.618 1.446*** 1.302*** 0.618*  0.635 2.873*** 2.360*** 0.635 0.272*** 0.184*** 0.202*** 0.272***
(1.68) (4.35) (4.25) (2.20) (0.99) (5.07) (4.57) (1.29) (5.96) (3.81) (4.67) (8.83)
constant 1.894* 3.494*** 1.247 1.894*** 3.563** 2.902 2.198 3.563*** 0.726*** 1.138*** 0.931*** 0.726***
(2.38) (3.37) (1.79) (3.69) (2.75) (1.35) (1.78) (4.38) (6.91) (8.70) (8.71) (10.61)
AdjR-sqr 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON51   
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is a dummy variable of taking 1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity  .  
This model captures only the effects of   industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.4.3 Results Controlling for Country Effects.  
The illustration of different regression results regarding the effects of ownership concentration 
on firm performance after controlling for country effects are presented in tables 4.22, 4.23, 
4.24, 4.25 and 4.26. The effects of ownership concentration remain unchanged; thus, CON, 
HHI, H_Con, H_Diff, and CON51 affect firm performance both significantly and positively. 
Like the other results, these effects depend on the regression models used.  
The effects of firm size also do not change when controlling for the effects of different 
countries; it demonstrates a significant positive relationship with ROA when using a GMM 
regression only. However, it has significant positive effects on ROE and a negative significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q in all regressions, except for fixed effects.  
Firm age lost its significance in Tobin’s Q after taking into consideration country effects. 
However, firm age in both ROA and ROE remain unchanged at a 1% significance level in 
OLS, random effects, and GMM regression models. Though financial leverage effects on firm 
performance do not change, leverage negatively affects ROA and ROE at the 1% level of 
significance using all regression models. Auditor type has no effect on Tobin’s Q after 
controlling for country effects. Nevertheless, it still affects the accounting ratios positively.  
GDP growth results remain the same in all regressions, even after controlling for country 
effects; it has a 1% level of significance that positively affects firm performance. 
Furthermore, the Arab Spring effects remain unchanged; this variable has a positive impact on 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% level of significance in most of the regression results.  
In summary, controlling for country effects has no impact on the significance levels of the 
dependent variables when investigating their relationship to firm performance. However, the 
role of the big four auditors is affected when controlling for country differences; this variable 
no longer affects Tobin’s Q. 
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Table ‎4.22 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON as ownership concentration index by controlling countries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON 0.029** 0.003 0.014 0.029*** 0.032 0.001 0.022 0.032** 0.007*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.007***
(3.19) (0.24) (1.88) (5.39) (1.95) (0.02) (1.53) (3.24) (5.29) (1.92) (4.20) (8.36)
Firm Size 0.012 0.025 0.009 0.012** 0.064*** 0.099 0.077*** 0.064*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.66) (0.78) (1.11) (2.84) (4.11) (1.58) (4.39) (8.01) (-5.36) (-0.69) (-5.18) (-11.56)
Firm Age 0.513*** 0.163 0.383*** 0.513*** 0.703** 0.345 0.606** 0.703*** 0.037 0.029 0.026 0.037*  
(3.39) (1.07) (3.33) (5.96) (2.63) (1.10) (2.70) (4.64) (1.63) (1.18) (1.26) (2.49)
Financial leverage -0.729*** -0.425*** -0.511*** -0.729*** -0.737** -0.662*** -0.679*** -0.737*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.006 -0.001
(-5.54) (-4.48) (-4.77) (-6.51) (-2.91) (-3.75) (-3.95) (-4.68) (-0.10) (-1.16) (-1.12) (-0.16)
Auditor 0.811 0.521 0.037 0.811*  2.401** 0.788 0.38 2.401*** 0.015 0.017 0.031 0.015
(1.49) (1.22) (0.10) (2.49) (2.68) (0.90) (0.53) (4.35) (0.25) (0.40) (0.80) (0.44)
GDP 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.119** 0.234*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.234** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*  
(3.54) (3.37) (3.46) (2.67) (3.64) (3.43) (3.50) (2.84) (2.70) (3.46) (3.33) (2.03)
Arab Spring 1.659*** 1.417*** 1.594*** 1.659*** 3.096*** 2.862*** 3.064*** 3.096*** 0.196*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 0.196***
(4.79) (4.21) (4.80) (4.82) (5.43) (5.05) (5.54) (5.27) (3.56) (3.86) (4.01) (3.79)
constant 1.476 3.704** 3.196** 1.476 0.733 2.976 2.63 0.733 0.449* 0.984*** 0.580*** 0.449***
(1.05) (3.23) (2.62) (1.85) (0.34) (1.25) (1.38) (0.56) (2.57) (6.12) (3.71) (4.10)
AdjR-sqr 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  .  This model captures only the effects of  countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.23 Results - Different Regressions Results using HHI as ownership concentration index by controlling countries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
HHI 0.026* 0.036 0.032* 0.026*** 0.023 0.061 0.045 0.023*  0.008*** 0.003 0.007** 0.008***
(2.33) (1.35) (2.41) (3.97) (1.20) (1.27) (1.91) (2.06) (3.64) (1.05) (3.12) (5.60)
Firm Size 0.012 0.029 0.008 0.012** 0.065*** 0.094 0.076*** 0.065*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.73) (0.89) (0.97) (2.98) (4.17) (1.51) (4.27) (8.15) (-5.20) (-0.36) (-5.00) (-11.07)
Firm Age 0.527*** 0.143 0.375** 0.527*** 0.722** 0.315 0.598** 0.722*** 0.038 0.03 0.027 0.038** 
(3.44) (0.94) (3.26) (6.08) (2.69) (1.00) (2.66) (4.76) (1.72) (1.24) (1.33) (2.63)
Financial leverage -0.730*** -0.425*** -0.512*** -0.730*** -0.738** -0.662*** -0.682*** -0.738*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.55) (-4.47) (-4.79) (-6.56) (-2.91) (-3.75) (-3.97) (-4.69) (-0.00) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-0.00)
Auditor 0.853 0.579 0.062 0.853** 2.452** 0.882 0.348 2.452*** 0.023 0.016 0.03 0.023
(1.56) (1.35) (0.17) (2.62) (2.74) (1.02) (0.49) (4.44) (0.38) (0.36) (0.77) (0.67)
GDP 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.119** 0.234*** 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.234** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*  
(3.55) (3.34) (3.44) (2.67) (3.64) (3.41) (3.49) (2.85) (2.71) (3.44) (3.31) (2.02)
Arab Spring 1.527*** 1.513*** 1.570*** 1.527*** 2.939*** 2.996*** 3.019*** 2.939*** 0.171** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.171***
(4.48) (4.60) (4.78) (4.44) (5.19) (5.39) (5.48) (5.00) (3.17) (3.69) (3.74) (3.34)
constant 2.757* 2.960** 3.609** 2.757*** 2.172 1.93 3.297 2.172 0.721*** 1.087*** 0.781*** 0.721***
(2.20) (2.67) (3.21) (3.86) (1.15) (0.84) (1.91) (1.86) (4.67) (7.21) (5.44) (7.45)
AdjR-sqr 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.10
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; HHI is 
Herfindahl index   = the sum of squared  largest shareholders  .  This model captures only the effects of  countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.24 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_CON as ownership concentration index by controlling countries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Con 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*  0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001***
(2.38) (1.88) (2.78) (4.05) (1.35) (2.01) (2.45) (2.28) (3.51) (0.29) (2.66) (5.39)
Firm Size 0.012 0.033 0.007 0.012** 0.065*** 0.086 0.074*** 0.065*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.71) (1.01) (0.85) (2.94) (4.14) (1.38) (4.17) (8.11) (-5.20) (-0.28) (-4.93) (-11.04)
Firm Age 0.526*** 0.146 0.375** 0.526*** 0.719** 0.317 0.594** 0.719*** 0.039 0.032 0.029 0.039** 
(3.43) (0.94) (3.23) (6.07) (2.68) (1.00) (2.63) (4.74) (1.74) (1.30) (1.39) (2.66)
Financial leverage -0.729*** -0.421*** -0.509*** -0.729*** -0.738** -0.653*** -0.678*** -0.738*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.006 -0.001
(-5.55) (-4.49) (-4.80) (-6.56) (-2.91) (-3.75) (-3.97) (-4.70) (-0.06) (-1.18) (-1.10) (-0.09)
Auditor 0.865 0.533 0.032 0.865** 2.461** 0.807 0.385 2.461*** 0.026 0.021 0.037 0.026
(1.58) (1.25) (0.09) (2.66) (2.75) (0.93) (0.54) (4.46) (0.43) (0.48) (0.95) (0.77)
GDP 0.117*** 0.105** 0.109*** 0.117** 0.232*** 0.207*** 0.214*** 0.232** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011
(3.50) (3.23) (3.36) (2.64) (3.62) (3.30) (3.43) (2.83) (2.62) (3.43) (3.23) (1.96)
Arab Spring 1.497*** 1.483*** 1.535*** 1.497*** 2.917*** 2.956*** 2.978*** 2.917*** 0.160** 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.160** 
(4.41) (4.50) (4.67) (4.36) (5.15) (5.18) (5.34) (4.97) (3.04) (3.76) (3.67) (3.20)
constant 2.781* 2.727* 3.557** 2.781*** 2.17 1.333 3.137 2.17 0.733*** 1.132*** 0.795*** 0.733***
(2.22) (2.51) (3.16) (3.90) (1.15) (0.57) (1.81) (1.86) (4.78) (7.74) (5.57) (7.66)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_CON 
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners   .  This model 
captures only the effects of  countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.25 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_ DIFF as ownership concentration index by controlling countries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Diff 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001***
(1.85) (1.77) (2.36) (3.10) (1.14) (1.99) (2.25) (1.91) (2.94) (0.27) (2.38) (4.46)
Firm Size 0.013 0.031 0.008 0.013** 0.065*** 0.089 0.074*** 0.065*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.80) (0.95) (0.92) (3.08) (4.17) (1.44) (4.18) (8.16) (-5.13) (-0.26) (-4.86) (-10.84)
Firm Age 0.536*** 0.16 0.386*** 0.536*** 0.728** 0.345 0.610** 0.728*** 0.041 0.032 0.03 0.041** 
(3.48) (1.03) (3.32) (6.16) (2.71) (1.09) (2.70) (4.79) (1.82) (1.30) (1.47) (2.79)
Financial leverage -0.730*** -0.421*** -0.510*** -0.730*** -0.738** -0.654*** -0.679*** -0.738*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.56) (-4.51) (-4.81) (-6.57) (-2.92) (-3.77) (-3.98) (-4.71) (-0.00) (-1.18) (-1.12) (-0.00)
Auditor 0.87 0.545 0.036 0.870** 2.465** 0.833 0.376 2.465*** 0.027 0.021 0.037 0.027
(1.58) (1.28) (30.10) (2.67) (2.75) (0.96) (0.52) (4.47) (0.45) (0.48) (0.94) (0.79)
GDP 0.118*** 0.106** 0.110*** 0.118** 0.233*** 0.207*** 0.215*** 0.233** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011*  
(3.53) (3.25) (3.39) (2.67) (3.63) (3.31) (3.44) (2.84) (2.68) (3.45) (3.28) (2.00)
Arab Spring 1.469*** 1.437*** 1.499*** 1.469*** 2.890*** 2.866*** 2.920*** 2.890*** 0.153** 0.183*** 0.175*** 0.153** 
(4.33) (4.28) (4.53) (4.28) (5.11) (5.05) (5.25) (4.93) (2.94) (3.86) (3.65) (3.09)
constant 3.005* 2.932** 3.876*** 3.005*** 2.389 1.629 3.629* 2.389*  0.796*** 1.137*** 0.841*** 0.796***
(2.43) (2.79) (3.50) (4.27) (1.28) (0.72) (2.14) (2.08) (5.51) (8.00) (6.18) (8.91)
AdjR-sqr 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  .  This model captures only the effects of  countries fixed effects; z-statistics are 
within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.26  Results - Different Regressions Results using CON51 as ownership concentration index by controlling countries effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON51 1.304* 0.483 0.998 1.304*** 2.055* 0.516 1.633 2.055*** 0.255** 0.05 0.165* 0.255***
(2.42) (0.52) (1.72) (4.19) (2.12) (0.38) (1.81) (3.67) (3.01) (0.45) (2.03) (4.76)
Firm Size 0.014* 0.027 0.01 0.014*** 0.066*** 0.098 0.078*** 0.066*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005***
(1.98) (0.83) (1.24) (3.39) (4.23) (1.57) (4.48) (8.30) (-5.04) (-0.28) (-4.87) (-10.91)
Firm Age 0.523*** 0.159 0.385*** 0.523*** 0.703** 0.343 0.609** 0.703*** 0.04 0.032 0.03 0.040** 
(3.42) (1.04) (3.34) (6.04) (2.64) (1.09) (2.70) (4.64) (1.76) (1.29) (1.42) (2.70)
Financial leverage -0.730*** -0.424*** -0.510*** -0.730*** -0.741** -0.661*** -0.679*** -0.741*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.53) (-4.48) (-4.78) (-6.55) (-2.92) (-3.75) (-3.96) (-4.71) (-0.06) (-1.18) (-1.12) (-0.09)
Auditor 0.843 0.523 0.025 0.843** 2.415** 0.786 0.401 2.415*** 0.024 0.021 0.038 0.024
(1.56) (1.23) (0.07) (2.60) (2.72) (0.90) (0.56) (4.38) (0.39) (0.49) (0.97) (0.69)
GDP 0.119*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.119** 0.233*** 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.233** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*  
(3.54) (3.36) (3.45) (2.67) (3.63) (3.42) (3.49) (2.84) (2.76) (3.48) (3.37) (2.04)
Arab Spring 1.495*** 1.446*** 1.522*** 1.495*** 2.934*** 2.873*** 2.958*** 2.934*** 0.157** 0.184*** 0.179*** 0.157** 
(4.39) (4.35) (4.61) (4.35) (5.17) (5.07) (5.31) (5.00) (2.97) (3.81) (3.66) (3.14)
constant 2.994* 3.494*** 3.895*** 2.994*** 2.357 2.902 3.671* 2.357*  0.798*** 1.138*** 0.842*** 0.798***
(2.42) (3.37) (3.53) (4.26) (1.26) (1.35) (2.18) (2.05) (5.45) (8.70) (6.19) (8.90)
AdjR-sqr 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON51   
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is a dummy variable of taking 1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity  .  
This model captures only the effects of  countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.4.4 Results Controlling for Year effects.  
Regression results of the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance after 
controlling for year are presented in tables 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.30 and 4.31. Regarding the 
consequences of ownership concentration, it appears that even after controlling for the effects 
of different years, all concentration indexes used in this study have significant positive effects 
on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, when using OLS and GMM at the 10% and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively. Also tables 4.30 and 4.31 show that H_Con and H_Diff 
respectively, have some effect on ROA and ROE when using random and fixed regression 
models at the 5% level of significance.  
For firm factors, despite using a model that accounted for the effects of different years, firm 
size has a different significance level with all firm performance measures in all the models, 
depending on the regression type. It shows a significant positive relationship with ROA and 
ROE and a negative significant association with Tobin’s Q. Firm age also shows effects on 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% level of significance and is positive in most regression 
models, save for the fixed effect model. 
Similar to other results when controlling for industry and country effects, financial leverage 
negatively affects ROA and ROE at the 1% level of significance using all regression models, 
but this effect is not significant with Tobin’s Q. Also, the effects of auditors on firm 
performance do not change after controlling for year effects; it has a positive relationship with 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q.  
GDP growth effect on firm performance does not change after controlling for year effects. It 
positively affects ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% level of significance. Also, the Arab 
Spring variable remains unchanged after controlling for year effects; it confirms a positive 
relationship with ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% level of significance in most of the 
regression results.  
Briefly, even though years were controlled for, the year effects did not have any impact on the 
significance effects of independent variables on firm performance. As a result, the level of 
significance remains the same, with small variations in the coefficient value of some 
variables. 
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Table ‎4.27 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON as ownership concentration index by controlling year effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON 0.029** 0.011 0.013 0.029*** 0.043** 0.002 0.031* 0.043*** 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.003***
(3.11) (0.87) (1.47) (5.43) (2.61) (0.10) (1.96) (4.44) (2.38) (1.14) (1.98) (3.88)
Firm Size 0.018* 0.029 0.016 0.018*** 0.072*** 0.099 0.083*** 0.072*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.33) (-0.87) (1.92) (4.34) (4.09) (1.58) (4.51) (8.55) (-4.75) (-0.80) (-3.43) (-8.83)
Firm Age 0.818*** 0.151 0.518*** 0.818*** 1.228*** 0.358 0.799*** 1.228*** 0.075*** 0.028 0.050** 0.075***
(5.72) (0.99) (4.62) (10.46) (5.07) (1.14) (3.77) (9.12) (3.64) (1.13) (2.61) (5.69)
Financial leverage -0.688*** -0.427*** -0.500*** -0.688*** -0.624* -0.666*** -0.651*** -0.624*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.49) (-4.53) (-4.79) (-6.51) (-2.54) (-3.77) (-3.90) (-4.21) (-0.09) (-1.15) (-1.19) (-0.14)
Auditor 1.018* 0.529 0.224 1.018*** 2.378** -0.763 0.805 2.378*** 0.143** 0.022 0.094* 0.143***
(2.17) (1.23) (0.64) (3.82) (2.85) (-0.87) (1.21) (4.91) (2.60) (0.50) (2.35) (4.72)
GDP 0.166*** 0.112*** 0.126*** 0.166*** 0.333*** 0.216*** 0.247*** 0.333*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015** 
(4.49) (3.47) (4.01) (3.77) (4.65) (3.38) (3.99) (4.07) (3.70) (3.82) (4.00) (2.94)
Arab Spring 1.091** 1.508*** 1.459*** 1.091*** 1.117 2.799*** 2.426*** 1.117*  0.380*** 0.216*** 0.254*** 0.380***
(2.77) (4.37) (4.67) (3.64) (1.60) (4.83) (4.67) (2.11) (6.96) (3.48) (4.51) (10.12)
constant 1.985* 3.928** 0.145 1.985** 3.450* 2.992 0.615 3.450** 0.416** 0.947*** 0.788*** 0.416***
(2.03) (3.24) (0.17) (2.87) (-2.02) (1.22) (-0.39) (-2.90) (2.87) (5.48) (5.59) (4.13)
AdjR-sqr 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.12
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  .  This model captures only the effects of  year fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.28 Results - Different Regressions Results using HHI as ownership concentration index by controlling year effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
HHI 0.029** 0.034 0.031* 0.029*** 0.038* 0.071 0.051* 0.038*** 0.005* 0.002 0.004* 0.005***
(2.66) (1.19) (2.34) (4.63) (2.04) (1.40) (2.23) (3.52) (2.47) (0.55) (1.96) (3.93)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.029 0.014 0.017*** 0.071*** 0.100 0.081*** 0.071*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.23) (0.89) (1.74) (4.15) (4.04) (1.59) (4.38) (8.45) (-4.75) (-0.71) (-3.46) (-8.64)
Firm Age 0.805*** 0.143 0.498*** 0.805*** 1.214*** 0.345 0.770*** 1.214*** 0.071*** 0.028 0.048* 0.071***
(5.59) (0.94) (4.47) (10.27) (4.99) (1.10) (3.64) (9.01) (3.62) (1.13) (2.55) (5.67)
Financial leverage -0.691*** -0.426*** -0.501*** -0.691*** -0.626* -0.666*** -0.655*** -0.626*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.49) (-4.50) (-4.80) (-6.57) (-2.55) (-3.77) (-3.92) (-4.24) (-0.22) (-1.17) (-1.23) (-0.36)
Auditor 1.057* 0.569 0.264 1.057*** 2.416** 0.841 0.852 2.416*** 0.160** 0.02 0.099* 0.160***
(2.23) (1.32) (0.76) (3.94) (2.88) (0.97) (1.26) (4.95) (2.97) (0.46) (2.46) (5.44)
GDP 0.170*** 0.111*** 0.127*** 0.170*** 0.338*** 0.213*** 0.248*** 0.338*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016** 
(4.62) (3.45) (4.03) (3.87) (4.72) (3.36) (4.01) (4.13) (3.86) (3.80) (4.02) (3.11)
Arab Spring 0.870* 1.516*** 1.426*** 0.870** 0.792 2.794*** 2.348*** 0.792 0.358*** 0.214*** 0.248*** 0.358***
(2.17) (4.39) (4.57) (2.90) (1.12) (4.83) (4.51) (1.49) (6.63) (3.49) (4.54) (9.94)
constant 0.883 2.932* 0.339 0.883 1.801 2.046 0.139 1.801 0.509*** 1.014*** 0.851*** 0.509***
(1.01) (2.58) (0.44) (1.39) (1.21) (0.87) (0.10) (1.68) (4.02) (6.32) (6.65) (5.68)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.11
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; HHI is 
Herfindahl index   = the sum of squared  largest shareholders  .  This model captures only the effects of  year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.29 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_CON as ownership concentration index by controlling year effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Con 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(2.80) (1.86) (2.83) (4.85) (2.22) (2.05) (2.74) (3.78) (2.50) (0.11) (1.80) (3.96)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.035 0.013 0.017*** 0.070*** 0.088 0.079*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.20) (1.07) (1.61) (4.09) (4.01) (1.41) (4.28) (8.39) (-4.74) (-0.68) (-3.41) (-8.63)
Firm Age 0.802*** 0.139 0.493*** 0.802*** 1.208*** 0.337 0.758*** 1.208*** 0.071*** 0.028 0.049* 0.071***
(5.56) (0.90) (4.38) (10.21) (4.96) (1.06) (3.56) (8.95) (3.61) (1.15) (2.57) (5.66)
Financial leverage -0.690*** -0.422*** -0.500*** -0.690*** -0.626* -0.658*** -0.652*** -0.626*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.50) (-4.53) (-4.82) (-6.59) (-2.55) (-3.77) (-3.92) (-4.24) (-0.19) (-1.16) (-1.19) (-0.32)
Auditor 1.073* 0.537 0.303 1.073*** 2.448** 0.775 0.927 2.448*** 0.161** 0.022 0.100* 0.161***
(2.26) (1.25) (0.87) (3.99) (2.92) (-0.89) (1.40) (5.01) (2.99) (0.50) (2.50) (5.47)
GDP 0.169*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.169*** 0.337*** 0.206** 0.245*** 0.337*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016** 
(4.57) (3.32) (3.95) (3.84) (4.69) (3.24) (3.93) (4.11) (3.82) (3.76) (3.95) (3.07)
Arab Spring 0.882* 1.544*** 1.447*** 0.882** 0.812 2.847*** 2.386*** 0.812 0.358*** 0.214*** 0.250*** 0.358***
(2.21) (4.50) (4.66) (2.94) (1.15) (4.90) (4.58) (1.53) (6.65) (3.44) (4.52) (9.97)
constant 0.97 2.655* 0.164 0.97 1.948 1.517 0.213 1.948 0.499*** 1.036*** 0.849*** 0.499***
(-1.10) (2.38) (0.21) (-1.52) (-1.30) (0.64) (-0.15) (-1.81) (3.88) (6.54) (6.50) (5.50)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.12
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_CON 
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners   .  This model 
captures only the effects of  year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.30 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_ DIFF as ownership concentration index by controlling year effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Diff 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001***
(2.27) (1.77) (2.41) (3.86) (1.89) (2.02) (2.44) (3.20) (2.28) (0.15) (1.78) (3.58)
Firm Size 0.017* 0.034 0.013 0.017*** 0.070*** 0.091 0.079*** 0.070*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.24) (1.03) (1.61) (4.15) (4.03) (1.46) (4.26) (8.42) (-4.65) (-0.70) (-3.37) (-8.42)
Firm Age 0.811*** 0.152 0.499*** 0.811*** 1.218*** 0.364 0.767*** 1.218*** 0.071*** 0.028 0.049** 0.071***
(5.57) (0.98) (4.42) (10.28) (4.98) (1.15) (3.60) (9.01) (3.64) (1.15) (2.60) (5.72)
Financial leverage -0.689*** -0.423*** -0.500*** -0.689*** -0.626* -0.659*** -0.653*** -0.626*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.51) (-4.54) (-4.83) (-6.60) (-2.55) (-3.79) (-3.94) (-4.25) (-0.22) (-1.16) (-1.20) (-0.36)
Auditor 1.038* 0.548 0.289 1.038*** 2.410** 0.801 0.915 2.410*** 0.159** 0.022 0.100* 0.159***
(2.19) (1.28) (0.83) (3.87) (2.87) (0.92) (1.38) (4.94) (2.97) (0.50) (2.49) (5.45)
GDP 0.169*** 0.108*** 0.126*** 0.169*** 0.338*** 0.208** 0.247*** 0.338*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016** 
(4.59) (3.35) (4.00) (3.85) (4.70) (3.27) (3.97) (4.12) (3.83) (3.79) (3.98) (3.11)
Arab Spring 0.814* 1.498*** 1.401*** 0.814** 0.713 2.751*** 2.301*** 0.713 0.345*** 0.214*** 0.245*** 0.345***
(2.03) (4.30) (4.46) (2.71) (1.00) (4.74) (4.42) (1.34) (6.55) (3.53) (4.57) (9.91)
constant 0.703 2.836** 0.42 0.703 1.589 1.797 0.204 1.589 0.541*** 1.036*** 0.872*** 0.541***
(-0.81) (2.61) (0.55) (-1.11) (1.08) (0.78) (0.15) (1.49) (4.45) (6.79) (6.99) (6.31)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.12
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  .  This model captures only the effects of  year fixed effects; z-statistics are within 
parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.31 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON51 as ownership concentration index by controlling year effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON51 1.428** 0.413 0.94 1.428*** 2.574** 0.57 1.7 2.574*** 0.177* 0.021 0.107 0.177***
(2.65) (0.44) (1.66) (4.69) (2.66) (0.42) (1.92) (4.66) (2.06) (0.20) (1.34) (3.38)
Firm Size 0.019* 0.03 0.016 0.019*** 0.073*** 0.099 0.083*** 0.073*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(2.44) (0.92) (1.91) (4.52) (4.17) (1.57) (4.54) (8.69) (-4.55) (-0.71) (-3.35) (-8.64)
Firm Age 0.800*** 0.149 0.505*** 0.800*** 1.190*** 0.358 0.781*** 1.190*** 0.072*** 0.028 0.049* 0.072***
(5.52) (0.98) (4.50) (10.15) (4.88) (1.14) (3.66) (8.80) (3.60) (1.15) (2.56) (5.63)
Financial leverage -0.690*** -0.426*** -0.500*** -0.690*** -0.628* -0.665*** -0.652*** -0.628*** -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.47) (-4.51) (-4.80) (-6.56) (-2.54) (-3.78) (-3.92) (-4.24) (-0.13) (-1.16) (-1.19) (-0.21)
Auditor 1.014* 0.528 0.241 1.014*** 2.410** 0.759 0.824 2.410*** 0.144** 0.022 0.094* 0.144***
(2.15) (1.23) (0.69) (3.80) (2.89) (0.87) (1.24) (4.98) (2.66) (0.51) (2.36) (4.84)
GDP 0.170*** 0.112*** 0.127*** 0.170*** 0.340*** 0.215*** 0.248*** 0.340*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016** 
(4.58) (3.47) (4.02) (3.85) (4.75) (3.38) (3.99) (4.16) (3.76) (3.83) (4.03) (3.02)
Arab Spring 0.816* 1.521*** 1.421*** 0.816** 0.705 2.799*** 2.337*** 0.705 0.349*** 0.214*** 0.247*** 0.349***
(2.04) (4.41) (4.55) (2.72) (0.99) (4.83) (4.48) (1.33) (6.56) (3.48) (4.54) (9.88)
constant 0.615 3.375** 0.625 0.615 1.486 3.009 0.6 1.486 0.567*** 1.037*** 0.895*** 0.567***
(0.71) (3.15) (0.83) (0.97) (-1.01) (1.36) (0.44) (-1.40) (4.87) (7.42) (7.57) (6.92)
AdjR-sqr 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.12
Industry effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON51   
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is a dummy variable of taking 1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity  .  
This model captures only the effects of  year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.4.5 Results with Controlling for Country, Industry and Year effects.  
Tables 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, 4.35 and 4.36 show how the significance of independent variables are 
used to indicate firm performance change when regression models take into account the 
effects of country, industry, and years together. The results prove that the effects of ownership 
concentration change depending on concentration indexes and regressions type. Tables 4.32 
and 4.33 show that, although CON and HHI still affects ROA and Tobin’s Q in some 
regression types, they show no significant effects on ROE. A noticeable change in this 
methodology is that all concentration indexes affect Tobin’s Q positively and significantly in 
all regression models, save for the fixed effect regression. Tables 4.34 and 4.35 demonstrate 
that both H_Con and H_Diff have some degrees of effect on firm performance.  
The significance effect on firm size also changed, but this change is one seen in one firm 
performance variable, ROA. However, all concentration indexes show a significant effect on 
ROA when using GMM only. All concentration indexes positively affect ROE and negatively 
affect Tobin’s Q in all regression models, save for the fixed effect regression.  
Firm age lost its significant effect on Tobin’s Q after taking into consideration country, 
industry, and year effects together. Although firm age still affects both ROA and ROE, the 
level of significance decreased. Nevertheless, financial leverage affects ROA, and its effect on 
ROE did not change; it still affects them negatively at 1% level of significant using all 
regression models. Auditor type shows no change regarding its effect on ROA and ROE; 
though, it no longer affects Tobin’s Q.  
GDP growth results remain the same in all regressions, even after controlling for country, 
industry, and year effects together; it has a 1% level of significance that positively affects all 
firm performance measures. Furthermore, the Arab Spring variable remains unchanged; it 
shows a positive impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q at the 1% level of significance in most 
of the regression results.  
In summary, it is noticeable that controlling industries, countries and years in the one 
regression model, has dramatic impacts on the significance effects of the dependent variables. 
This was not applied to financial leverage, GDP growth, and the big four auditors, which have 
the same effects on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Thus, controlling for all the effects in one 
regression shows the effects of the independent variables in each industry type in a single 
country for a single year. 
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Table ‎4.32 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON as ownership concentration index by controlling industries, countries and 
years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON 0.022* 0.011 0.01 0.022*** 0.022 0.002 0.02 0.022*  0.006*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.006***
(2.28) (0.87) (1.09) (3.92) (1.29) (0.10) (1.23) (2.18) (4.54) (1.14) (3.52) (7.44)
Firm Size 0.012 0.029 0.009 0.012** 0.064*** 0.099 0.076*** 0.064*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.67) (0.87) (1.13) (2.87) (4.09) (1.58) (4.35) (8.02) (-5.36) (-0.80) (-5.19) (-11.48)
Firm Age 0.309* 0.151 0.280* 0.309*** 0.44 0.358 0.483* 0.440** 0.027 0.028 0.021 0.027
(2.04) (0.99) (2.45) (3.63) (1.63) (1.14) (2.15) (2.89) (1.12) (1.13) (0.99) (1.73)
Financial leverage -0.698*** -0.427*** -0.506*** -0.698*** -0.698** -0.666*** -0.671*** -0.698*** -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-5.55) (-4.53) (-4.84) (-6.61) (-2.78) (-3.77) (-3.97) (-4.57) (-0.39) (-1.15) (-1.02) (-0.60)
Auditor 1.224* 0.529 0.16 1.224*** 2.935** 0.763 0.646 2.935*** 0.037 0.022 0.043 0.037
(2.27) (1.23) (0.43) (3.82) (3.29) (0.87) (0.90) (5.36) (0.62) (0.50) (1.14) (1.11)
GDP 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.119** 0.232*** 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.232** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*  
(3.58) (3.47) (3.57) (2.66) (3.57) (3.38) (3.47) (2.77) (2.95) (3.82) (3.66) (2.23)
Arab Spring 1.625*** 1.508*** 1.569*** 1.625*** 3.076*** 2.799*** 2.906*** 3.076*** 0.213** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.213***
(4.59) (4.37) (4.59) (4.28) (5.24) (4.83) (5.09) (4.74) (3.29) (3.48) (3.46) (3.40)
constant 0.815 3.928** 1.765 0.815 0.072 2.992 1.003 0.072 0.321 0.947*** 0.445** 0.321** 
(0.62) (3.24) (1.50) (0.96) (0.04) (1.22) (0.53) (0.05) (1.80) (5.48) (2.67) (2.64)
AdjR-sqr 0.14 0.30 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.29 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.14
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  .  This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
141 
 
 
Table ‎4.33 Results - Different Regressions Results using HHI as ownership concentration index by controlling industries, countries and 
years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
HHI 0.017 0.034 0.026 0.017** 0.012 0.071 0.039 0.012 0.007** 0.002 0.006** 0.007***
(1.55) (1.19) (1.88) (2.65) (0.63) (1.40) (1.63) (1.07) (3.27) (0.55) (2.68) (5.11)
Firm Size 0.012 0.029 0.008 0.012** 0.065*** 0.1 0.075*** 0.065*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.73) (0.89) (0.98) (2.99) (4.16) (1.59) (4.25) (8.15) (-5.23) (-0.71) (-5.07) (-11.04)
Firm Age 0.318* 0.143 0.274* 0.318*** 0.451 0.345 0.479* 0.451** 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.028
(2.08) (0.94) (2.40) (3.70) (1.67) (1.10) (2.13) (2.96) (1.18) (1.13) (1.00) (1.81)
Financial leverage -0.699*** -0.426*** -0.507*** -0.699*** -0.698** -0.666*** -0.673*** -0.698*** -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-5.54) (-4.50) (-4.86) (-6.65) (-2.78) (-3.77) (-3.99) (-4.57) (-0.28) (-1.17) (-1.08) (-0.43)
Auditor 1.258* 0.569 0.134 1.258*** 2.978*** 0.841 0.614 2.978*** 0.043 0.02 0.041 0.043
(2.32) (1.32) (0.36) (3.91) (3.34) (0.97) (0.86) (5.43) (0.72) (0.46) (1.07) (1.29)
GDP 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.119** 0.232*** 0.213*** 0.219*** 0.232** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*  
(3.58) (3.45) (3.55) (2.66) (3.57) (3.36) (3.45) (2.77) (2.94) (3.80) (3.63) (2.22)
Arab Spring 1.605*** 1.516*** 1.557*** 1.605*** 3.051*** 2.794*** 2.882*** 3.051*** 0.210** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.210***
(4.54) (4.39) (4.55) (4.21) (5.19) (4.83) (5.04) (4.70) (3.25) (3.49) (3.43) (3.36)
constant 1.608 2.932* 2.036 1.608*  0.75 2.046 1.631 0.75 0.532*** 1.014*** 0.600*** 0.532***
(1.33) (2.58) (1.86) (1.99) (0.40) (0.87) (0.93) (0.56) (3.34) (6.32) (3.97) (4.84)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.28 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.13 0.12 0.27 0.29 0.12
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; HHI is 
Herfindahl index   = the sum of squared  largest shareholders  .    This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are 
within parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.34 Results - Different Regressions Results using H_CON as ownership concentration index by controlling industries, countries 
and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Con 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001***
(1.69) (1.86) (2.37) (2.88) (0.84) (2.05) (2.18) (1.43) (3.23) (0.11) (2.42) (5.02)
Firm Size 0.012 0.035 0.007 0.012** 0.064*** 0.088 0.073*** 0.064*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.70) (1.07) (0.84) (2.95) (4.12) (1.41) (4.14) (8.09) (-5.23) (-0.68) (-5.01) (-11.03)
Firm Age 0.316* 0.139 0.272* 0.316*** 0.448 0.337 0.472* 0.448** 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.028
(2.07) (0.90) (2.36) (3.68) (1.65) (1.06) (2.09) (2.94) (1.18) (1.15) (1.02) (1.81)
Financial leverage -0.699*** -0.422*** -0.505*** -0.699*** -0.698** -0.658*** -0.671*** -0.698*** -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-5.55) (-4.53) (-4.88) (-6.66) (-2.78) (-3.77) (-3.99) (-4.58) (-0.33) (-1.16) (-1.03) (-0.50)
Auditor 1.265* 0.537 0.15 1.265*** 2.980*** 0.775 0.633 2.980*** 0.046 0.022 0.046 0.046
(2.33) (1.25) (0.40) (3.93) (3.34) (0.89) (0.88) (5.44) (0.77) (0.50) (1.20) (1.37)
GDP 0.118*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 0.118** 0.231*** 0.206** 0.215*** 0.231** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*  
(3.54) (3.32) (3.47) (2.63) (3.55) (3.24) (3.39) (2.76) (2.84) (3.76) (3.54) (2.14)
Arab Spring 1.621*** 1.544*** 1.576*** 1.621*** 3.069*** 2.847*** 2.914*** 3.069*** 0.213** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.213***
(4.59) (4.50) (4.62) (4.25) (5.23) (4.90) (5.09) (4.73) (3.28) (3.44) (3.43) (3.39)
constant 1.555 2.655* 1.925 1.555 0.688 1.517 1.426 0.688 0.519** 1.036*** 0.592*** 0.519***
(1.28) (2.38) (1.75) (1.92) (0.37) (0.64) (0.81) (0.51) (3.21) (6.54) (3.86) (4.67)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.26 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.23 0.12
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_CON 
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners   .    This model 
capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.35  Results - Different Regressions Results using H_ DIFF as ownership concentration index by controlling industries, countries 
and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
H_Diff 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001*  0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001***
(1.30) (1.77) (2.06) (2.17) (0.73) (2.02) (2.06) (1.22) (2.74) (0.15) (2.22) (4.20)
Firm Size 0.012 0.034 0.007 0.012** 0.065*** 0.091 0.073*** 0.065*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006***
(1.76) (1.03) (0.89) (3.04) (4.14) (1.46) (4.14) (8.12) (-5.18) (-0.70) (-4.97) (-10.88)
Firm Age 0.321* 0.152 0.280* 0.321*** 0.452 0.364 0.485* 0.452** 0.03 0.028 0.023 0.03
(2.09) (0.98) (2.42) (3.73) (1.67) (1.15) (2.15) (2.96) (1.23) (1.15) (1.07) (1.90)
Financial leverage -0.699*** -0.423*** -0.505*** -0.699*** -0.699** -0.659*** -0.672*** -0.699*** -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-5.55) (-4.54) (-4.89) (-6.66) (-2.79) (-3.79) (-4.01) (-4.59) (-0.28) (-1.16) (-1.04) (-0.43)
Auditor 1.273* 0.548 0.149 1.273*** 2.985*** 0.801 0.628 2.985*** 0.048 0.022 0.046 0.048
(2.34) (1.28) (0.40) (3.95) (3.35) (0.92) (0.87) (5.45) (0.80) (0.50) (1.20) (1.43)
GDP 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.119** 0.232*** 0.208** 0.216*** 0.232** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*  
(3.57) (3.35) (3.51) (2.65) (3.56) (3.27) (3.41) (2.76) (2.91) (3.79) (3.60) (2.19)
Arab Spring 1.605*** 1.498*** 1.548*** 1.605*** 3.056*** 2.751*** 2.864*** 3.056*** 0.207** 0.214*** 0.210*** 0.207***
(4.54) (4.30) (4.51) (4.21) (5.20) (4.74) (5.02) (4.71) (3.22) (3.53) (3.42) (3.33)
constant 1.679 2.836** 2.150* 1.679*  0.798 1.797 1.803 0.798 0.567*** 1.036*** 0.627*** 0.567***
(1.40) (2.61) (1.98) (2.09) (0.43) (0.78) (1.04) (0.60) (3.70) (6.79) (4.29) (5.39)
AdjR-sqr 0.15 0.30 0.32 0.15 0.14 0.28 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.14
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  .    This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; 
z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
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Table ‎4.36 Results - Different Regressions Results using CON51 as ownership concentration index by controlling industries, countries 
and years effects 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
CON51 1.035 0.413 0.83 1.035*** 1.717 0.57 1.476 1.717** 0.234** 0.021 0.14 0.234***
(1.95) (0.44) (1.45) (3.35) (1.77) (0.42) (1.64) (3.06) (2.75) (0.20) (1.77) (4.39)
Firm Size 0.013 0.03 0.009 0.013** 0.065*** 0.099 0.077*** 0.065*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005***
(1.89) (0.92) (1.18) (3.26) (4.16) (1.57) (4.41) (8.19) (-5.13) (-0.71) (-5.02) (-11.07)
Firm Age 0.311* 0.149 0.277* 0.311*** 0.432 0.358 0.480* 0.432** 0.028 0.028 0.022 0.028
(2.04) (0.98) (2.42) (3.63) (1.60) (1.14) (2.13) (2.84) (1.17) (1.15) (1.04) (1.81)
Financial leverage -0.699*** -0.426*** -0.505*** -0.699*** -0.702** -0.665*** -0.671*** -0.702*** -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-5.54) (-4.51) (-4.86) (-6.65) (-2.79) (-3.78) (-3.99) (-4.59) (-0.36) (-1.16) (-1.03) (-0.55)
Auditor 1.250* 0.528 0.163 1.250*** 2.935*** 0.759 0.658 2.935*** 0.046 0.022 0.048 0.046
(2.33) (1.23) (0.44) (3.90) (3.32) (0.87) (0.92) (5.36) (0.77) (0.51) (1.24) (1.38)
GDP 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.119** 0.231*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.231** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*  
(3.57) (3.47) (3.56) (2.65) (3.55) (3.38) (3.46) (2.76) (2.99) (3.83) (3.70) (2.23)
Arab Spring 1.610*** 1.521*** 1.562*** 1.610*** 3.062*** 2.799*** 2.891*** 3.062*** 0.209** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.209***
(4.55) (4.41) (4.57) (4.23) (5.21) (4.83) (5.05) (4.72) (3.23) (3.48) (3.42) (3.33)
constant 1.701 3.375** 2.142* 1.701*  0.85 3.009 1.787 0.85 0.567*** 1.037*** 0.626*** 0.567***
(1.42) (3.15) (1.98) (2.11) (0.45) (1.36) (1.03) (0.63) (3.64) (7.42) (4.25) (5.32)
AdjR-sqr 0.14 0.30 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.29 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.14
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; CON51   
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is a dummy variable of taking 1 if the firm has 3 owners or less owning 51% or more of it equity  .    
This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.4.6 Testing the Effects of Blockholders Number‎on‎firms’‎performance. 
It is important to know if the number of the largest shareholders has any effect on firm 
performance. Ownership indexes HHI, H_Con, H_Diff, and CON51 have shown to have 
positive and significant effects on firm performance, and those indexes take into account the 
power of the largest owners. However, to test these results, I must include the number of the 
largest owner in the regression model to observe how this number could change the results.  
To do this, the study uses only CON as the ownership index because it is the only index that 
does not capture the power of the largest shareholders. All other dependent and independent 
variables remain the same, and the following regression model was used.  
                                                               
                                                                    
 10 IndustryDummy  + 11CountryDummy  +  12YearDummys  +                         
(5.3) 
Where the following is true: 
 Number_Owner. Is the number of the largest owner. 
Unlike the tests in previous sections and because of the extensive data, only one regression 
model, the Housman test, and the Breach-Pagan test is applied; this shows that the random 
regression model is the best one to explain the determination of ownership structure.   
Table 4.37 shows the random regression results of the relationship between the number of 
largest shareholders and firm performance after controlling for the effects of country, 
industry, and years separately. Regarding the total ownership concentration percentage, CON 
shows significant positive effects on all companies’ performance measures at the 1% level. 
However, some larger owners show significant adverse effects at the 10% significance level, 
especially when ROA was used and year effects were controlled. Other models show the 
negative effects regarding the number of larger owners and firm performance, yet these 
effects are not significant.  
To control for the possible effects between variables when they are used together in one 
regression model, another test was conducted by taking two variables separately with CON 
and the number of owners in each regression, and undertaken in 12 different models. Tables 
4.38, 4.39, and 4.40 show the results of those regressions.   
146 
 
The number of owners show contradictory results depending on the model; it shows a 
significant negative relationship with ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q when the models do not 
control for country, industry, and year effects. However, when the models are taking into 
account the effects of country, the number of owners has a negative effect on firm 
performance, yet none of these effects are significant.  
On the other hand, approximately 70% of the whole sample has a maximum of three owners 
only. So, although not all the regression models show significant effects regarding the number 
of owners and firm performance, these results still indicate that a low number of large owners 
has a positive effect on firm performance. These results align with previous empirical 
findings, that both H_Con and H_Diff both positively and significantly affect firm 
performance. That is, ownership concentration indexes control for the largest three owners 
only and indicate that firms with fewer owners with a large concentration percentage, 
influence firms more positively than firms that have many larger owners.  
In summary, this section attempts to find the role of the number of blockholders on firms’ 
performance. Different regression models indicate that the number of owners has a negative 
impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, a small number of owners can control a 
firm, and in the study results, this influence benefits the firm.  
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Table ‎4.37 Random regressions results of the effects of the largest owner number in firms performance using all independents variables 
together.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CON 0.018* 0.014 0.020* 0.018* 0.028 0.022 0.023 0.034* 0.003* 0.003* 0.005*** 0.002
(5.86) (4.46) (5.39) (5.76) (4.63) (3.56) (3.09) (4.70) (5.63) (5.06) (9.67) (4.77)
Number_Owner -0.151 -0.093 -0.034 -0.153*  -0.211 -0.133 0.098 -0.215 -0.007 -0.005 -0.01 -0.007
(-1.95) (-1.22) (-0.44) (-1.97) (-1.54) (-0.98) (0.71) (-1.57) (-0.74) (-0.46) (-0.99) (-0.68)
Firm Size 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.012* 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.071*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004***
(3.60) (3.49) (2.29) (3.59) (8.08) (8.00) (7.18) (8.12) (-5.53) (-5.57) (-8.78) (-5.84)
Firm Age 0.804*** 0.602*** 0.512*** 0.805*** 1.198*** 0.927*** 0.705*** 1.211*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.037*** 0.074***
(10.42) (7.72) (6.09) (10.40) (8.73) (6.65) (4.76) (8.79) (7.78) (6.64) (3.41) (7.42)
Financial leverage -0.690*** -0.664*** -0.729*** -0.690*** -0.626*** -0.592*** -0.737*** -0.627*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-16.73) (-16.30) (-17.82) (-16.73) (-8.55) (-8.12) (-10.24) (-8.55) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.11)
Auditor 1.080*** 1.399*** 0.816** 1.079*** 2.447*** 2.875*** 2.387*** 2.464*** 0.152*** 0.167*** 0.016 0.146***
(3.99) (5.21) (2.58) (3.99) (5.09) (5.99) (4.29) (5.12) (4.35) (4.77) (0.40) (4.18)
GDP 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.119** 0.171*** 0.331*** 0.323*** 0.233** 0.339*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.011* 0.016** 
(3.89) (3.80) (2.72) (3.95) (4.39) (4.32) (3.02) (4.41) (2.53) (2.48) (1.98) (2.80)
Arab Spring 0.980*** 0.800** 1.642*** 0.955** 1.140* 0.898 3.143*** 0.926 0.317*** 0.308*** 0.191*** 0.374***
(3.37) (2.78) (4.73) (3.08) (2.20) (1.75) (5.14) (1.68) (8.43) (8.20) (4.29) (9.33)
constant 1.557** 2.785*** 1.579 1.545*  3.150** 4.797*** 0.437 2.827*  0.619*** 0.559*** 0.479*** 0.435***
(2.62) (4.67) (1.66) (2.25) (2.98) (4.50) (0.26) (2.32) (8.05) (7.17) (3.92) (4.92)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13
Industry effect NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
Year Effects NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents Random regressions results to find  if number of largest owner (Number_Owner  )  effects firm performance in the MENA region; ; CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  ; Dependent Variable  : ROA ; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
  *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.38 Random regressions results of the effects of the largest owner number in firms performance. Dependent variable is ROA.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
CON 0.009 0.013 0.019* 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.020* 0.017 0.019* 0.018
(4.04) (5.94) (5.83) (2.63) (4.18) (3.93) (4.67) (5.67) (5.73) (4.27) (5.97) (5.56)
Number_Owner -0.156* -0.355*** -0.169* -0.071 -0.242** -0.071 -0.086 -0.098 -0.044 -0.147 -0.352*** -0.169*  
(-2.03) (-4.71) (-2.14) (-0.94) (-3.25) (-0.91) (-1.06) (-1.24) (-0.54) (-1.91) (-4.65) (-2.14)
Firm Size 0.012* 0.012**                0.001 0.012*                
(2.46) (2.58)                (0.24) (2.49)                
Firm Age 0.817*** 0.600***                0.526*** 0.824***                
(10.32) (7.51)                (6.08) (10.39)                
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.634***                -0.724*** -0.663***                
(-16.05) (-15.64)                (-17.81) (-16.04)                
Auditor 1.422*** 1.776***                1.056*** 1.436***                
(5.32) (6.73)                (3.36) (5.36)                
GDP 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.118** 0.162***
(3.57) (3.86) (2.62) (3.65)
Arab Spring 1.392*** 1.068*** 1.695*** 1.468***
(4.69) (3.65) (4.74) (4.65)
constant 1.045* 4.395*** 1.206** 2.371*** 1.495*** 1.185*  2.406* 5.484*** 3.397*** 0.872 4.575*** 0.853
(1.97) (11.86) (2.60) (4.44) (3.60) (2.43) (2.55) (6.52) (3.87) (1.44) (9.53) (1.43)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15
Industry effect NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents Random regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; this model test 
the effects of  diffrent variables sepretly ; Number_Owner  is the number of largest owner  CON  = total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of 
firm’s equity  ; Dependent Variable  : ROA ; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1 – 3 : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  4 – 6 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  7 – 9 : only capture countries  fixed effects
Models  10 – 12 : only capture years  fixed effects 
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Table ‎4.39  Random regressions results of the effects of the largest owner number in firms performance. Dependent variable is ROE. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
CON 0.01 0.019 0.033* 0.004 0.012 0.025 0.008 0.017 0.031 0.031 0.037* 0.037*
(3.20) (4.93) (5.04) (2.16) (3.50) (3.56) (2.57) (3.70) (4.28) (3.52) (5.10) (4.85)
Number_Owner -0.178* -0.588*** -0.293* -0.071 -0.428** -0.163 0.017 -0.045 -0.066 -0.159 -0.577*** -0.295*  
(-1.33) (-4.38) (-2.12) (-0.53) (-3.20) (-1.18) (0.12) (-0.33) (-0.47) (-1.18) (-4.28) (-2.12)
Firm Size 0.073*** 0.073***                0.055*** 0.073***                
(8.66) (8.79)                (6.19) (8.69)                
Firm Age 1.190*** 0.912***                0.725*** 1.206***                
(8.61) (6.49)                (4.84) (8.71)                
Financial leverage -0.523*** -0.484***                -0.672*** -0.522***                
(-7.11) (-6.65)                (-9.35) (-7.09)                
Auditor 3.489*** 3.992***                3.112*** 3.531***                
(7.32) (8.43)                (5.60) (7.40)                
GDP 0.354*** 0.367*** 0.233** 0.363***
(4.64) (4.86) (2.98) (4.67)
Arab Spring 2.053*** 1.622** 3.147*** 2.106***
(3.95) (3.14) (5.08) (3.81)
constant 1.155 6.394*** 2.703*** 2.846** 2.313** 0.468 3.293* 6.914*** 4.560** 0.694 6.849*** 2.347*  
(1.25) (9.69) (3.32) (3.03) (3.10) (0.54) (2.02) (4.65) (2.99) (0.65) (8.00) (2.24)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14
Industry effect NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents Random regressions results find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; this model test the 
effects of  diffrent variables sepretly ; Number_Owner  is the number of largest owner  CON  = total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s 
equity  ; Dependent Variable  : ROE ; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1 – 3 : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  4 – 6 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  7 – 9 : only capture countries  fixed effects
Models  10 – 12 : only capture years  fixed effects 
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Table ‎4.40 Random regressions results of the effects of  largest owner number in firms performance. Dependent variable is Tobin’s_Q. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
CON 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.65) (4.42) (5.56) (3.11) (3.61) (4.78) (9.27) (8.64) (8.99) (3.19) (3.89) (4.59)
Number_Owner -0.022* -0.032** -0.006* -0.018 -0.025* -0.001 -0.015 -0.012 -0.007 -0.023* -0.032*** -0.005
(-2.24) (-3.25) (-0.59) (-1.83) (-2.58) (-0.11) (-1.52) (-1.21) (-0.72) (-2.33) (-3.33) (-0.49)
Firm Size -0.002*** -0.002**                -0.006*** -0.002***                
(-3.29) (-3.24)                (-8.84) (-3.31)                
Firm Age 0.081*** 0.070***                0.034** 0.080***                
(8.03) (6.85)                (3.13) (7.92)                
Financial leverage -0.006 -0.004                -0.008 -0.006                
(-1.05) (-0.73)                (-1.50) (-1.06)                
Auditor 0.125*** 0.145***                -0.023 0.122***                
(3.61) (4.19)                (-0.56) (3.54)                
GDP 0.013* 0.013*  0.011 0.014*  
(2.29) (2.38) (1.89) (2.56)
Arab Spring 0.304*** 0.288*** 0.182*** 0.362***
(8.16) (7.73) (4.06) (9.15)
constant 1.003*** 1.333*** 1.004*** 0.940*** 1.165*** 0.886*** 0.659*** 0.774*** 0.601*** 0.927*** 1.245*** 0.787***
(14.94) (27.86) (17.19) (13.74) (21.39) (14.24) (5.62) (7.15) (5.46) (12.04) (20.09) (10.52)
Adjusted R-sqr 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14
Industry effect NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1 – 3 : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  4 – 6 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  7 – 9 : only capture countries  fixed effects
Models  10 – 12 : only capture years  fixed effects 
This table presents Random regressions results find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region; this model test the 
effects of  diffrent variables sepretly ; Number_Owner  is the number of largest owner  CON  = total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s 
equity  ; Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q ; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
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4.4.7 Testing the Endogeneity of Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
Using panel-data regressions presents a major problem when considering the exogenous 
relationship between explanatory variables. Thus, the endogeneity issue between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is not addressed in these regressions. Many researchers in 
this field have stated that ownership concentration should be viewed as endogenous. Thus, 
ownership concentration is also affected by firm performance. Therefore, dealing with the 
endogeneity problem when studying ownership structure is critical (Cho, 1998; Demsetz, 
1983; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness et al., 1999; Morck et al., 1988).  
However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) believed that instrumental variables (IV) can control the 
endogeneity issue between ownership concentration and firm performance. So to mitigate the 
unobservable heterogeneity that may exist across firms, this study uses a 2SLS.  
It has been argued in many studies that firm performance can influence ownership 
concentration. So this study treats ownership concentration as an endogenous variable. Also, 
the study uses rule of law (explained in detail in chapter seven) as an instrumental variable. 
The rule of law has been shown in some studies to positively affect ownership concentration. 
This instrument variable was carefully chosen; it is highly correlated with ownership 
concentration but has no impact on firm performance. The study ended up with the following 
2SLS equation: 
                                                                  
                                                                    
 8 IndustryDummy  +  9YearDummys  +                                                                 (5.4a)                         
                                                                                                   (5.4b) 
Where, ROL equals the role of law index, which is the confidence degree in the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, crime, and violence. 
Given this 2SLS, first by estimating equation (4a) to obtain the value of ownership 
concentration, and then replacing this value in equation (4b) to examine the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, putting a strong 
instrument in place is very important to avoid weak instrumental variable biases (Stock et al., 
2002). Accordingly, the first stage IV test is used to examine the weakness of the instrumental 
variable (CON = rule of law); following Stock and Yogo (2005) tabulation of the significant 
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values for weak instruments tests, the study rejects the null of a relative bias greater than 10%, 
and the test’s results show that the instruments are not weak and are valid in the model.  
Tables 4.41, 4.42, 4.43, 4.44, and 4.45 show 2SLS regression results for the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance after controlling for endogeneity. The 
study uses five concentration indexes: CON, HHI, H_Con, H_Diff, and CON51 respectively. 
Also, it takes into account the effects of industry and year separately that model with country 
effects show weakness and excluded from the study. The results show that all concentration 
indexes used in this study have significant positive effects on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q.  
Regarding firm factors, firm size shows a different significance level. Although the size of the 
firm still affects ROA positively, this effect is only significant in the model that uses CON51 
as the ownership concentration index. However, firm size has a significant positive impact on 
ROE and a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 1% significance level in most 
models.  
Firm age shows significant positive effects on ROA and ROE in all models, save for the 
model that uses CON51 as the ownership concentration index. Nevertheless, the age of the 
firm does not show any significant effects on Tobin’s Q. Financial leverage affects both ROA 
and ROE negatively at the 1% level of significance using all regression models; nonetheless, 
this effect is not significant with Tobin’s Q. 
The auditor variable shows a positive relationship with ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q in all 
models at a 1% significance level. Also, GDP growth has a positive impact on all firm 
performance measures; mostly, it has a 1% level of significance with ROA and ROE and a 
5% level of significance with Tobin’s Q. The Arab Spring variable has a positive impact on 
Tobin’s Q in all models at a 1% level of significance. It also has significant positive effects on 
ROA and ROE, but with models that have CON, HHI, and H_Con as their ownership 
concentration index. 
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Table ‎4.41 Results of using 2SLS regression models, CON is ownership concentration index.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
CON 0.485** 0.492** 0.93 0.905** 0.884** 1.797 0.083** 0.076** 0.138
(2.62) (3.01) (1.64) (2.67) (3.02) (1.66) (2.91) (3.24) (1.69)
Firm Size 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.034 0.039* 0.014 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008** 
(0.11) (0.01) (-0.53) (1.76) (2.29) (0.33) (-4.31) (-4.84) (-2.63)
Firm Age 0.433* 0.378* 0.245 0.489 0.519* 0.112 0.012 0.032 -0.011
(2.19) (2.57) (0.60) (1.36) (1.97) (0.14) (0.38) (1.41) (-0.18)
Financial leverage -0.772*** -0.767*** -0.840*** -0.783*** -0.779*** -0.919** -0.015 -0.015 -0.023
(-5.87) (-5.79) (-4.50) (-3.85) (-3.81) (-2.85) (-1.38) (-1.46) (-1.13)
Auditor 2.685*** 2.706*** 4.524 5.517*** 5.258*** 9.210* 0.437*** 0.373*** 0.667*  
(3.35) (4.28) (1.95) (3.76) (4.65) (2.07) (3.59) (4.20) (2.00)
GDP 0.216** 0.215** 0.231* 0.429** 0.426** 0.459* 0.023* 0.022* 0.025
(3.01) (3.01) (1.97) (3.23) (3.29) (2.04) (2.14) (2.24) (1.49)
Arab Spring 6.086** 6.134** 8.425 10.748** 10.534** 15.407 1.183*** 1.123*** 1.476*  
(2.94) (3.26) (1.81) (2.85) (3.15) (1.73) (3.72) (4.15) (2.20)
constant 28.630** 29.167** 46.652 54.212** 52.504** 90.485 4.005* 3.484** 6.26
(2.64) (3.21) (1.66) (2.74) (3.24) (1.69) (2.41) (2.67) (1.55)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.13
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents 2SLS regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region;  CON  = total 
percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  ;  This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects sepretly; 
z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
First stage IV test shows that model with country effects are weakness by greater than 10 percent and excluded from the study. 
Models  1, 4 and 7  : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2, 5 and 8 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3, 6 and 9 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
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Table ‎4.42 Results of using 2SLS regression models, HHI is ownership concentration index.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
HHI 0.284*** 0.307*** 0.323** 0.531*** 0.552*** 0.624*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048***
(3.37) (3.81) (3.20) (3.47) (3.82) (3.36) (4.07) (4.31) (3.58)
Firm Size 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.037* 0.036* 0.033* -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.01) (0.21) (0.16) (2.53) (2.57) (2.08) (-6.00) (-6.32) (-5.82)
Firm Age 0.501*** 0.349** 0.481*** 0.615* 0.465* 0.567* 0.023 0.028 0.024
(3.72) (2.99) (3.33) (2.55) (2.25) (2.16) (1.16) (1.57) (1.16)
Financial leverage -0.755*** -0.746*** -0.763*** -0.751*** -0.742*** -0.771*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(-6.79) (-6.81) (-6.75) (-4.44) (-4.37) (-4.42) (-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.83)
Auditor 2.431*** 2.738*** 2.661*** 5.050*** 5.317*** 5.613*** 0.395*** 0.379*** 0.392***
(4.33) (5.41) (4.07) (4.95) (5.86) (4.65) (5.18) (5.75) (4.66)
GDP 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.442*** 0.445*** 0.466*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.026***
(4.16) (4.15) (4.12) (4.45) (4.45) (4.35) (3.34) (3.37) (3.48)
Arab Spring 1.415*** 1.375*** 1.133** 2.040** 1.997** 1.317* 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.396***
(3.83) (3.62) (3.12) (3.15) (3.02) (2.00) (8.00) (8.00) (8.42)
constant 5.097*** 6.260*** 4.696** 10.342*** 11.401*** 9.401*** 0.003 0.05 0.044
(3.35) (4.86) (3.17) (3.84) (5.13) (3.52) (0.01) (0.28) (0.22)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.12
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents 2SLS regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region;   HHI is 
Herfindahl index   = the sum of squared  largest shareholders    ;  This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects sepretly; z-
statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
First stage IV test shows that model with country effects are weakness by greater than 10 percent and excluded from the study. 
Models  1, 4 and 7  : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2, 5 and 8 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3, 6 and 9 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
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Table ‎4.43 Results of using 2SLS regression models, H_CON is ownership concentration index.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
H_Con 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003**   0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.25) (3.66) (3.19)   (3.33) (3.67) (3.36) (3.87) (4.12) (3.58)
Firm Size 0.003 0.005 0.003   0.031 0.03 0.029 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.35) (0.56) (0.39)   (1.89) (1.96) (1.75) (-5.59) (-5.94) (-5.72)
Firm Age 0.469** 0.327** 0.465**   0.555* 0.426 0.537*  0.018 0.025 0.022
(3.16) (2.59) (3.10)   (2.08) (1.90) (1.96) (0.82) (1.30) (1.03)
Financial leverage -0.753*** -0.745*** -0.755***   -0.747*** -0.738*** -0.755*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
(-6.90) (-6.91) (-6.90)   (-4.48) (-4.41) (-4.48) (-1.76) (-1.78) (-1.72)
Auditor 2.738*** 3.032*** 2.759***   5.616*** 5.841*** 5.798*** 0.446*** 0.423*** 0.406***
(4.12) (5.11) (4.05)   (4.65) (5.52) (4.63) (4.83) (5.39) (4.63)
GDP 0.213*** 0.215*** 0.218***   0.424*** 0.425*** 0.434*** 0.023** 0.022** 0.023** 
(3.89) (3.85) (3.93)   (4.16) (4.15) (4.13) (3.02) (3.04) (3.26)
Arab Spring 1.172*** 1.117** 1.176**   1.584* 1.531* 1.396*  0.347*** 0.349*** 0.401***
(3.35) (3.09) (3.22)   (2.56) (2.42) (2.11) (7.48) (7.53) (8.48)
constant 5.460** 6.530*** 5.313**   11.008*** 11.876*** 10.579*** 0.062 0.01 0.131
(3.27) (4.68) (3.24)   (3.71) (4.94) (3.57) (0.26) (0.05) (0.60)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.14
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent Variable  : ROA Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
This table presents 2SLS regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region;  H_CON 
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  calculated by adding the square ownership percentage of the three largest owners  ;  This model 
capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects sepretly; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
First stage IV test shows that model with country effects are weakness by greater than 10 percent and excluded from the study. 
Models  1, 4 and 7  : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2, 5 and 8 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3, 6 and 9 : only capture years  fixed effects 
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Table ‎4.44 Results of using 2SLS regression models; H_ DIFF is ownership concentration index.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
H_Diff 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***   0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.47) (3.90) (3.40)   (3.59) (3.93) (3.62) (4.19) (4.40) (3.83)
Firm Size 0.001 0.004 0.001   0.035* 0.032* 0.033*  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.12) (0.48) (0.17)   (2.39) (2.24) (2.24) (-6.05) (-6.28) (-6.15)
Firm Age 0.560*** 0.384*** 0.556***   0.725*** 0.528** 0.714** 0.034 0.033* 0.035*  
(4.62) (3.46) (4.55)   (3.36) (2.69) (3.24) (1.84) (1.96) (1.99)
Financial leverage -0.751*** -0.741*** -0.753***   -0.743*** -0.732*** -0.751*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.01
(-7.14) (-7.25) (-7.14)   (-4.68) (-4.62) (-4.69) (-1.93) (-1.90) (-1.86)
Auditor 2.394*** 2.787*** 2.416***   4.976*** 5.402*** 5.135*** 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.355***
(4.43) (5.48) (4.35)   (5.11) (5.99) (5.09) (5.37) (5.86) (5.10)
GDP 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.223***   0.425*** 0.429*** 0.444*** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024***
(4.12) (4.09) (4.20)   (4.40) (4.39) (4.43) (3.28) (3.29) (3.56)
Arab Spring 0.459 0.319 0.415   0.255 0.098 -0.075 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.288***
(1.37) (0.93) (1.13)   (0.42) (0.16) (-0.11) (5.26) (5.37) (6.31)
constant 2.484** 3.688*** 2.443**   5.457*** 6.775*** 5.030** 0.445*** 0.449*** 0.294*  
(3.01) (5.03) (2.77)   (3.90) (5.63) (3.27) (3.88) (4.52) (2.52)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents 2SLS regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region;  H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  ;  This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects 
sepretly; Standard errors are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
First stage IV test shows that model with country effects are weakness by greater than 10 percent and excluded from the study. 
Models  1, 4 and 7  : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2, 5 and 8 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3, 6 and 9 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Dependent viable : ROA Dependent viable : ROE Dependent viable :Tobin_Q
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Table ‎4.45 Results of using 2SLS regression models, CON51 is ownership concentration index.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
H_Diff 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***   0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.47) (3.90) (3.40)   (3.59) (3.93) (3.62) (4.19) (4.40) (3.83)
Firm Size 0.001 0.004 0.001   0.035* 0.032* 0.033*  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.12) (0.48) (0.17)   (2.39) (2.24) (2.24) (-6.05) (-6.28) (-6.15)
Firm Age 0.560*** 0.384*** 0.556***   0.725*** 0.528** 0.714** 0.034 0.033* 0.035*  
(4.62) (3.46) (4.55)   (3.36) (2.69) (3.24) (1.84) (1.96) (1.99)
Financial leverage -0.751*** -0.741*** -0.753***   -0.743*** -0.732*** -0.751*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.01
(-7.14) (-7.25) (-7.14)   (-4.68) (-4.62) (-4.69) (-1.93) (-1.90) (-1.86)
Auditor 2.394*** 2.787*** 2.416***   4.976*** 5.402*** 5.135*** 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.355***
(4.43) (5.48) (4.35)   (5.11) (5.99) (5.09) (5.37) (5.86) (5.10)
GDP 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.223***   0.425*** 0.429*** 0.444*** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024***
(4.12) (4.09) (4.20)   (4.40) (4.39) (4.43) (3.28) (3.29) (3.56)
Arab Spring 0.459 0.319 0.415   0.255 0.098 -0.075 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.288***
(1.37) (0.93) (1.13)   (0.42) (0.16) (-0.11) (5.26) (5.37) (6.31)
constant 2.484** 3.688*** 2.443**   5.457*** 6.775*** 5.030** 0.445*** 0.449*** 0.294*  
(3.01) (5.03) (2.77)   (3.90) (5.63) (3.27) (3.88) (4.52) (2.52)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent Variable  : ROE Dependent Variable  :Tobin_Q
This table presents 2SLS regressions results to find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the MENA region;  H_ DIFF  
measure the power gained by the largest shareholders  which is the square difference between the largest and second largest ownership percentage added to 
the square difference of the second and third largest ownership percentages  ;  This model capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects 
sepretly; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
First stage IV test shows that model with country effects are weakness by greater than 10 percent and excluded from the study. 
Models  1, 4 and 7  : does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2, 5 and 8 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3, 6 and 9 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Dependent Variable  : ROA
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4.5  Other robustness checks 
The study carries out seven robustness tests as shown in Tables 4.46, 4.47 and 4.48. Each 
table has different dependent variable: ROA, ROE and Tobin’s_Q respectively. The first five 
columns in the robustness test follow the work done by (Kim, Miller, Wan, & Wang, 2016);  
Column (1) shows  the regression results when  industry is replaced with firm fixed effects. 
Column (2) presents the results using Year-level clustering. Column (3) reports the results 
using two-way clustering by industry and year. As shown in table 4.2, Turkey and Egypt 
represent respectively 23% and 20% of the total study sample. In order to validate the results 
and to ensure that one country does not affect the results, the study follows the methodology 
of (DeFond, Hung, & Trezevant, 2007). Columns (4 and 5) reports the results model after 
excluding Turkey and Egypt. In addition, to eliminate the biases of effect of firms market 
capitalisation, firms are divided into two groups, Group A with high market capitalisation 
(above firm size mean) and Group B with low market capitalisation (below firm size mean). 
Results presented in Columns (6 and 7) are by running regression for each group only. As 
noticed in the different regressions outcomes, the results are mostly constant in the seven tests 
and this strongly supports the robustness of the study results.  
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Table ‎4.46 Robustness tests, Dependent Variable: ROA 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CON 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.038***
(4.29) (10.83) (3.91) (3.93) (5.03) (4.43) (4.67)
HHI 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.025** 0.023** 0.036*** 0.001** 0.057***
(3.47) (11.81) (3.40) (3.15) (5.01) (0.07) (5.74)
Firm Size 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.012* 0.017** 0.025*** -0.007 0.734*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.015* 0.024*** -0.005 0.707***
(3.59) (7.43) (2.49) (2.80) (4.83) (-1.59) (8.55) (3.47) (7.18) (2.70) (2.56) (4.64) (-1.11) (8.26)
Firm Age 0.608*** 0.818*** 0.513*** 0.941*** 0.662*** 0.270** 0.768*** 0.601*** 0.805*** 0.525*** 0.934*** 0.642*** 0.286** 0.731***
(7.82) (10.40) (5.82) (10.63) (7.55) (2.80) (6.27) (7.71) (10.22) (5.73) (10.54) (7.30) (2.96) (5.95)
Financial leverage -0.663*** -0.688*** -0.730*** -0.625*** -0.730*** -0.755*** -0.748*** -0.664*** -0.691*** -0.732*** -0.625*** -0.732*** -0.751*** -0.767***
(-16.27) (-10.20) (-6.42) (-13.27) (-15.14) (-15.84) (-11.04) (-16.28) (-10.31) (-6.50) (-13.27) (-15.17) (-15.70) (-11.32)
Auditor 1.364*** 1.018** 0.815* 0.920** 1.392*** 0.175* 0.021* 1.394*** 1.057** 0.852* 0.947** 1.464*** 0.035** 0.132**
(5.11) (3.76) (2.18) (3.04) (4.68) (0.56) (0.05) (5.20) (3.88) (2.31) (3.13) (4.89) (0.11) (0.29)
GDP 0.157*** 0.166 0.120* 0.277*** 0.128** 0.198*** 0.153*  0.159*** 0.17 0.120* 0.281*** 0.132** 0.192*** 0.164*  
(3.75) (2.03) (2.37) (3.99) (2.99) (4.34) (2.01) (3.79) (2.12) (2.39) (4.05) (3.07) (4.19) (2.16)
Arab Spring 0.877** 1.091*** 1.702** 0.897* 1.397*** 0.614* 0.252* 0.671* 0.870** 1.680** 0.707* 1.092*** 0.254* 0.039*
(3.13) (8.45) (3.16) (2.53) (4.20) (1.65) (0.59) (2.44) (5.57) (3.18) (2.03) (3.36) (0.70) (0.09)
constant 3.063*** 1.985 1.571 2.658*** 2.002** 3.745*** 6.535*** 2.113*** 0.883 2.626* 1.653** 0.798 5.479*** 5.092***
(5.56) (2.25) (1.35) (4.14) (3.26) (4.88) (7.45) (4.44) (1.11) (2.66) (3.04) (1.55) (8.03) (6.72)
AdjR-sqr 0.105 0.08 0.113 0.056 0.065 0.103 0.089 0.104 0.079 0.111 0.078 0.081 0.097 0.091
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
CON = Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  , HHI = Herfindahl Index, the squared sum of the largest ownership ; z-statistics are within parentheses
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Firm FE
Dependent Variable  : ROA
Firm FE
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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Table ‎4.47 Robustness tests, Dependent Variable: ROE 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CON 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.031* 0.029** 0.044*** 0.028*** 0.054***
(3.43) (6.63) (2.37) (2.80) (4.10) (4.43) (4.14)
HHI 0.027* 0.038** 0.022* 0.023* 0.044*** 0.020* 0.069***
(2.50) (5.15) (1.80) (1.83) (3.49) (0.07) (4.31)
Firm Size 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.081*** -0.007 1.117*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.081*** -0.005 1.081***
(8.10) (15.66) (6.30) (5.69) (8.90) (-1.59) (8.10) (8.01) (15.64) (6.53) (5.54) (8.78) (-1.11) (7.85)
Firm Age 0.936*** 1.228*** 0.704*** 1.451*** 0.922*** 0.270** 1.143*** 0.929*** 1.214*** 0.721*** 1.444*** 0.902*** 0.286** 1.110***
(6.73) (8.91) (4.47) (9.47) (5.90) (2.80) (5.81) (6.66) (8.74) (4.48) (9.42) (5.75) (2.96) (5.62)
Financial leverage -0.590*** -0.624** -0.739*** -0.384*** -0.696*** -0.755*** -1.217*** -0.590*** -0.626** -0.741*** -0.384*** -0.698*** -0.751*** -1.237***
(-8.10) (-5.29) (-4.29) (-4.72) (-8.10) (-15.84) (-11.17) (-8.10) (-5.36) (-4.32) (-4.71) (-8.12) (-15.70) (-11.34)
Auditor 2.825*** 2.378** 2.409*** 2.243*** 3.187*** 0.175** 0.699** 2.854*** 2.416** 2.454*** 2.265*** 3.242*** 0.035** 0.853*
(5.92) (4.48) (3.90) (4.29) (6.01) (0.56) (0.95) (5.95) (4.65) (4.03) (4.33) (6.07) (0.11) (1.17)
GDP 0.320*** 0.333* 0.233** 0.636*** 0.255*** 0.198*** 0.293*  0.322*** 0.338* 0.233** 0.640*** 0.260*** 0.192*** 0.307*  
(4.28) (2.53) (2.79) (5.30) (3.34) (4.34) (2.40) (4.30) (2.60) (2.78) (5.34) (3.39) (4.19) (2.52)
Arab Spring 1.008* 1.117* 3.175** 0.596* 1.860** 0.614* 0.099* 0.706* 0.792* 3.149** 0.324 1.409* 0.254* 0.234*
(2.01) (1.64) (2.93) (0.97) (3.14) (1.65) (0.14) (1.44) (1.13) (2.92) (0.54) (2.43) (0.70) (0.35)
constant 5.195*** 3.45 0.895 5.384*** 3.890*** 3.745*** 9.917*** 3.798*** 1.801 2.058 4.040*** 2.020* 5.479*** 7.712***
(5.28) (2.16) (0.44) (4.85) (3.56) (4.88) (7.04) (4.46) (1.23) (1.16) (4.29) (2.20) (8.03) (6.32)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.075 0.104 0.07 0.065 0.103 0.089 0.075 0.065 0.103 0.056 0.065 0.103 0.089
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
CON = Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  , HHI = Herfindahl Index, the squared sum of the largest ownership ; z-statistics are within parentheses
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Firm FE Firm FE
Dependent Variable  : ROE
Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
 
 
161 
 
Table ‎4.48  Robustness tests, Dependent Variable: Tobin’s_Q 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CON 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(5.08) (6.04) (6.96) (4.25) (4.58) (4.26) (3.72)
HHI 0.005*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.009***
(6.79) (4.81) (5.29) (5.50) (4.92) (3.42) (6.75)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.026*  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.029*  
(-5.56) (-10.58) (-8.80) (-4.10) (-5.12) (-4.35) (-2.09) (-5.89) (-9.95) (-8.25) (-4.56) (-5.30) (-4.27) (-2.41)
Firm Age 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.037** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.044*** 0.126*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.038** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.045*** 0.117***
(6.69) (6.15) (2.71) (7.66) (8.53) (4.07) (7.25) (6.40) (6.20) (2.81) (7.54) (8.27) (4.12) (6.73)
Financial leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.014
(0.14) (-0.45) (0.20) (0.52) (-1.02) (-2.95) (1.87) (0.01) (1.26) (0.01) (0.46) (-1.06) (2.86) (1.49)
Auditor 0.166*** 0.143** 0.016 0.093* 0.193*** 0.216*** 0.101 0.181*** 0.160** 0.023 0.101** 0.202*** 0.219*** 0.115
(4.75) (4.09) (0.49) (2.43) (5.94) (6.17) (1.56) (5.16) (4.63) (0.70) (2.63) (6.18) (6.17) (1.78)
GDP 0.013* 0.015* 0.013* 0.012* 0.013** 0.012* 0.012* 0.014** 0.016* 0.012* 0.012* 0.014** 0.012* 0.014*
(2.46) (2.35) (2.03) (1.40) (2.80) (2.38) (1.11) (2.61) (2.49) (2.06) (1.34) (2.89) (2.37) (1.27)
Arab Spring 0.312*** 0.380*** 0.217*** 0.455*** 0.353*** 0.308*** 0.380*** 0.286*** 0.358*** 0.214*** 0.443*** 0.323*** 0.276*** 0.364***
(8.51) (10.84) (3.73) (10.08) (9.73) (7.42) (6.27) (7.97) (10.69) (3.65) (10.01) (9.10) (6.81) (6.11)
constant 0.545*** 0.416*** 0.361** 0.669*** 0.562*** 0.775*** 0.465*** 0.662*** 0.509*** 0.584*** 0.769*** 0.677*** 0.898*** 0.592***
(7.58) (7.00) (2.94) (8.19) (8.39) (9.04) (3.73) (10.66) (8.48) (5.37) (11.12) (12.06) (11.81) (5.51)
AdjR-sqr 0.075 0.065 0.081 0.07 0.065 0.079 0.089 0.065 0.06 0.083 0.056 0.06 0.06 0.065
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
CON = Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more of firm’s equity  , HHI = Herfindahl Index, the squared sum of the largest ownership ; z-statistics are within parentheses
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Firm FE Firm FE
Dependent Variable   : TOBIN_Q
 Variables Explanation in Table 5.5 
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4.6  Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions 
Quantile regression model (QRM) is the way of estimating the conditional quantile functions 
(Koenker & Bassett Jr, 1978; Koenker & Hallock, 2001). According to Li (2015), QRM can 
be very functional for management research, thus results from QRM are estimated from the 
whole range of quantile functions. Unlike other model that minimise the mean square error 
and predict one part only of the distribution of the outcome, QRM gives the options for the 
researchers to group the outcomes. For example, QRM can easily compare the conditional 
mean from the least squares estimator by predicting the conditional median of the dependent 
variable. In addition, QRM differentiate the whole distribution of dependent variables by a 
different distribution, say at the 15th or 85th percentile, which can be of interest in their own 
right. 
Many researchers use QRM in the interest to find the effects of independents variables on 
response variable along the different parts of the distribution rather than the average effect. 
For example, (Buchinsky, 1994; Lemieux, 2006) study the return made by education at 
different distribution of wages. In the health sectors, Koenker and Hallock (2001) study the 
effects of smoking mothers on birth weight using QRM by distributing the birth weight into 
different Quantiles. Also QRM is applied in corporate governance studies; researchers in this 
field are interested in finding if certain governance characteristics have a quantitatively 
different effect across the distribution of the dependent variable. Hallock, Madalozzo, and 
Reck (2010) confirm that CEO pay, based on performance, is strangely higher in 
conditionally firms with high CEO wage.  Likewise Chen and Huang (2011) use QRM to 
examine the relationship between the performance of mutual funds and Morningstar’s 
fiduciary grades. They found that managerial incentives are positively correlated to fund 
performance. Also, Li (2015) apply QRM to investigate CEOs pay in gender difference. 
Although he does not confirm any discrimination in payment by using standard linear 
regression methods, he found that women receive less payment than men at around the 95th 
quantile.  
In this part, the goal is to compare the results of classical least squares (OLS) of the effects of 
ownership concentration on firm’s performance and these effects in different quantile 
distribution using quantile regression outcomes. The following is the regression model used in 
this study. 
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                                                                             (5.5) 
Where the following is true: 
 Q  =  The percentile in the conditional distribution of the performance measure 
 Firm performance = ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q 
 Ownership concentration = Total percentage of largest owners who won 5% or more 
of firm’s equity  
 Firm size = total firm assets 
 Firm age = period from a firm’s establishment up to 2008, increasing by one each year 
afterward 
 Financial leverage = a company’s total debt / total assets 
 Auditors. Dummy variable taking 1 if a big four auditor is the firm’s external auditors 
and 0 otherwise 
 GDP = Growth rate of gross domestic product 
However, when considering the exogenous relationship between explanatory variables, 
standard quantile regression does not address the endogeneity issue between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. So, the study implements the instrumental variables 
quantile regression (IVQR) as described by (Chernozhukov & Hansen, 2004, 2005, 2008). 
The implementation of IVQR in this study follows that described by (Kwak, 2010), by using 
Stata. Kwak’s (2010) instrumental variables quantile regression implementation required 
three steps. (1) use least squares to estimate the first stage; (2) uses predicted values of d to 
estimate the quantile regression function τth of outcome variable Y; (3) minimising the 
objective functions of both stages at  by searching around the estimated value. The following 
discuss the implementation of IVQR in the study following (Kwak’s , 2010) and (Bang, 
Mitra, & Wunnava, 2016) . 
 
                  
                                                                                           (5.6a) 
 
Where: 
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 Y = the outcome variable of the study which are firm’s performances measured by 
ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q.  That Y is conditional on a treatment variable which is 
d and other controls variables which is x.  
 d = is a binary variable taking 1 if firm has total ownership concentration of 50% 
or more and 0 otherwise.  
 x = control variable used in this study which are Firm size, Firm age, Financial 
leverage,  Auditors and GDP.  
 u = a non-separable error term 
 
The study assumes that the treatment value, which in this study is the ownership 
concentration “d” is endogenously determined by the following function: 
 
                                                                                                                      (5.6b) 
 
Where δ(∙) is an unknown function and “ v ” is a vector of unobservable characteristics. “ z ” 
is the instruments variables that are correlated with the ownership concentration “ d ” and 
does not correlate with the firm’s performance  “ Y ”. In this study the instrumental binary 
variable taking 1 if the firm’s founder is either individual or institution. This is under the 
assumption that firms with these founders tend to keep control over firms after initial public 
offerings (IPO). According to Ehrhardt and Nowak (2001), founding-family owned firms 
continue to exercise considerable control of the firms even ten years after the IPO.  
The quantile regression model at the τth quantile of Y is identified by: 
 
                                                                                                                       (5.6c)  
 
This guides to the simplified objective function: 
 
       
      
              
     
                                                                                (5.6d) 
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where   (∙) is a weighted absolute value function that solves the τ
th
  quantile of Y in the 
sample. The study estimates five quantiles: tails of the performance distribution (10
th
 and 90
th
 
percentile); median regression (50
th  
percentile); and interquartile regressions (25
th
 and 75
th
 
percentile). 
The purpose of regression is to find how ownership concentration effects different firms’ 
performance in different quantiles. Tables 4.49, 4.50 and 4.51 presents the results of the OLS 
regression (column 1); standard quantile regression (columns 2-6) and IVQR (columns 7-11). 
Each table has different dependent variable: ROA, ROE and Tobin’s_Q respectively. Both 
Standard quartile and iv quantile gave the same outcome of the effects of firms performance 
measured by ROA and ROE  that the effects of those performance measures are significant in 
the all quantile percentiles. However, although ownership concentration has the same 
significant effects on Tobin’s_Q the using standard quantile regression, it shows no 
significant effects using IVQR. The study reports data in case a convergence takes place. 
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Table ‎4.49  Regression results using standard and iv quantile, Dependent Variable: ROA 
       
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CON 0.029** 0.033** 0.019** 0.019** 0.028** 0.047** 4.281** 0.693* 0.802** 1.123** 0.237*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.47) (0.37) (0.34) (0.37) (0.47)
Firm Size 0.018** 0.042** 0.022** 0.006* 0.005* 0.025** 0.111 0.143** 0.092* 0.085 0.259**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Firm Age 0.817** 1.123** 0.705** 0.616** 0.657** 0.429** 0.575 0.518 0.995** 1.861** 1.488**
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.19) (0.48) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.48)
Financial leverage -0.688** -0.876** -0.711** -0.531** -0.662** -0.766** -0.034** -0.021** -0.007 -0.009 -0.025**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Auditor 1.019** 0.675 0.762** 0.934** 0.828** 1.249* 1.041** 0.715** 0.584** 0.625** 0.545**
(0.27) (0.50) (0.28) (0.20) (0.27) (0.64) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
GDP 0.161** 0.221** 0.151** 0.109** 0.078* 0.232** 0.739** 0.707** 0.543** 0.679** 0.754**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Arab Spring 1.108** 0.22* 0.536* 0.999** 1.721** 2.171** 1.014** 0.716* 1.026** 0.904** 1.385**
(0.28) (0.53) (0.29) (0.21) (0.28) (0.68) (0.48) (0.37) (0.34) (0.37) (0.47)
constant 1.996** 12.369** 4.616** 0.687* 2.135** 8.89** 13.424** 3.951** 0.03 4.184** 11.328**
(0.55) (1.02) (0.57) (0.40) (0.54) (1.32) (0.81) (0.64) (0.59) (0.64) (0.81)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
 Dependnt variable : ROA
Standard quantile regression IV Quantiles Regression
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Table ‎4.50   Regression results using standard and iv quantile, Dependent Variable: ROE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CON 0.041** 0.052** 0.029** 0.03** 0.031** 0.085** 5.518** 1.612** 2.495** 1.64** 1.693**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (1.07) (0.67) (0.61) (0.66) (0.84)
Firm Size 0.071** 0.116** 0.083** 0.054** 0.036** 0.019* 0.208 0.33** 0.261** 0.262** 0.319**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Firm Age 1.216** 1.6** 1.096** 1.124** 1.153** 1.29** -0.115 0.416 2.104** 3.127** 5.04**
(0.14) (0.30) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15) (0.27) (1.10) (0.69) (0.62) (0.68) (0.86)
Financial leverage -0.623** -4.848** -1.759** -0.099* -0.164** -0.373** -0.101** -0.084** -0.059** -0.034** -0.016
(0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Auditor 2.362** 1.302* 0.97** 2.199** 3.263** 3.739** 1.463** 1.047** 1.058** 1.145** 1.384**
(0.48) (1.05) (0.64) (0.40) (0.53) (0.94) (0.30) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24)
GDP 0.326** 0.288* 0.312** 0.281** 0.265** 0.283* 5.023** 1.751** 0.118 0.205** 0.335**
(0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Arab Spring 1.318** 1.287** 0.325** 2.031** 2.944** 5.86** 1.344 0.934 2.223** 2.723** 3.72**
(0.50) (1.11) (0.68) (0.43) (0.56) (0.99) (1.08) (0.68) (0.61) (0.67) (0.85)
constant 3.763** 13.734** 6.766** 4.09** 0.921** 7.539** 13.464** 6.085** 3.638** 3.626** 11.324**
(0.98) (2.15) (1.32) (0.82) (1.08) (1.92) (1.84) (1.15) (1.04) (1.14) (1.45)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
 Dependnt variable : ROE
Standard quantile regression IV Quantiles Regression
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Table ‎4.51 Regression results using standard and iv quantile, Dependent Variable: Tobin’s_Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CON 0.004** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.003** 0.008** 0.038 0.019 0.019 0.059 0.067
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Firm Size -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002** -0.006** 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.014* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age 0.078** 0.032** 0.04** 0.045** 0.064** 0.084** 0.083 0.114** 0.169** 0.28** 0.416**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Financial leverage 0.001 0.022** 0.017** 0.002 -0.004 -0.011  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** -0.005**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Auditor 0.149** 0.089** 0.113** 0.108** 0.147** 0.255** 0.033* 0.042** 0.045** 0.071** 0.109**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
GDP 0.014** 0.01** 0.008** 0.007** 0.015** 0.02**  0.02** 0.018** 0.002 0.008 0.009
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Arab Spring 0.323** 0.088** 0.117** 0.181** 0.28** 0.593** 0.088 0.113** 0.101** 0.169** 0.275**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
constant 0.597** 0.383** 0.465** 0.682** 0.739** 1.088** 0.409** 0.503** 0.747** 0.98** 1.517**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Standard quantile regression IV Quantiles Regression
Dependnt variable : TOBIN_Q
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study seeks to provide a logical explanation of the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in the MENA region. The study uses five ownership 
concentration indexes (CON, HHI, H_Con, H_Diff, and CON51) and three firm performance 
variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). The study uses different panel-data analyses to 
capture the bias results in a single model, and it also applies different approaches to 
controlling for country, industry, and year effects. In addition, to control for endogeneity, a 
2SLS is used to treat ownership concentration as an exogenous variable.  
The results of the study show that the five ownership indexes have positive significant effects 
on all firm performance in the MENA region, even after controlling for endogeneity. Firms 
with a high ownership concentration perform better than firms with diffuse ownership 
structures supporting the hypothesis (H1). These findings align with other studies done on 
companies in this region. Omran et al. (2008a) found that ownership concentration has 
positive effects on Tobin’s Q. Also, Mandacı and Gumus (2010b) found that Turkish public 
firms are positively related to ownership concentration. Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that 
Jordanian public firms with high ownership concentration are more profitable, as measured by 
ROE and ROA. 
This finding supports the argument that ownership concentration enables blockholders to 
maintain control over the firms in which they invest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Short, 1994). 
Moreover, these results indicate that the blockholders’ ownership in a firm plays an effective 
role in mitigating agency problems between shareholders and managers (Hartzell & Starks, 
2003). This may be explained by the fact that monitoring carried out by blockholder owners 
often results in more effective manager performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). This confirms 
that owners with a high level of voting rights in MENA countries, work effectively in 
enhancing firms’ performance and mitigating agency problem. In addition, this outcome 
proves that ownership concentration in the MENA region is an essential tool in corporate 
governance. This gives the evidence that blockholder owners in countries with week 
investments’ protection law like MENA countries can be alternative to this law.  
Moreover, the study found that firms with many largest owners are negatively performed than 
firms with fewer owners. The study examines how the number of the largest owners can 
affect firm performance in two ways. The first used the number of largest owners as a variable 
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and the second uses two ownership concentration indexes (H_Con and H_Diff) that control 
for the largest three owners. The study finds that firms having fewer larger owners impact 
firms positively.  
This finding aligns with the argument of (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
who stated that managerial behaviour cannot be controlled in diffused ownership structures. 
Also, Nyman and Silberston (1978) argued that control should be viewed as a power, rather 
than a structural phenomenon. Thus, small numbers of owners can gain enough power to 
control the firm; and according to the results of this study, the power of largest owners in 
MENA public firms enhances firm performance and enables them to control managerial 
behaviour toward the firm’s benefits. This gives the facts that a small number of owners with 
a high level of voting right in MENA countries, can form a power to protect their investment 
and reduce agency problem.    
Firm size has positive significant effects on ROA and ROE, and larger firms are more 
profitable than smaller companies. Regionally, the same results were found by Omran et al. 
(2008a) in their study of four Arab countries. Also, using non-financial firms listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange, Mandacı and Gumus (2010b) found a significant positive 
relationship between firm size and firm performance. The current results support the study of 
Fama and French (1995), who documented that ROE is higher in larger firms when compared 
with smaller firms. Also, Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) found there is a direct and positive 
correlation between firm size and firm performance. These results may be because large firms 
can easily secure the sufficient funds to run the firm smoothly (Short and Keasey (1999).  
However, unlike the performance measured by the accounting ratio, this study finds that large 
firms negatively affect Tobin’s Q; this ratio is related directly to the share price of firms in the 
stock market. Regionally, this finding was also concluded by Mandacı and Gumus (2010b), 
who used Turkish firms and found Tobin’s Q negatively correlates with firm size. These 
results can be explained by Banz (1981), who stated that there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and firm performance; he found that small firms have higher common stock 
returns than large firms.  
Moreover, the study shows that firm age positively affects firm performance, and that older 
firms have a higher return on assets, return on  equity, and Tobin’s Q value. This can be 
explained by Majumdar (1997), who stated that older firms have experience, which helps 
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them perform better when compared to younger firms. Also, older firms have a history and 
reputation that ensures easier access to bank loans, giving sufficient liquidity to run their 
firms effectively (Diamond, 1991). 
Regarding financial leverage, the results show that firms with high leverage are less profitable 
than low-leverage firms. These results align with other studies conducted previously on the 
MENA region. Using Tunisian-listed companies, Turki and Sedrine (2012) found a negative 
effect of leverage on firm performance. In Kuwait, Alfaraih, Alanezi, and Almujamed (2012) 
found a negative relationship between OA and Tobin’s Q with firm leverage, and in Turkey, 
Mandacı and Gumus (2010b) found the same thing. This finding disputes Myers (1977), who 
believed that firms should have low financial leverage and should depend on their internal 
funds, because financial risks and a firm’s credit risks, are increased by increasing outside 
borrowing (Krivogorsky, 2006). Moreover, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argued that firms 
with high debt have to pay high interest rates, which reduces a firm’s net profits. 
Auditor type has a positive impact on firm performance; firms having one of the big four 
auditors as external auditors reported higher ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Mitton (2002) 
mirrored this result when using five Asian firms, finding that having the big four auditors (in 
his case, the big six) correlated with superior performance in stock price and higher returns. 
This result can be linked with Fan and Wong (2005), who claimed that using one of the big 
four auditors increases monitoring efficiency and reduces agency conflicts between owners 
and managers. That big-four auditors is one of the mechanism in corporate governance that 
reduce agency conflicts (Farooq & El Kacemi, 2011). Moreover, firms audited by the largest 
four auditors have higher disclosure qualities, and as a result, this increases transparency and 
mitigates expropriation (Mitton, 2002).  
Moreover, GDP growth as a country factor shows positive effects on firm performance. This 
result aligns with many studies that indicated positive effects of a country’s GDP growth on 
the overall outcomes of firms, including profitability. Regionally, Omran et al. (2008a) found 
the same results in their study on the effects of corporate governance on firm performance in 
Arab equity markets.  
Another interesting point is the effect the Arab Spring had on firm performance. Even after 
controlling for the year effects in the regression models, the Arab Spring variable has a 
positive impact on firm performance. However, these results could not be linked to other 
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findings because this is the first study to address the effects of the Arab Spring movement on 
the performance of firms in the MENA region. The positive correlation may be the result of 
the corrections that happened in the legal system in the countries affected by this revolution. 
Such corrections eliminated dictatorships and increased transparency and accountability in 
business. Also, this result opens the opportunity for further research to investigate how 
political change can positively affect firm performance.  
In conclusion, ownership concentration plays a major role in corporate governance in MENA 
countries. This demonstrates that larger owners play an essential role in mitigating agency 
costs. The study’s results show positive significant effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, as measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Moreover, it shows that firms with 
a small number of blockholders do better than firms with several owners.  
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Chapter Five : The Effects of Ownership Identity on Firm 
Performance 
 
5.1 Introduction  
As discussed in chapter three, ownership concentration is one part found in ownership 
structure literature. However, Xia and Walker (2015) stated, ‘Who owns the firm (the state, 
private ownership, foreign investors) has long been an important topic for research on 
organizations’. That is, ownership structure can be classified into two main dimensions: 
ownership concentration and owner identity (Nazir & Malhotra, 2016).  
Xia and Walker (2015) used Chinese manufacturing firms’ data over a 10-year period to study 
the effects of different owners on firm performance. They found that the owner type is 
significantly related to firm performance. Some studies showed that managerial ownership 
works effectively towards reducing agency costs. For example, (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
argued that managerial ownership increases firm performance by mitigating agency costs. 
They believed it is a mechanism that can be used to align managers’ interests with that of 
shareholders’ interest. Supporting this argument, Morck et al. (1988) found a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. In addition, managerial 
ownership gave a strong incentive for managers to maximise the value of the firm (Mandacı 
& Gumus, 2010b).  
Conversely, Demsetz (1983) stated that an increase of insider ownership has a negative 
correlation to firm performance. He defended his idea that large managerial ownership leads 
to managers being more concern about their own interests at the expense of other 
shareholders; this results in a decrease of the firm’s value. In addition, Stulz (1988) argued 
that less managerial ownership will increase the value of firms because of the transfer control 
right from mangers to shareholders. That managerial ownership in dispersed ownership 
structures have a greater chance of obtaining increased personal benefits (Fauzi & Locke, 
2012) .  
Government ownership could solve the asymmetrical information flow that is disclosed to 
investors and can align the interests of managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Thus, the government has access to different sources of information using its links with  
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financial organisations and non-government firms (Eng & Mak, 2003). However, the 
government cannot play an active role in monitoring its investments because of weaker 
accountability and monitoring (Mak & Li, 2001). Moreover, the government plays a political 
role in firms rather than enhancing a firm’s performance (Boycko et al., 1996). Thus, the 
government gives special consideration to political aims such as employment and low output 
prices, at the expense of firms’ profitability (Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).  
In the same context, foreign investors create shareholder value in two ways: building 
excessive cash balances in the market and avoiding any risk-taking strategies (Nakano & 
Nguyen, 2013). Moreover, Ferreira and Matos (2008) suggested that foreign ownership 
enhances firm performance by providing technology, research and development, and 
managerial skills. In addition foreign investors bring technological resources and experience 
to the firms they invest in (Huang & Shiu, 2009). Also, foreign investors play an important 
role as independent, outside monitors who control the behaviour of both management and 
majority shareholders (Choi, Sul, & Min, 2012). Similarly, Kim and Yoon (2007) claimed 
that foreign investment within a country has an impact on corporate governance practices. 
Although it seems that, theoretically, foreign investors enhance firm performance, different 
empirical studies indicated conflicting results. 
Nevertheless, managerial monitoring is increased when there is institutional ownership, and 
this, according to the corporate governance perspective, helps in improving firm performance 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). In addition, large institutional investors have effective 
monitoring that leads to a positive influence on a firm’s market value (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). However, Pound (1988) argued that institutional investors may have either a positive 
or negative effect on firm performance; the effects are positive when acting as monitors and 
negative when working alongside the firm’s managers to benefit themselves.  
Family ownership may have the same agency problem as other shareholder groups (Claessens 
& Fan, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). That is, family members acquire top-management 
positions, which enables them to have control over a firm’s board of directors (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003) and gives them the opportunity to use the firm’s resources for their own gains. 
Moreover, Cho and Kim (2007) found that firms with a controlling family may negatively 
affect firm value. That is, the mechanisms of corporate governance may not be effective in 
family firms, and family members are able to use the firm’s resources for their own gains 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
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The relationship between ownership identity and firm performance can be seen as conflicting. 
Therefore, this chapter highlights the effects of different ownership identities on firm 
performance. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: a review of the existing 
literature, the methodology used in this study, and finally, the results and discussion. 
5.2 Review of Existing Literature and Hypotheses Development 
5.2.1 Managerial Ownership 
Short and Keasey (1999) examined the relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership in the UK and compared their findings with previous studies conducted in the 
United States. They found a nonlinear relationship for both accounting and market measures 
of performance. Also, they confirmed that UK management with a high level of equity, 
become more entrenched, and this has a positive effect on firm performance. They believed 
that this aligned with the theory that more managerial equity in the firm incentivised the 
managers to work towards a higher level of performance. They also argued that the 
performance of the good firms affects the degree of managerial ownership. Thus, successful 
firms award directors with equity shares; this kind of reward should not be the mechanism for 
aligning the interests of management and shareholders, and corporate governance should be 
concerned with the complex practice of governance (Short & Keasey, 1999).  
Also in the UK, Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) found a nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q. They found that firm value 
was increased when managerial ownership went up to 7% and declined when it reached 26%. 
The researchers also found that for the endogeneity of managerial ownership, both corporate 
value and managerial ownership are linked. The authors argued that external market discipline 
plays a major role in manager and ownership behaviour. Thus, when the market is ineffective, 
managers with around 50% ownership have no control over the firm but have power and can 
benefit from disregarding any external monitoring or discipline. However, when managerial 
ownership exceeds 50%, managers who are owners have the power and the incentive to work 
effectively, which aligns with the best interests of the other shareholders.  
Cho (1998) studied how insider ownership influences firm investments and how these 
investments enhance firm performance. The researcher used 326 U.S. manufacturing firms’ 
data from 1991. He assumed that insider ownership is endogenous rather than exogenous. The 
researcher found that investment affects firm performance; but there is no relationship 
176 
 
between ownership structure and a firm’s investments. He found that investments affect 
ownership structure rather than the other way around. The researcher concluded that insider 
ownership is homogenous in terms of its ability to enhance a firm’s investments. So it is not 
an effective mechanism that forces managers to make value maximisation investment 
decisions.  
In the United States, Himmelberg et al. (1999) used 600 firms’ data between 1982–1992 to 
find the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. They believed that 
managerial equity is an effective mechanism to align the interests of both managers and 
owners. So they extended the cross-sectional results of (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) study and 
used panel data to show that managerial ownership is a function of the contracting 
environment. The authors argued that the ownership structure is endogenous and firms are 
governed by the interaction of different mechanisms, such as financing, capital structure, 
managerial ownership, and compensation. It is not easy to identify the cause of each 
mechanism on firm performance without taking into consideration the other mechanisms. 
They concluded that even after controlling for both firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, 
there is no (econometrically) relationship between a change in managerial ownership and firm 
performance.  
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argued that ownership structure is endogenously determined 
and depends on the firm’s performance proxy used. They used a previous data sample in a 
study done by (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) and concluded a positive effect regarding insider 
ownership on firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) used a 2SLS to control for 
endogeneity. They found no significant relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. They documented that the optimal ownership structure differs among firms, and 
there is no systematic relationship between structure and firm performance. 
Furthermore, Jelinek and Stuerke (2009) studied the nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and agency costs in U.S. firms. They used asset utilisation and an 
expense ratio as the agency cost indicators, to show management efficiency in use of assets. 
The researchers used ROA as a measure of profitability. Looking at ROA, they found a 
nonlinear and positive relationship between managerial ownership and asset utilisation, but a 
nonlinear and negative relation when using the expense ratio. Also, Ellili (2011) investigated 
the interrelations between American ownership structures and financial policies. The 
researcher found that managers do not attempt to have ownership in high-leverage firms 
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because of the high risk of bankruptcy. The author documented a nonlinear relationship 
between ownership percentage by manager and firm performance. Thus, managers with 
ownership levels between 22.17–32.08 % become more entrenched. 
In Germany, Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) used 245 German companies’ data in 2003 to 
find the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance; the authors used stock 
price performance, Tobin’s Q, and ROA as corporate performance indicators. They found a 
positive and significant relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. 
Furthermore, they also showed that outside owners and concentrated insider ownership has 
positive effects on firm performance. However, when they controlled for ownership 
endogeneity, they did not find any significant effects on firm performance when there was 
insider ownership. Moreover, the authors believed that ownership structure could play a major 
role in creating long-term value in the corporate sector.  
However, Krivogorsky (2006) used 87 European firms operating in U.S as foreign firms and 
found no relationship between managerial ownership and firm profitability, as measured by 
ROE, ROA, and MTB. In a study conducted in New Zealand, Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
concluded that large managerial ownership provides greater monitoring that has a significant 
impact on firm performance.  
Chen, Guo, and Mande (2003) used 123 Japanese firms to study the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Using an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression, they found a negative effect when there is low ownership and 
a positive one in high levels of ownership. However, when they controlled for ownership 
endogeneity using 2SLS, they found that Tobin’s Q increased when managerial ownership 
increased. They concluded that managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q should be treated as 
endogeneity to each other.  
Chen and Yu (2012) studied how managerial ownership affects the diversification strategies 
of Taiwanese firms and how this diversification can enhance firm performance. They found a 
high level of managerial ownership in Taiwanese firms compared to other countries because 
many of the firms in Taiwan are under family control. The results of the study showed a U-
shaped relationship between managerial ownership and corporate diversification. Thus, the 
inflection point exists at 33.17%, and managerial ownership has a negative (positive) 
relationship with diversification below (over) this point. The authors argued that this U-
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shaped relationship supports the idea that managerial owners benefit themselves from 
diversification at the expense of minority shareholders. This comes either form avoiding the 
high costs associated with diversification or by pursuing unrelated diversification that may not 
be in the best interests of the minority shareholders.  
In Sri Lanka, Wellalage and Locke (2012) found that insider ownership has a U-shaped 
relationship with firm performance. Thus, at some level, insider ownership increases 
management entrenchment, and at a smaller level, it increases the conflict of interests between 
management and owners. However, insider ownership has a positive and significant effect on 
firm performance. Also (Hoang et al., 2016) used manufacturing firms from Vietnam and 
employed a GMM regression to address endogeneity of ownership concentration and firm 
performance. They found that managerial ownership significantly affects Tobin’s Q when the 
managers own either low level or high level voting rights.  
In Nigeria, Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) found that insider ownership negatively and 
significantly affects firm performance. In Croatia, Dzanic (2012) found that ownership by 
management negatively affects the efficiency of labour. The author explained that 
management tries to satisfy union labour at the expense of efficiency. Moreover, Hasan and 
Butt (2009) found that managerial ownership in Pakistani firms has a significantly negative 
relationship with the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Mandacı and Gumus (2010a) found that managerial ownership has a negative effect on firm 
value; the study was conducted on non-financial firms in Turkey. However, the negative 
relationship was explained as managers being sensitive to their own interests, which affected 
firm value. They argued that firms in Turkey could improve firm performance by having low 
managerial ownership. On the other hand, Turki and Sedrine (2012) used 23 non-financial 
companies listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange and found that managerial ownership has a 
positive relationship with firms performance, as measured by MTB. However, MTB 
positively, but not significantly, affects managerial ownership. However, in Palestine, 
Daraghma and Alsinawi (2010) found that managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm 
financial performance, as measured by return on revenues (ROR).  
5.2.2 Foreign Ownership 
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2017) used non-listed firms in 28 Central and Eastern European 
countries. They found that foreign owners have an important role in enhancing firm 
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performance because of the managerial skills, knowledge, and superior technologies they 
bring. Contrary to this, Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, and Hashimoto (2005) used 247 Japanese 
manufacturers and found that foreign ownership negatively affect firm investment behaviour 
and financial performance. 
Nakano and Nguyen (2013) investigated the effect of foreign investors on the performance of 
Japanese electronics firms. The study could not find any significant effects that foreign 
shareholders had on firm performance when measuring by Tobin’s Q and ROA. In addition, 
the study had difficulties using the assumption that firm effects are fixed, because each firm 
had its own characteristics that changed over time, and foreign investors acted in response to 
those changes. Thus, when the study applied fixed effect regressions, the foreign investors’ 
influence on the firms’ operating performance was overstated. However, the researchers 
found that an increase of foreign ownership has positive impacts on market value. The authors 
agreed with the idea that foreign investors create shareholder value in two ways: building 
excessive cash balances in the market and avoiding any risk-taking strategies.  
In another study, (Choi et al., 2012) used Korean firms to study the relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance (using Tobin’s Q). The researchers found that both 
foreign block ownership and foreign board membership enhance firm performance. The 
researchers suggested that foreign investors implement a globalised governance system that 
improves governance in the firm. In addition, they play an important role as independent, 
outside monitors that control the behaviour of both management and majority shareholders. 
However, according to the authors, foreign investors have the opposite effect if they have a 
controlling power that reaches a certain level of ownership. Much like with other firms 
examined in previously mentioned studies, the blockowners start extracting firm resources for 
their own gains.  
However, in South Korea, Lee (2008) found no significant relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance, as measured by net income to total assets ratio (NIA) and 
ordinary income to total assets ratio (OIA). Moreover, Gul et al. (2010) studied the effects of 
ownership structure and the quality of the auditors on firms information, and how these two 
variables affect share price, as measured by stock price synchronicity in the Chinese market. 
The researchers found that foreign investors decrease synchronicity by enhancing 
capitalisation information.  
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In India, Douma, George, and Kabir (2006) found that foreign ownership has a positive 
relationship with firm performance when measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The authors 
believed that in emerging markets, external corporate governance mechanisms are inefficient 
and less developed. In contrast, internal mechanisms in these markets are more efficient and 
play a major role in corporate governance. Accordingly, the researchers showed that foreign 
investors could have a critical role in monitoring the internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance in emerging markets. Also, in Nigeria, Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) found a 
positive but insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance.  
Wellalage and Locke (2012) used data from Sri Lankan businesses that have weak legal 
protection for investors; they examined the relationship between foreign ownership and 
financial performance. The researchers found that foreign ownership does not affect firm 
performance. Moreover, in Croatia, Dzanic (2012) found that foreign ownership has either a 
negative, or no effect, on firm performance.  
However, in Vietnam, Phung and Le (2013) found a negative relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance using Tobin’s Q as the performance indicator. The authors 
believed that ownership can only play a major role in enhancing firm performance when 
ownership is concentrated. However, foreign owners could not own more than 49% of the 
firm’s equity, and this restricted foreign investors, stopping them from imposing their 
influence on the firm and enhancing firm performance. Furthermore, the researchers found 
that foreign ownership is not an effective corporate governance mechanism for monitoring 
management. They found that because foreign ownership faces asymmetric information, they 
have a positive effect on capital structure by increasing debt to mitigate the agency problem. 
Using Jordanian publicly traded firms, Zeitun and Tian (2007) did not find any significant 
effect regarding foreign ownership on firm performance, as measured by ROE and ROA. 
However, foreign ownership lowers the probability of a firm defaulting. The authors stated 
that foreign ownership gives an incentive to monitor the firms. Omran et al. (2008a) used 304 
firms from four Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia) and found that foreign 
investors have a significant effect on Tobin’s Q, yet they have no significant effect on ROA 
and ROE.  
Furthermore, Ghunmi, Al-Zu'bi, Badreddine, and Chaudhry (2013) used another measure of 
firm performance, productivity, and they found no significant relationship between foreign 
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ownership and the productivity of the studied manufacturing companies. They concluded that 
neither foreign direct investments nor portfolio investments have a clear effect on firm 
productivity. But they documented that firm characteristics such as large size, low dividend, 
yield, and low liquidity attract foreign investors.  
Almudehki and Zeitun (2012) investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance. They used 29 non-financial firms listed on the Qatar Exchange and used 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE as firm performance measures. The researchers found foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. Furthermore, Kobeissi and Sun (2010) 
used 249 banks in 20 MENA countries and found that banks operate efficiently when they are 
owned by either foreigners or the government.  
Ben Naceur, Ghazouani, and Omran (2007) studied four MENA countries (Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Turkey) and found that newly privatised banks with high foreign ownership have 
a significantly positive outcome on sales per employee and net income per employee. The 
authors argued that foreigners want to influence a firm's productivity by monitoring the firm. 
In Egypt, Omran (2009) examined how the identity of ownership concentration in post-
privatisation affects firm performance. The author found that ownership concentration, 
especially foreign ownership, had a positive impact on firm performance when measured by 
ROS, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. The author argued that to increase the value of post-
privatisation, more shares should be given to foreign investors. Accordingly, the hypothesis to 
examine effects of foreign ownership on firm performance in this study is:  
H2a: Foreign ownership in MENA region has positive effects on firm performance.  
5.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
Tsai and Zheng (2007) examined information from 99 U.S. restaurants between 1999-2003, to 
find what effect institutional ownership has on firm performance in the restaurant industry. 
They used both OLS and 2SLS regressions and found that 2SLS gave more unbiased and 
consistent parameter estimates, and a more reliable assessment of the relationship. The 
researchers found institutional ownership, especially by the financial institutions, has a 
significant and positive relationship with firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. They 
believed that financial institutions have the power to monitor firm activities and accordingly 
enhance firm performance. They found this relationship is endogenous and that financial 
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institutions are more interested in restaurants that are better performing, larger, and more 
profitable. 
In the United States, Ellili (2011) investigated the relationship between institutional 
ownership and financial policy. The researcher found that institutional ownership has a 
positive influence on the wealth of the shareholders. However, the researcher also found that 
institutions do not invest in high-leveraged firms because of the high risk of bankruptcy. 
However, in South Korea, Lee (2008) found no significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm financial performance. 
In New Zealand, Navissi and Naiker (2006) investigated the effect institutional investors have 
on firm value. They found that when institutional ownership has a representative on the board 
of directors of the firms, there is a significant relationship. However, this relationship is not 
linear, so when institutional investors own 30% of the firm’s equity, the value of the firm 
improves. But when institutional investors have less than 30% of the firm’s equity, this leads 
to a reduction in the firm’s value. The researchers concluded that ownership structure has an 
important role in the corporate governance process.  
Moreover, Gedajlovic et al. (2005) used data from 247 of Japan’s manufacturers to find out 
how ownership structure influences both a firm’s investment behaviour and financial 
performance. The researchers found that firms with high financial institution ownership have 
a high level of investments in capital projects, which leads to positive firm ROA. The 
researchers also found that pension funds and financial institutions positively affect the firm 
performance when measured by ROA.  
In India, Pathak et al. (2012) found that institutional ownership has a negative impact on firm 
performance (ROA). Furthermore, in Sri Lanka, Wellalage and Locke (2012) also found that 
institutional ownership is negatively related with ROA. However, the institutional ownership 
variable has no relationship with Tobin’s Q. However, Fazlzadeh et al. (2011) used 137 listed 
firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange and found that institutional ownership positively affects 
firm performance. The researchers also stated that although institutional ownership can 
improve firm performance, more share equity in institutional ownership can lead to adverse 
reactions. 
Using Arab countries in the MENA region, Omran et al. (2008a) found no significant effects 
regarding institutional ownership on ROA and ROE; nevertheless, institutional ownership has 
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a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. Alfaraih et al. (2012) looked at 2010 data from 134 firms 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange to find the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance, when measuring the relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q. The 
researchers concluded that firm performance is affected by different types of ownership 
structures, and there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. They suggested that institutional investors play a large role in the corporate 
governance mechanism. However, Al-Saidi (2013) also used Kuwaiti firms and found no 
relationship between institutional ownership and Tobin's Q.  
In Jordon, Zeitun (2009) found that institutional ownership has a negative impact on ROA, 
but has a positive effect on firm performance measure by market value of equity to book 
value of equity (MBVR). Moreover, in Qatar, Almudehki and Zeitun (2012) found that 
institutional ownership has a negative and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q when 
measuring financial performance. Therefore, the hypothesis to examine effects of institutional 
ownership on firm performance in this study is:  
H2b: Institutional ownership in MENA region has positive effects on firm performance.  
5.2.4 Government Ownership 
Using Tobin's Q as the performance indicator, Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002) studied the 
relationship between government ownership in privatised firms and the performance of these 
firms. The researchers found there is a nonlinear relationship, and when a small level of 
shares were sold to the public, there was an improvement in firm performance. After a certain 
percentage, of fewer shares being held by the government and more by the public, there was 
poorer firm performance. They concluded that in a planned economy such as China, the 
government tends to have a critical role in supporting the financial market. However using 
Chinese market, Gul et al. (2010) studied the effects of ownership structure and the quality of 
the auditors on firm information, that affects share prices measured by stock price 
synchronicity. The study found that government ownership increases stock price 
synchronicity. 
Using 10,639 firm-year observations of non-financial Chinese-listed firms and an applied 
panel-data regression technique, Yu (2013) found that state ownership has a U-shaped 
relationship with firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE. He covered 
the period between 2003-2006 and found that government ownership dramatically decreased 
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after 2006. However, he stated that state ownership stays high in particular sectors, such as 
oil, natural gas, mining, publishing, broadcasting, and media. The researcher found that these 
sectors perform better with state ownership compared to dispersed ownership because of 
government support and political connections. The author argued that in markets that have 
weak laws and cannot protect investors, state ownership is an effective mechanism in 
mitigating the agency problem, especially the free-rider problem. 
In Kuwait, Alfaraih et al. (2012) found that government ownership has a negative relationship 
with firm market performance. The authors argued that government ownership does not have 
adequate entrepreneurship and tends to be politically, rather than economically, motivated. In 
addition, Kobeissi and Sun (2010) used 249 banks in 20 MENA countries and found that 
banks owned by the government are less efficient than other banks. Furthermore, Samir 
(2013) found that banks in the MENA region that are owned by the government, have higher 
risks and higher non-performing loans than other banks. 
Moreover, using Jordanian publicly traded firms, Zeitun and Tian (2007) also found a 
negative relationship between government ownership and firm performance. However, they 
also found that the firms with government ownership were protected from bankruptcy. In 
addition, Zeitun (2009) also found in Jordan that government ownership has a negative 
relationship with a firm’s accounting performance. However, ownership by the government 
reduces the firm’s defaults. So it was suggested that government ownership should be 
maintained at some level to achieve optimal firm performance and default reduction. 
In the MENA region, Ben Naceur et al. (2007) used a comparison of four countries (Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey) to examine the effect of ownership structure on newly 
privatised banks. The researchers found that firms that remained with government ownership 
after privatisation improved their profitability (ROS, ROA, and ROE).  
In four Arab countries, Omran et al. (2008a) found that state ownership has a positive impact 
on Tobin’s Q. However, in Kuwait, Al-Saidi (2013) applied an OLS regression using 130 
listed firms to find the relationship between ownership identity and firm performance, as 
measured by Tobin's Q and ROA. He found that the government does not significantly affect 
firm performance. For that reason, the hypothesis to examine effects of government 
ownership on firm performance in this study is:  
H2c: Government ownership in MENA region has positive effects on firm performance.  
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5.2.5 Family Ownership 
Dow and McGuire (2016) investigated how family ownership affects firm performance. The 
study used data from 33 publicly listed firms from different countries over a 5-year period that 
started in 2010. They found that firms with family ownership have a lower Tobin's Q than 
non-family firms. However, after controlling for country differences, the researchers found 
contradictory results; the authors believed the country is an important part to consider when 
understanding the effects of ownership on firm performance.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) found a positive and significant effect regarding family ownership 
on firm performance when they used ROA and Tobin's Q as the performance indicators. They 
also found that 18% of outstanding equity in U.S. S&P 500 firms, are controlled by families. 
These firms have better performance than non-family firms, especially when a family member 
acts as the CEO. This is because of the awareness that a family has about the business, and 
family members act as the firm’s stewards. However, this positive relationship is not linear, in 
that a high level of family ownership leads to poor performance. The authors argued that 
when regulations and transparency exist in the market, family ownership is a major corporate 
mechanism in reducing agency costs and enhancing decision-making efficiency.  
In Croatia, Dzanic (2012) used the data from 119 firms between the years 2003–2009 to 
examine the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The 
researcher found that family ownership, when it comes as a second blockholder, has a positive 
effect on Tobin’s Q. The author argued that family members can enhance firm performance 
because of their incentive to prevent large shareholders from extracting firm resources.  
In Malaysia, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) investigated the effect of family and non-family 
ownership on firm performance. On average, the researchers found that firms with family 
ownership have lower agency costs (asset utilization ratio and expense ratio) when compared 
to other firms. On the other hand, they found that firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q and ROA, is greater in non-family ownership firms than in firms with family ownership. 
This result indicates that the finding of a study conducted in Palestine by Daraghma and 
Alsinawi (2010), who found that firms that have a CEO as the chairman, have better 
performance than firms that separate the two positions, may be correct. Daraghma and 
Alsinawi (2010) explained that most firms in Palestine are family owned, and this produced 
the incentive to monitor and maximise the family’s wealth.  
186 
 
Using Indian manufacturing firms, Pathak et al. (2012) examined the relationship between 
ownership identity and firm performance (ROA). The researchers found that individuals have 
no significant connection to firm performance.  
Samir (2013) investigated how risks in banks (conventional and Islamic) in the MENA region 
are affected by the banks’ ownership structures. He used two measurers of risk: Z-score and 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. The researcher found that family-owned 
banks tend to be low risk. However, avoiding taking risks may lead to poor performance. In a 
sample of four Arab countries, Omran et al. (2008a) found that individuals have significant 
negative impacts on ROA , ROE, and Tobin’s Q. For that reason, the hypothesis to examine 
effects of government ownership on firm performance in this study is:  
H2d: individual ownership in MENA region has positive effects on firm performance.  
5.3 Methodology 
This chapter uses the same data set found in chapter three and uses the same dependent 
variables in chapter three (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). Also, the control variables are the 
same ones used in chapter three. However, this chapter concentrates on the effects of 
ownership identity on firm performance.  
5.3.1 Identity Concentration Measures 
Ownership concentration is defined as 5% or more of a firm’s equity being owned by each 
shareholder; though, the ownership concentration was gathered according to the types of 
owners. (Omran et al., 2008a) classification of ownership identity was followed, and the 
largest ownership types were divided into four groups: foreign, individual, institution, and 
government. It was calculated by adding the total concentration shares of each identity. Table 
5.1 defines each identity group. 
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Table ‎5.1 Definitions of Ownership Identity Group   
 
Foreign Ownership 
 
Firms that register in a country other than the invested 
country 
 
Individual Ownership 
 
A single person who represents him- or herself, either as 
citizen or noncitizen of the invested century 
 
Institution Ownership 
 
All firms that register in the invested country, including 
banks 
 
Government Ownerships 
 
Institutions that belong to the country, such as a ministry of 
finance or reserve and pension funds controlled by 
government 
 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 shows the percentage of each ownership in the sample. On average, 73% 
of the firms in the study have institutional ownership, followed by individual ownership at 
approximately 46%. However, on average, only 17% of the firms have government ownership 
while firms that have foreign investors are approximately at 22%.  
Individually, all the countries in the study have at least 50% institutional ownership, and 
Tunisia has the largest representation of institutional owners at 91%. Regarding foreign 
ownership, Bahrain has the largest investors of this type, with nearly 48% of its firms being 
owned by foreign interest, while Turkey is the lowest at 12%. Some counties, such as Qatar 
and Bahrain, have government ownership near the 50% range.  
Table ‎5.2 Average Ownership by Identity Types.  
  Ownership Type  
  Foreign Individual Institution Government  
Bahrain 47.77 39.49 78.34 48.41 
Egypt 19.41 39.27 83.54 8.86 
Jordan 21.99 71.47 72.26 18.44 
Oman 36.28 40.90 76.09 27.99 
Qatar 25.45 3.64 50.91 49.09 
Saudi 20.12 48.86 57.96 29.22 
Tunisia 31.65 26.58 91.14 10.13 
Turkey 11.87 29.87 75.63 2.99 
Financial 25.94 47.23 78.90 11.74 
Manufacturing 19.56 47.17 69.47 18.76 
Service 20.17 44.17 72.93 18.94 
Grand Total 21.66 45.64 73.90 16.88 
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Table ‎5.3 Average Ownership Concentration Percentage by Each Identity  
 
In addition, the ownership type is classified by a possible combination of the types of 
ownership that can exist in each firm. Table 5.4 and table 5.5 shows the firms that have only 
one possible combination of ownership identity; approximately 30% of the firms in the study 
have institutional owners as the largest ownership group, followed by individual owners at 
13%. The largest percentage for firms that have more than two identities is group H, which is 
only individual and institution together in one firm with 22%.  
Table ‎5.4  Possible combination of ownership Identity 
 
Description  Observation Percentage 
A Foreigners are the only largest owners  209 3.79 
B Individuals are the only largest owners 735 13.31 
C Institutions are the only largest owners  1,613 29.22 
E  Government are the only largest owners  195 3.53 
E Foreigners and individuals 105 1.90 
F Foreigners and institution  472 8.55 
G Foreigners and government  52 0.94 
H Individuals and institution  1,231 22.30 
I Individuals and government  103 1.87 
J Institution and government  287 5.20 
K Foreigners, individuals, and institution  194 3.51 
L Foreigners, individuals, and government  12 0.22 
M Foreigners, institution, and government 143 2.59 
N Individuals, institution, and government  131 2.37 
O All types of ownership  9 0.16 
  Observation Mean % Maximam % 
Standard 
deviation 
Foreign Ownership 1,196 6.99 99.66 17.64 
Individual Ownership 2,520 13.19 99.66 20.66 
Institution Ownership 4,080 35.00 99.88 28.36 
Government Ownership 932 30.45 99.88 27.89 
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Table ‎5.5 Observation of possible combination of ownership identity by each country  
A B C E E F G H I J K L M N O
Bahrain 0 6 12 8 7 18 8 32 5 13 6 0 36 6 0
Egypt 26 129 456 8 14 104 0 238 1 52 46 0 27 11 0
Jordan 33 214 125 18 45 58 14 476 21 80 84 7 34 56 4
Oman 47 54 103 39 13 124 11 161 7 77 28 5 34 28 5
Qatar 7 0 19 13 0 0 7 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0
Saudi 26 129 147 85 8 87 12 149 69 36 23 0 12 30 0
Tunisia 0 7 32 0 0 18 0 7 0 8 7 0 0 0 0
Turky 70 196 719 24 18 63 0 166 0 14 0 0 0 0 0
Financial 64 185 439 20 28 174 9 382 14 68 89 0 37 33 1
Servise 107 384 845 120 49 215 40 625 49 155 63 5 89 75 5
Manufacturing 38 166 329 55 28 83 3 224 40 64 42 7 17 23 3
Total 209 735 1,613 195 105 472 52 1,231 103 287 194 12 143 131 9
 
 
5.3.2 Regression Model 
As mentioned in previous sections, the study uses three dependent variables to measure firm 
performance: accounting ratios, which are ROA and ROE, and market ratio, which is Tobin’s 
Q. For ownership identity concentration, the study uses four identities (foreign, individual, 
institution, and government). In addition, the study uses many control variables, which were 
explained in detail in chapter five; using these variables and measures, the study ended up 
developing the following equations. 
                                                                        
                                                                 
                                                                     
 11 IndustryDummy  + 12CountryDummy  +  13YearDummys  +                         
(6.1) 
 
Where the following is true: 
 Firm performance = ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q.  
 Ownership concentration = CON, HHI, H_DIFF, H_CON, and CON51 (As explained 
in Table 17) 
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 Firm size = total firm assets 
 Firm age = period from a firm’s establishment up to 2008, increasing by one each year 
afterward 
 Financial leverage = a company’s total debt / total assets 
 Auditors. Dummy variable taking 1 if a big four auditor is the firm’s external auditors 
and 0 otherwise 
 GDP = Growth rate of gross domestic product 
 
5.4 Results  
Following the same argument in chapter 4, based on the study of Wang and Shailer (2015) 
who argue that studying ownership concentration can be bias, depending on how ownership 
concentration is calculated and the type of regression model used. This chapter uses a panel-
data analysis that implements four regression types, as follows: OLS, fixed effects model, 
random effects model, and GMM in order to make clear understanding of the effect of 
ownership types on firm performance. Also, to capture the different characteristics between 
countries, industries, and time effects, the study uses a different approach to control for 
country, industry, and year-fixed effects.  
Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 confirm the effects of different ownership identity on ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q respectively without controlling for country, industry and year effects. The results 
show that both government and institutional ownership positively affect ROA ROE and 
Tobin’s Q at 1% significance level. Also foreign ownership has positive and significant effect 
on ROA at different levels of significance. Individual ownership shows negative effects but is 
not significant on ROA and ROE, however, individual effects significantly and positively 
Tobin’s Q.  
Even after controlling for country, industry and year effects separately, the effects of 
ownership identity on different firm performance remain unchanged. Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 
5.11 report the effects of ownership identity on ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q respectively after 
controlling industry effects only. Tables 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 explain the effects of ownership 
identity after considering country effects only. And, tables 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 show the 
effects on firm performance after controlling for year effects only. In addition, taking into 
account the effects of country, industry and year effects altogether, tables 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 
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demonstrate that the effects of ownership identity on ROA, ROE and Tobin’s are not 
changed. 
To sum up the results of the effects of ownership identity on firm performance in all the 15 
tables (tables from 5.6 to table 5.20), foreign ownership has a positive impact on ROA in two 
regression models, OLS and GMM. Furthermore, the significance level for foreign investors 
stays the same, even after controlling for country, industry and year. Also, foreign ownership 
shows significant positive effects on ROE using OLS and GMM. However, when using a 
model that controls for industry and country, foreigners do not show any significant 
relationship with ROE. Regarding the effects of foreign ownership on the market ratio, in 
most regression models, foreign investors enhance Tobin’s Q positively, even when taking 
into account the different effects of country, industry, and time.  
Individual owners had negative impacts on accounting ratios, yet none of these effects are 
significant. However, individual ownership has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q, and this effect 
is significant in most regression models that capture the fixed effects of industry and country. 
The significance levels vary between models so that some models show a 1% level of 
significance. 
Regarding the effects of institutional ownership, it has a significant and positive effect on all 
performance measures used in this study. OLS regression shows that institutional owners 
positively affect at the 1% level of significance ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q in most models, 
even after controlling for industry, country, and time. However, although the other regression 
models show significant positive effects on firm performance, the levels of significance are 
not the same. 
Government ownership has a positive impact on ROA at the 1% level of significance in all 
regression models, save for fixed effects. This effect on ROA does not change even after 
controlling for industry, country and year. Also, government ownership enhances the ratios of 
ROE and Tobin’s Q, yet OLS and GMM record a 1% level of significance.  
192 
 
Table ‎5.6   Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure, 
without industries, countries and years effects.  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.025** 0.017 0.015 0.025** 
(3.10) (0.60) (1.15) (3.28)
Individual Ownership -0.004 -0.051 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.55) (-1.94) (-0.22) (-0.50)
Institution Ownership 0.029*** 0.029* 0.008 0.029***
(5.20) (2.09) (0.98) (5.21)
Government Ownerships 0.095*** 0.036 0.080*** 0.095***
(8.96) (0.82) (3.85) (7.90)
Firm Size 0.006 -0.024 0.006 0.006
(1.25) (-0.73) (0.63) (1.34)
Firm Age 0.762*** 0.157 0.514*** 0.762***
(9.86) (1.03) (4.60) (9.79)
Financial leverage -0.679*** -0.424*** -0.493*** -0.679***
(-16.42) (-4.47) (-4.78) (-6.50)
Auditor 0.578* 0.444 0.019 0.578*  
(2.10) (1.04) (0.05) (2.14)
GDP 0.150*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.150***
(3.56) (3.42) (3.72) (3.47)
Arab Spring 1.080*** 1.482*** 1.482*** 1.080***
(3.82) (4.50) (4.86) (3.83)
constant 1.140* 3.658** 0.418 1.14
(2.03) (3.19) (0.49) (1.83)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model does not capture the effects 
of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable  : ROA
  *** Significance at the 1% level , ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% 
level.; ; Firm Size = Total assets  ; Firm Age = The number of years since firms have been 
founded ; Financial Leverage = Total debt/Total equity  ; GDP = Growth rate of gross 
domestic product  ; Auditor = 1 if firms’ external auditors is one of the big four auditors and 
0 otherwise.  
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Table ‎5.7   Different Regressions Results using ROE as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎
without industries, countries and years effects.  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.033* 0.056 0.018 0.033*  
(2.35) (0.62) (0.50) (2.25)
Individual Ownership -0.017 -0.059 -0.003 -0.017
(-1.27) (-1.41) (-0.12) (-1.31)
Institution Ownership 0.052*** 0.02 0.031 0.052***
(5.11) (0.74) (1.91) (4.99)
Government Ownerships 0.074*** 0.009 0.059 0.074***
(3.89) (0.11) (1.86) (4.38)
Firm Size 0.063*** 0.103 0.075*** 0.063***
(7.00) (1.63) (4.08) (7.45)
Firm Age 1.100*** 0.345 0.750*** 1.100***
(7.98) (1.09) (3.52) (8.12)
Financial leverage -0.646*** -0.657*** -0.649*** -0.646***
(-8.77) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.29)
Auditor 2.014*** 0.644 0.636 2.014***
(4.10) (0.76) (0.96) (4.02)
GDP 0.325*** 0.218*** 0.241*** 0.325***
(4.32) (3.46) (3.94) (4.07)
Arab Spring 1.135* 2.927*** 2.585*** 1.135*  
(2.25) (5.18) (5.07) (2.30)
constant 2.383*  2.992 0.294 2.383*  
(2.38) (1.24) (0.19) (2.27)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model does not capture the effects 
of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable  : ROE
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.8   Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q as‎‎firms’‎performance‎
measure, without industries, countries and years effects . 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.006*** 0.005* 0.006** 0.006***
(5.83) (2.22) (3.23) (5.52)
Individual Ownership 0.002* 0.006* 0.003* 0.002** 
(2.29) (2.41) (2.07) (2.64)
Institution Ownership 0.003*** 0.002 0.003 0.003** 
(4.16) (0.93) (1.95) (3.16)
Government Ownerships 0.006*** 0.004 0.005* 0.006***
(4.64) (0.87) (2.53) (3.92)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(-5.98) (-0.66) (-3.37) (-8.35)
Firm Age 0.077*** 0.029 0.052** 0.077***
(7.72) (1.17) (2.68) (6.13)
Financial leverage -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-0.10) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-0.16)
Auditor 0.113** 0.017 0.079 0.113***
(3.16) (0.40) (1.89) (3.40)
GDP 0.013* 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*  
(2.35) (3.47) (3.58) (2.50)
Arab Spring 0.324*** 0.207*** 0.230*** 0.324***
(8.82) (3.92) (4.89) (9.89)
constant 0.641*** 0.976*** 0.869*** 0.641***
(8.77) (6.09) (6.76) (7.37)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model does not capture the effects 
of   industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Dependent variable  :Tobin
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.9 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎with‎
industries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.018* 0.017 0.012 0.018*  
(2.33) (0.60) (0.95) (2.47)
Individual Ownership -0.012 -0.051 -0.001 -0.012
(-1.60) (-1.94) (-0.10) (-1.45)
Institution Ownership 0.024*** 0.029* 0.006 0.024***
(4.33) (2.09) (0.71) (4.35)
Government Ownerships 0.079*** 0.036 0.070*** 0.079***
(7.40) (0.82) (3.40) (6.62)
Firm Size 0.007 0.024 0.005 0.007
(1.39) (0.73) (0.58) (1.52)
Firm Age 0.555*** 0.157 0.403*** 0.555***
(7.10) (1.03) (3.65) (7.13)
Financial leverage -0.660*** -0.424*** -0.489*** -0.660***
(-16.16) (-4.47) (-4.82) (-6.61)
Auditor 0.952*** 0.444 0.234 0.952***
(3.48) (1.04) (0.67) (3.56)
GDP 0.148*** 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.148***
(3.56) (3.42) (3.77) (3.44)
Arab Spring 0.836** 1.482*** 1.376*** 0.836** 
(2.99) (4.50) (4.48) (2.95)
constant 2.148*** 3.658** 1.369 2.148***
(3.82) (3.19) (1.63) (3.44)
AdjR-sqr 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.11
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of   
industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  : ROA
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.10   Different Regressions Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure, 
with industries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.024 0.056 0.014 0.024
(1.74) (0.62) (0.41) (1.67)
Individual Ownership -0.028* -0.059 -0.008 -0.028*  
(-2.09) (-1.41) (-0.36) (-2.16)
Institution Ownership 0.044*** 0.02 0.028 0.044***
(4.41) (0.74) (1.70) (4.30)
Government Ownerships 0.051** 0.009 0.046 0.051** 
(2.65) (0.11) (1.43) (3.04)
Firm Size 0.064*** 0.103 0.074*** 0.064***
(7.14) (1.63) (4.09) (7.64)
Firm Age 0.811*** 0.345 0.600** 0.811***
(5.78) (1.09) (2.80) (5.83)
Financial leverage -0.620*** -0.657*** -0.641*** -0.620***
(-8.47) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-4.22)
Auditor 2.537*** 0.644 0.924 2.537***
(5.17) (0.76) (1.40) (5.11)
GDP 0.322*** 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.322***
(4.32) (3.46) (3.98) (4.05)
Arab Spring 0.794 2.927*** 2.442*** 0.794
(1.58) (5.18) (4.76) (1.60)
constant 3.793*** 2.992 2.668 3.793***
(3.76) (1.24) (1.75) (3.61)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  : ROE
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of   
industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.11 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q‎‎as‎firms’ performance 
measure, with industries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.006*** 0.005* 0.006** 0.006***
(5.52) (2.22) (3.18) (5.27)
Individual Ownership 0.002 0.006* 0.003 0.002*  
(1.89) (2.41) (1.94) (2.18)
Institution Ownership 0.003*** 0.002 0.003 0.003** 
(3.81) (0.93) (1.87) (2.92)
Government Ownerships 0.006*** 0.004 0.005* 0.006***
(4.02) (0.87) (2.31) (3.40)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(-5.92) (-0.66) (-3.43) (-8.36)
Firm Age 0.067*** 0.029 0.046* 0.067***
(6.55) (1.17) (2.34) (5.07)
Financial leverage -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-0.07) (-1.18) (-1.21) (-0.11)
Auditor 0.131*** 0.017 0.088* 0.131***
(3.64) (0.40) (2.15) (3.97)
GDP 0.013* 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*  
(2.33) (3.47) (3.61) (2.49)
Arab Spring 0.312*** 0.207*** 0.226*** 0.312***
(8.49) (3.92) (4.79) (9.54)
constant 0.592*** 0.976*** 0.780*** 0.592***
(8.01) (6.09) (6.15) (6.88)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  :Tobin
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of   
industries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.12 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure, 
with countries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.025** 0.017 0.016 0.025** 
(3.11) (0.60) (1.19) (3.27)
Individual Ownership -0.009 -0.051 -0.012 -0.009
(-1.14) (-1.94) (-0.93) (-1.04)
Institution Ownership 0.025*** 0.029* 0.006 0.025***
(4.20) (2.09) (0.69) (4.21)
Government Ownerships 0.106*** 0.036 0.087*** 0.106***
(9.93) (0.82) (4.09) (8.64)
Firm Size -0.002 -0.024 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.32) (-0.73) (-0.23) (-0.35)
Firm Age 0.469*** 0.157 0.369** 0.469***
(5.60) (1.03) (3.24) (5.50)
Financial leverage -0.708*** -0.424*** -0.504*** -0.708***
(-17.30) (-4.47) (-4.77) (-6.52)
Auditor 0.544 0.444 0.11 0.544
(1.71) (1.04) (0.30) (1.70)
GDP 0.114** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.114*  
(2.62) (3.42) (3.39) (2.57)
Arab Spring 1.613*** 1.482*** 1.602*** 1.613***
(4.70) (4.50) (4.88) (4.72)
constant 1.288 3.658** 2.674* 1.288
(1.40) (3.19) (2.16) (1.60)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROA
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.13 Different Regressions Results using ROE as firms’‎performance‎measure, 
with countries effects only . 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.022 0.056 0.01 0.022
(1.56) (0.62) (0.29) (1.47)
Individual Ownership -0.001 -0.059 -0.011 -0.001
(-0.10) (-1.41) (-0.49) (0.10)
Institution Ownership 0.034** 0.02 0.022 0.034** 
(3.29) (0.74) (1.34) (3.11)
Government Ownerships 0.088*** 0.009 0.066* 0.088***
(4.69) (0.11) (2.09) (5.28)
Firm Size 0.054*** 0.103 0.070*** 0.054***
(5.75) (1.63) (3.87) (6.42)
Firm Age 0.655*** 0.345 0.593** 0.655***
(4.42) (1.09) (2.64) (4.35)
Financial leverage -0.730*** -0.657*** -0.674*** -0.730***
(-10.07) (-3.75) (-3.95) (-4.65)
Auditor 2.121*** 0.644 0.332 2.121***
(3.77) (0.76) (0.47) (3.83)
GDP 0.229** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.229** 
(2.99) (3.46) (3.47) (2.80)
Arab Spring 3.022*** 2.927*** 3.055*** 3.022***
(4.98) (5.18) (5.52) (5.16)
constant 0.769 2.992 2.389 0.769
(0.47) (1.24) (1.24) (0.58)
AdjR-sqr 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROE
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.14 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q  as‎firms’‎performance‎
measure, with countries effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.010*** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.010***
(9.23) (2.22) (4.51) (8.82)
Individual Ownership 0.005*** 0.006* 0.005** 0.005***
(5.37) (2.41) (3.25) (6.20)
Institution Ownership 0.006*** 0.002 0.004** 0.006***
(7.53) (0.93) (2.86) (5.79)
Government Ownerships 0.010*** 0.004 0.007*** 0.010***
(7.16) (0.87) (3.66) (5.98)
Firm Size -0.006*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006***
(-9.27) (-0.66) (-5.13) (-10.82)
Firm Age 0.035** 0.029 0.025 0.035*  
(3.23) (1.17) (1.23) (2.39)
Financial leverage -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-0.15) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-0.24)
Auditor -0.014 0.017 0.019 -0.014
(-0.35) (0.40) (0.47) (-0.41)
GDP 0.011 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*  
(1.92) (3.47) (3.32) (1.99)
Arab Spring 0.190*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.190***
(4.30) (3.92) (4.00) (3.71)
constant 0.457*** 0.976*** 0.561*** 0.457***
(3.85) (6.09) (3.57) (4.24)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  :Tobin
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
countries fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.15 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROA‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎
with year effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.024** 0.025 0.014 0.024** 
(3.04) (0.85) (1.07) (3.21)
Individual Ownership -0.005 -0.042 -0.002 -0.005
(-0.62) (-1.54) (-0.12) (-0.56)
Institution Ownership 0.029*** 0.037* 0.008 0.029***
(5.04) (2.38) (0.80) (5.00)
Government Ownerships 0.095*** 0.028 0.080*** 0.095***
(8.88) (0.62) (3.74) (7.82)
Firm Size 0.006 -0.027 0.005 0.006
(1.22) (-0.82) (0.61) (1.31)
Firm Age 0.760*** 0.146 0.517*** 0.760***
(9.80) (0.96) (4.59) (9.69)
Financial leverage -0.679*** -0.426*** -0.495*** -0.679***
(-16.42) (-4.52) (-4.80) (-6.51)
Auditor 0.572* 0.449 0.027 0.572*  
(2.08) (1.05) (0.08) (2.11)
GDP 0.155*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.155***
(3.61) (3.53) (3.86) (3.54)
Arab Spring 1.097*** 1.566*** 1.481*** 1.097***
(3.63) (4.64) (4.76) (3.67)
constant 1.21 3.818** 0.363 1.21
(1.85) (3.16) (0.41) (1.71)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROA
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.16 Different Regressions‎Results‎using‎ROE‎as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎
with year effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.034* 0.054 0.022 0.034*  
(2.38) (0.59) (0.62) (2.27)
Individual Ownership -0.016 -0.062 -0.003 -0.016
(-1.17) (-1.40) (-0.14) (-1.21)
Institution Ownership 0.053*** 0.017 0.036* 0.053***
(5.12) (0.56) (2.03) (4.99)
Government Ownerships 0.074*** 0.013 0.064 0.074***
(3.90) (0.15) (1.96) (4.37)
Firm Size 0.064*** 0.103 0.076*** 0.064***
(7.04) (1.64) (4.11) (7.47)
Firm Age 1.109*** 0.359 0.770*** 1.109***
(8.02) (1.13) (3.61) (8.15)
Financial leverage -0.647*** -0.661*** -0.651*** -0.647***
(-8.77) (-3.78) (-3.91) (-4.30)
Auditor 2.030*** 0.613 0.699 2.030***
(4.13) (0.72) (1.06) (4.06)
GDP 0.333*** 0.219*** 0.245*** 0.333***
(4.34) (3.42) (3.94) (4.07)
Arab Spring 0.97 2.855*** 2.390*** 0.97
(1.80) (4.97) (4.61) (1.83)
constant 2.148 2.959 0.203 2.148
(1.84) (1.20) (0.13) (1.77)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROE
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.17 Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q  as‎firms’‎performance‎
measure, with years effects only. 
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.006*** 0.004 0.005** 0.006***
(5.41) (1.70) (2.77) (5.15)
Individual Ownership 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002
(1.52) (1.72) (1.21) (1.74)
Institution Ownership 0.002** 0.001 0.002 0.002*  
(3.27) (0.40) (1.26) (2.44)
Government Ownerships 0.006*** 0.003 0.004* 0.006***
(4.33) (0.69) (2.10) (3.67)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.004***
(-6.34) (-0.77) (-3.55) (-8.66)
Firm Age 0.074*** 0.027 0.051** 0.074***
(7.31) (1.12) (2.63) (5.80)
Financial leverage -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.001
(-0.11) (-1.17) (-1.24) (-0.18)
Auditor 0.104** 0.022 0.078 0.104** 
(2.92) (0.51) (1.87) (3.19)
GDP 0.015** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015** 
(2.62) (3.82) (3.96) (2.78)
Arab Spring 0.384*** 0.219*** 0.255*** 0.384***
(9.81) (3.53) (4.58) (10.35)
constant 0.455*** 0.935*** 0.798*** 0.455***
(5.36) (5.43) (5.76) (4.75)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Industry effect NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO NO NO
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  :Tobin
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model captures only the effects of  
year fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.18   Different Regressions Results using ROA as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎
by controlling industries, countries and years effects .  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.018* 0.025 0.012 0.018*  
(2.29) (0.85) (0.88) (2.41)
Individual Ownership -0.001 -0.042 -0.005 -0.001
(-0.08) (-1.54) (-0.39) (-0.07)
Institution Ownership 0.019** 0.037* 0.002 0.019** 
(3.17) (2.38) (0.23) (3.14)
Government Ownerships 0.087*** 0.028 0.074*** 0.087***
(8.16) (0.62) (3.43) (7.23)
Firm Size 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.001
(0.02) (0.82) (0.12) (0.02)
Firm Age 0.277** 0.146 0.271* 0.277** 
(3.28) (0.96) (2.39) (3.26)
Financial leverage -0.685*** -0.426*** -0.500*** -0.685***
(-16.89) (-4.52) (-4.85) (-6.62)
Auditor 0.934** 0.449 0.076 0.934** 
(2.95) (1.05) (0.20) (2.95)
GDP 0.115** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.115*  
(2.61) (3.53) (3.50) (2.57)
Arab Spring 1.616*** 1.566*** 1.580*** 1.616***
(4.29) (4.64) (4.65) (4.27)
constant 0.683 3.818** 1.375 0.683
(0.70) (3.16) (1.17) (0.80)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.13
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROA
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model capture the effects of   
industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.19   Different Regressions Results using ROE as‎firms’‎performance‎measure,‎
by controlling industries, countries and years effects.  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.013 0.054 0.009 0.013
(0.94) (0.59) (0.25) (0.89)
Individual Ownership -0.011 -0.062 -0.007 -0.011
(-0.80) (1.40) (-0.31) (-0.82)
Institution Ownership 0.026* 0.017 0.022 0.026*  
(2.50) (-0.56) (1.18) (2.35)
Government Ownerships 0.064*** 0.013 0.053 0.064***
(3.35) (0.15) (1.61) (3.82)
Firm Size 0.056*** 0.103 0.071*** 0.056***
(6.04) (1.64) (3.96) (6.77)
Firm Age 0.398** 0.359 0.473* 0.398** 
(2.65) (1.13) (2.11) (2.62)
Financial leverage -0.699*** -0.661*** -0.668*** -0.699***
(-9.69) (-3.78) (-3.97) (-4.57)
Auditor 2.645*** 0.613 0.596 2.645***
(4.69) (0.72) (0.84) (4.81)
GDP 0.228** 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.228** 
(2.92) (3.42) (3.44) (2.73)
Arab Spring 3.035*** 2.855*** 2.897*** 3.035***
(4.53) (4.97) (5.08) (4.69)
constant 0.047 2.959 0.886 0.047
(0.03) (1.20) (0.47) (0.03)
AdjR-sqr 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.13
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
Dependent variable  : ROE
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model capture the effects of   
industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.20  Different Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q as‎firms’‎performance‎
measure, by controlling industries, countries and years effects.  
Pooled
 OLS
Fixed
 Effect
Random
Effect
GMM   
Foreign Ownership 0.009*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.009***
(8.62) (1.70) (4.20) (8.33)
Individual Ownership 0.005*** 0.004 0.004** 0.005***
(4.51) (1.72) (2.58) (5.21)
Institution Ownership 0.005*** 0.001 0.004* 0.005***
(6.63) (0.40) (2.38) (5.17)
Government Ownerships 0.009*** 0.003 0.006** 0.009***
(6.26) (0.69) (3.12) (5.25)
Firm Size -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.006***
(-9.15) (-0.77) (-5.13) (-10.79)
Firm Age 0.025* 0.027 0.02 0.025
(2.30) (1.12) (0.96) (1.65)
Financial leverage -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.39) (-1.17) (-1.09) (-0.59)
Auditor 0.006 0.022 0.031 0.006
(0.15) (0.51) (0.78) (0.18)
GDP 0.012* 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*  
(2.14) (3.82) (3.66) (2.20)
Arab Spring 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.212***
(4.32) (3.53) (3.47) (3.39)
constant 0.328** 0.935*** 0.429* 0.328** 
(2.58) (5.43) (2.57) (2.74)
AdjR-sqr 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.13
Industry effect YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 5,521
  *** Significance at the 1% level 
** Significance at the 5% level,
 * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent variable  :Tobin
This table presents different regressions results to find the effects of different   ownership 
identity  on firm performance in the MENA region;  This model capture the effects of   
industries, countries and years fixed effects; z-statistics are within parentheses. 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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5.4.1 The effects of the Controller Identity  
This section is an investigation of the effects of each identity when it controls 51% or more of 
the firm’s equity. A dichotomous-type variable as described in table 4.21 was used in this 
section; the dichotomous variable is used to classify the power of the largest ownership 
identity that owns a voting percentage equalling at least 51% of the common stock. This 
ownership concentration index is symbolized as foreign_51, individual_51, institution_51, 
and government_51 and represents the power of the four ownership identities. The four 
dummy variables have a value of 1 if one of the identities own at least 51% of the firm’s 
equity.  
Table ‎5.21 The Classification of the Largest Ownership Identity Power. 
Variable  Description Observation 
 
Foreign_51 
 
Dummy variable, 1 if total foreign investors own at least 51% 
of the firm's equity and 0 otherwise. 
 
260 
Individual_51 Dummy variable, 1 if total individual investors own at least 
51% of the firm's equity and 0 otherwise. 
  
447 
Institution_51 Dummy variable, 1 if total institutional investors own at least 
51% of the firm's equity and 0 otherwise.  
 
1,452 
Government_51  Dummy variable, 1 if total government investors own at least 
51% of the firm's equity and 0 otherwise.  
164 
 
All other dependent and independent variables remained the same. The following regression 
model was used.  
                                                           
                                                                  
                                                                          
                                                                                                      (6.1) 
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Unlike the other tests in previous sections, because of the extensive data, only one regression 
model was used. The Housman test and the Breach-Pagan test were applied to show that the 
random regression is the best model to explain the determination of ownership structure.   
Tables 5.22, 5.23, and 5.24 using different dependent variable: ROA, ROE and Tobin_Q 
respectively, show the random regression results of the relationship between the number of 
largest shareholders and firm performance after controlling for the effects of country, 
industry, and years separately . The results in table 4.22 and 4.23 show that both foreigners 
and individuals have negative effects on firm accounting performance measures (ROA and 
ROE), yet this effect is not significant.  
Institutional ownership has significant positive effects on firm accounting ratios. Also, 
government ownership has positive effects on ROA at the 1% level of significance. However, 
although the results show that government ownership has positive effects on ROE, this is not 
significant, save for in one model that captured the effects of country differences.  
Regarding Tobin’s Q, the results in table 4.24 indicated that all ownership types have positive 
effects on market ratio, yet not all the effects are significant. Unlike the effects of foreign 
investors on accounting ratios, they have significant positive effects on Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
level of significance in all models. However, the effects of individual ownership are not 
significant. Institutional ownership also has a significant influence on Tobin’s Q in all 
models, save for two models that account for industry and year effects separately. On the 
other hand, government ownership has a significant effect on market ratio in all models, yet 
the level of significance varies depending on the model used. Thus, government has a 1% 
level of significance and a positive effect after controlling for country effects.  
In conclusion, studying the power of ownership identity, when controlling for firms that have 
51% or more of a firm’s equity, shows significant results. The findings are aligned to the 
results in the previous section regarding the effects of ownership identity on firm performance 
for three types which are individual, institution, and government. However, in this study, 
foreign investors had negative effects on ROA and ROE when they had control over firms, 
unlike the results discovered in the previous section.  
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Table ‎5.22 Random Regressions Results using ROA as dependent variable. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Foreign Ownership -1.153 -1.414 -1.204 -1.187 -1.479
(-1.31) (-1.62) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.68)
Individual Ownership 0.709 0.588 0.911 0.649 0.698
(0.73) (0.61) (0.94) (0.67) (0.73)
Institution Ownership 0.515 0.382 0.333 0.477 0.154
(1.24) (0.93) (0.79) (1.13) (0.36)
Government Ownerships 2.969* 2.709* 3.184* 2.965* 2.830*
(2.16) (2.04) (2.24) (2.16) (2.06)
Firm Size 0.013* 0.012* 0.006 0.012* 0.006
(2.50) (2.38) (1.21) (2.45) (1.21)
Firm Age 0.777*** 0.567*** 0.517*** 0.775*** 0.306***
(10.00) (7.23) (6.15) (9.94) (3.62)
Financial leverage -0.680*** -0.655*** -0.714*** -0.681*** -0.684***
(-16.37) (-15.98) (-17.34) (-16.37) (-16.80)
Auditor 0.959*** 1.306*** 0.834** 0.949*** 1.226***
(3.51) (4.81) (2.64) (3.47) (3.90)
GDP 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.119** 0.168*** 0.120** 
(3.82) (3.77) (2.72) (3.89) (2.72)
Arab Spring 0.858** 0.667* 1.495*** 0.886** 1.585***
(3.08) (2.42) (4.35) (2.96) (4.19)
constant 0.38 1.738*** 2.432** 0.524 1.288
(0.80) (3.62) (2.75) (0.87) (1.34)
AdjR-sqr 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.14
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES
Country effects NO NO YES NO YES
Year Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 5521 5521 5521 5521 5521
This table presents Random regressions results find the effects of each owner identify in firm 
performance.  Ownership identify in this model is Dummy variable taking 1 if total shears by each 
identify group owning 51% of total equity and 0 otherwise.  z-statistics are within parentheses.
Dependent variable  : ROA
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1: does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3 : only capture country  fixed effects
Models  4 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Models  4 :  capture industries, countries and years fixed effects 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.23 Random Regressions Results using ROE as dependent variable. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Foreign Ownership -2.87 -3.206 -3.377 -2.835 -3.672
(-1.15) (-1.30) (-1.38) (-1.14) (-1.53)
Individual Ownership 0.427 0.289 0.763 0.472 0.584
(0.32) (0.22) (0.57) (0.36) (0.44)
Institution Ownership 1.615* 1.434 1.183 1.689* 1.032
(2.04) (1.81) (1.46) (2.10) (1.25)
Government Ownerships 1.043 0.658 1.387 1.144 0.965
(0.54) (0.35) (0.70) (0.59) (0.50)
Firm Size 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.062***
(7.81) (7.74) (6.79) (7.84) (6.82)
Firm Age 1.112*** 0.827*** 0.698*** 1.121*** 0.423** 
(8.05) (5.89) (4.71) (8.08) (2.81)
Financial leverage -0.648*** -0.615*** -0.741*** -0.649*** -0.703***
(-8.78) (-8.38) (-10.21) (-8.78) (-9.73)
Auditor 2.488*** 2.958*** 2.455*** 2.497*** 2.969***
(5.12) (6.09) (4.40) (5.13) (5.32)
GDP 0.333*** 0.327*** 0.232** 0.342*** 0.231** 
(4.43) (4.38) (3.02) (4.46) (2.96)
Arab Spring 0.909 0.65 2.921*** 0.744 3.026***
(1.83) (1.32) (4.82) (1.40) (4.51)
constant 1.399 3.241*** 1.98 1.178 0.625
(1.67) (3.77) (1.27) (1.11) (0.37)
AdjR-sqr 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.12
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES
Country effects NO NO YES NO YES
Year Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 5521 5521 5521 5521 5521
This table presents Random regressions results find the effects of each owner identify in firm 
performance.  Ownership identify in this model is Dummy variable taking 1 if total shears by each 
identify group owning 51% of total equity and 0 otherwise.  z-statistics are within parentheses.
Dependent variable  : ROE
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1: does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3 : only capture country  fixed effects
Models  4 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Models  4 :  capture industries, countries and years fixed effects 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.24 Random Regressions Results using Tobin’s_Q as dependent variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Foreign Ownership 0.243 0.23 0.328** 0.219 0.292*
(1.95) (1.85) (2.65) (1.74) (2.36)
Individual Ownership 0.03 0.026 0.056 -0.003 0.025
(0.34) (0.30) (0.65) (-0.03) (0.29)
Institution Ownership 0.053 0.046 0.081 0.019 0.043
(0.78) (0.67) (1.18) (0.28) (0.65)
Government Ownerships 0.166 0.152 0.239 0.14 0.199
(1.03) (0.94) (1.54) (0.88) (1.31)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006***
(-5.55) (-5.60) (-8.30) (-5.94) (-8.35)
Firm Age 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.040*** 0.074*** 0.029** 
(7.74) (6.55) (3.70) (7.34) (2.58)
Financial leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.08) (0.45)
Auditor 0.132*** 0.149*** 0.018 0.123*** 0.039
(3.72) (4.19) (0.45) (3.49) (0.95)
GDP 0.013* 0.013* 0.011* 0.015** 0.013*  
(2.42) (2.39) (1.97) (2.72) (2.19)
Arab Spring 0.293*** 0.283*** 0.163*** 0.361*** 0.210***
(8.10) (7.84) (3.68) (9.30) (4.26)
constant 0.796*** 0.728*** 0.753*** 0.567*** 0.542***
(12.99) (11.55) (6.59) (7.33) (4.34)
AdjR-sqr 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10
Industry effect NO YES NO NO YES
Country effects NO NO YES NO YES
Year Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 5521 5521 5521 5521 5521
This table presents Random regressions results find the effects of each owner identify in firm 
performance.  Ownership identify in this model is Dummy variable taking 1 if total shears by each 
identify group owning 51% of total equity and 0 otherwise.  z-statistics are within parentheses.
Dependent variable  :Tobin
 *** Significance at the 1% level,  ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Models  1: does not capture the effects of   industries, countries and years fixed effects
Models  2 : only capture industries  fixed effects
Models  3 : only capture country  fixed effects
Models  4 : only capture years  fixed effects 
Models  4 :  capture industries, countries and years fixed effects 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3
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5.5 Other robustness checks 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter also carries out seven robustness tests as shown in 
tables 5.25 and 5.26.  Column (1) shows the regression results when industry is replaced with 
firm fixed effects. Column (2) presents the results using Year-level clustering. Column (3) 
reports the results using two-way clustering by industry and year. As shown in table 4.1 in 
chapter four, Turkey and Egypt represents respectively 23% and 20% of the total study 
sample. In order to validate the results and to ensure that one country does not affect the 
results, columns (4 and 5) reports the results model after excluding Turkey and Egypt 
represents from the sample. In addition, to eliminate the biases from the effect of firm’s 
market capitalisation, firms are divided into two groups: Group A with high market 
capitalisation (above firm size mean) and Group B with low market capitalisation (below firm 
size mean). Results presented in Columns (6 and 7) are by running regression for each group 
only. As noticed in the different regressions outcomes, the results are mostly constant in the 
seven tests, and this strongly supports the robustness of the study results.  
5.6 Quantile Regressions 
As an additional test, also in this chapter, I compare the results of classical least squares 
(OLS) of the effects of different types of ownership on firm’s performance, and these effects 
in different quantile distribution using quantile regression outcomes. The purpose of 
regression is to test the effects of ownership types in each performance quantile distributed by 
(10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile). As shown in tables 5.27 and 5.28, each ownership 
type has different effects on performance quantile. 
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Table ‎5.25 Robustness tests, Dependent Variable: ROA and ROE 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign Ownership 0.018* 0.024*** 0.024** 0.019** 0.026** 0.013* 0.040** 0.024** 0.034** 0.021** 0.022** 0.046** 0.018 0.062** 
(2.33) (10.81) (2.90) (2.12) (2.93) (1.40) (3.19) (1.74) (4.02) (1.39) (1.37) (2.89) (0.92) (3.07)
Individual Ownership -0.012 -0.005 0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.029 -0.028* -0.016 -0.001 -0.019 -0.006 -0.005 -0.033
(-1.60) (-0.87) (0.59) (-0.62) (-0.03) (-0.46) (2.70) (-2.09) (-2.39) (-0.01) (-1.27) (-0.42) (-0.25) (-1.87)
Institution Ownership 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.024** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.033* 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.058***
(4.33) (8.83) (2.93) (3.27) (4.35) (3.69) (3.88) (4.41) (7.00) (2.21) (3.44) (4.19) (3.38) (3.98)
Government Ownership 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.068*** 0.094*** 0.049** 0.006 0.022* 0.054*** 0.032 0.032 0.067** 0.011
(5.32) (13.38) (8.05) (6.41) (6.13) (8.55) (2.60) (0.33) (2.60) (3.63) (1.58) (1.63) (2.99) (0.37)
Firm Size 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.013* -0.023*** 0.726*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.002** 1.078***
(1.39) (2.17) (-0.24) (-0.26) (2.40) (-4.82) (8.36) (7.14) (12.04) (4.29) (4.19) (7.67) (0.25) (7.71)
Firm Age 0.555*** 0.760*** 0.469*** 0.895*** 0.613*** 0.256** 0.753*** 0.811*** 1.109*** 0.655*** 1.358*** 0.835*** 0.303 1.096***
(7.10) (10.64) (5.54) (10.09) (6.97) (2.70) (6.09) (5.78) (8.35) (4.20) (8.80) (5.31) (1.56) (5.51)
Financial leverage -0.660*** -0.679*** -0.709*** -0.611*** -0.717*** -0.717*** -0.742*** -0.620*** -0.647** -0.732*** -0.402*** -0.717*** -0.341*** -1.227***
(-16.16) (-9.87) (-6.43) (-12.94) (-14.79) (-15.13) (-10.90) (-8.47) (-5.41) (-4.22) (-4.90) (-8.26) (-3.53) (-11.20)
Auditor 0.952*** 0.572 0.545 0.581 0.841** 0.19** 0.301** 2.537*** 2.030** 2.127*** 1.910*** 2.647*** 0.625** 0.399**
(3.48) (2.21) (1.52) (1.89) (2.75) (0.60) (0.64) (5.17) (3.95) (3.55) (3.58) (4.83) (0.97) (0.52)
GDP 0.148*** 0.155 0.115* 0.262*** 0.120** 0.176*** 0.146* 0.322*** 0.333* 0.229** 0.625*** 0.254*** 0.383*** 0.287*  
(3.56) (1.97) (2.29) (3.81) (2.81) (3.92) (1.93) (4.32) (2.53) (2.78) (5.22) (3.33) (4.17) (2.35)
Arab Spring 0.836** 1.097*** 1.697** 0.893* 1.400*** 0.709** 0.26** 0.794** 0.97** 3.143** 0.581* 1.655** 0.243** 0.064**
(2.99) (13.02) (3.20) (2.53) (4.19) (1.94) (0.61) (1.58) (1.50) (2.95) (0.95) (2.77) (0.33) (0.09)
constant 2.148*** 1.21** 1.297** 1.849** 1.182** 4.345*** 6.246*** 3.793*** 2.148** 0.859** 4.290*** 2.595* 6.091*** 9.167***
(3.82) (1.54) (1.13) (2.84) (1.88) (5.71) (6.84) (3.76) (1.42) (0.43) (3.79) (2.30) (3.93) (6.24)
AdjR-sqr 0.117 0.094 0.125 0.093 0.094 0.134 0.089 0.076 0.061 0.107 0.062 0.067 3.83 0.084
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
z-statistics are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent  variable : ROA
Firm FE
Dependent  variable : ROE
Firm FE
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3
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Table ‎5.26   Robustness tests, Dependent Variable: Tobin’s_Q and Log- Tobin’s_Q 
Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms Cluster by Two-way Exclude Exclude Firms Firms 
Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B Year clustering  Turky  Egypt Group A Group B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign Ownership 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(5.52) (7.40) (6.19) (1.79) (7.52) (6.06) (2.96) (6.60) (8.67) (7.45) (2.75) (7.94) (6.00) (4.27)
Individual Ownership 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
(1.89) (2.19) (4.23) (1.81) (2.43) (1.93) (1.20) (1.91) (2.02) (3.26) (1.78) (3.69) (1.40) (1.92)
Institution Ownership 0.003*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002***
(3.81) (3.74) (4.48) (4.62) (1.55) (1.59) (4.44) (3.92) (4.85) (5.93) (5.30) (2.17) (2.15) (4.83)
Government Ownership 0.003* 0.004* 0.004** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.004***
(2.09) (3.27) (2.70) (0.13) (3.95) (7.46) (3.01) (1.17) (3.07) (2.16) (-0.47) (3.37) (5.56) (-3.48)
Firm Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.032** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.019***
(-5.92) (-11.12) (-8.28) (-4.10) (-5.64) (-6.54) (-2.58) (-4.36) (-9.88) (-6.36) (-2.79) (-3.79) (-4.88) (-4.08)
Firm Age 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.035* 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.120*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.025*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.026*** 0.070***
(6.55) (6.74) (2.61) (7.28) (8.69) (4.31) (6.82) (9.14) (10.53) (4.13) (10.90) (11.06) (4.81) (10.54)
Financial leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.015 0.007** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006* 0.006* -0.001 0.014***
(0.07) (0.43) (0.30) (0.44) (0.99) (2.15) (1.52) (3.06) (9.18) (3.51) (2.48) (2.12) (-0.30) (3.87)
Auditor 0.131*** 0.104* 0.014* 0.092* 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.11** 0.112*** 0.092*** 0.005* 0.071*** 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.076** 
(3.64) (3.25) (-0.39) (2.33) (4.35) (4.14) (1.63) (7.43) (6.59) (0.27) (4.29) (7.30) (6.82) (2.97)
GDP 0.013* 0.015 0.012* -0.012 0.012* 0.01 0.012 0.010*** 0.011 0.008* -0.003 0.010*** 0.006* 0.014***
(2.33) (2.25) (2.01) (-1.42) (2.54) (1.96) (1.14) (4.26) (2.06) (2.36) (-0.84) (4.24) (2.33) (3.33)
Arab Spring 0.312*** 0.384*** 0.216*** 0.455*** 0.372*** 0.328*** 0.372*** 0.174*** 0.217*** 0.132*** 0.265*** 0.226*** 0.204*** 0.179***
(8.49) (10.18) (3.74) (10.07) (10.20) (7.99) (6.14) (11.28) (8.79) (5.41) (13.95) (12.59) (9.67) (7.76)
constant 0.592*** 0.455*** 0.360** 0.695*** 0.586*** 0.814*** 0.553*** 0.346*** 0.417*** 0.447*** 0.279*** 0.379*** 0.174*** 0.345***
(8.01) (9.65) (3.03) (8.33) (8.53) (9.53) (4.27) (11.18) (12.29) (6.40) (7.95) (11.18) (3.97) (7.00)
AdjR-sqr 0.086 0.075 0.085 0.091 0.089 0.064 0.085 0.087 0.083 0.165 0.092 0.098 0.079 0.091
Industry effect YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year Effects NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Observations 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752 5,521 5,521 5,521 4,249 4403 2769 2752
z-statistics are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent  variable :: LOG _TOBIN_Q
Firm FE
Dependent  variable : : TOBIN_Q
Firm FE
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.27  Results of using standard quantile regression, Dependent Variable ROA and ROE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Foreign Ownership 0.025** 0.009 0.016* 0.016** 0.019** 0.053** 0.033** 0.037 0.025 0.026** 0.028* 0.128**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Individual Ownership -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.009* -0.009 -0.008  -0.017 -0.015 -0.005 -0.014 -0.042** -0.027  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Institution Ownership 0.029** 0.039** 0.021** 0.02** 0.028** 0.031** 0.052** 0.059** 0.035** 0.042** 0.045** 0.083**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Government Ownership 0.066** -0.016 0.009 0.044** 0.06** 0.197** 0.022 -0.021 -0.008 0.03** 0.025 0.057  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm Size 0.006 0.044** 0.02** 0.002 -0.013** -0.025** 0.063** 0.117** 0.081** 0.044** 0.028** -0.009  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Firm Age 0.762** 1.053** 0.671** 0.576** 0.554** 0.38** 1.1** 1.447** 1.015** 0.922** 0.915** 1.183**
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.18) (0.14) (0.30) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.28)
Financial leverage -0.679** -0.845** -0.703** -0.551** -0.655** -0.765** -0.646** -5.03** -1.829** -0.12* 0.079 0.49**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15)
Auditor 0.578** 0.853* 0.651** 0.559** 0.448 0.197  2.014** 1.703 0.963 1.984** 2.661** 2.355**
(0.28) (0.51) (0.30) (0.20) (0.29) (0.63) (0.49) (1.08) (0.69) (0.41) (0.53) (0.98)
GDP 0.15** 0.186** 0.145** 0.109** 0.062 0.146  0.325** 0.226 0.327** 0.258** 0.218** 0.372**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15)
Arab Spring 1.08** -0.285 0.413 0.892** 1.694** 2.878** 1.135** -1.239 0.366 1.734** 2.77** 4.661**
(0.28) (0.53) (0.31) (0.21) (0.29) (0.65) (0.51) (1.11) (0.71) (0.42) (0.54) (1.01)
constant -1.14** -11.436** -4.054** 0.082 3.215** 9.741** -2.383** -11.605** -5.921** -2.283** 3.239** 9.7**
(0.56) (1.05) (0.61) (0.41) (0.58) (1.28) (1.00) (2.20) (1.41) (0.84) (1.08) (2.01)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent  variable : ROA Dependent  variable : ROE
 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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Table ‎5.28  Results of using standard quantile regression, Dependent Variable: Tobin’s_Q and Log- Tobin’s_Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Foreign Ownership 0.006** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.006** 0.014** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004** 0.006**
(0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Individual Ownership 0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.007** 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.003**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institution Ownership 0.003** 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.005** 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)
Government Ownership 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.011** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.005**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Size -0.004** 0.001* 0.001 -0.001** -0.002** -0.007** -0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.002** -0.004**
(0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)
Firm Age 0.077** 0.033** 0.041** 0.045** 0.065** 0.089** 0.048** 0.046** 0.046** 0.04** 0.045** 0.038**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Financial leverage -0.001 0.021** 0.017** 0.002 -0.007 -0.008  0.006** 0.024** 0.018** 0.002 -0.005 -0.005  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Auditor 0.113** 0.086** 0.107** 0.091** 0.102** 0.159* 0.097** 0.112** 0.12** 0.084** 0.079** 0.081**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
GDP 0.013** 0.012** 0.009** 0.007** 0.015** 0.024* 0.01** 0.014** 0.009** 0.006** 0.01** 0.01* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Arab Spring 0.324** 0.086** 0.119** 0.18** 0.274** 0.642** 0.184** 0.126** 0.135** 0.16** 0.198** 0.292**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
constant 0.641** 0.38** 0.46** 0.701** 0.798** 1.07** -0.306** -0.801** -0.604** -0.268** -0.105** 0.276**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Standard errors are within parentheses
 ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at 10% level.
Dependent  variable : : TOBIN_Q Dependent  variable :: LOG _TOBIN_Q
 
Variables Explanation in Table 6.3 
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5.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
The aim of this study is to provide logical evidence for the effects of ownership identity on 
firm performance. The study used four types of ownership, foreign, individual, institution, 
and government, and three ways to measure firm performance, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. 
The study uses different panel-data analyses to capture the biased results when using a single 
model, but a different approach was used to control for country, industry, and year-fixed 
effects.  
The results show that foreign ownership has a positive impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q 
as stated in the hypothesis (H2a). These results align with other findings, such as Choi et al. 
(2012), who found foreign ownership has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q in Korean firms. 
Also in India, Douma et al. (2006) found positive effects on firm performance, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q and ROA. In Nigeria, Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) found a positive but 
insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. Using four 
MENA countries, Ben Naceur et al. (2007) found that newly privatised banks with high 
foreign ownership levels, have significant and positive effects on firm performance. This 
supports the argument that foreign investors enhance firm performance by providing 
technology, research and development, and managerial skills (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). This 
explains that overseas investors aside, with other type of investors in MENA, public firms can 
form a good tool in mitigating the agency problem and enhancing firms’ performance by 
supporting firms with up-to-date technology and managerial skills.  
However, when studying the effects of foreign investors, when they have control over a firm’s 
voting rights, there is a negative effect on ROA and ROE. This was concluded by  Gedajlovic 
et al. (2005) in their study of Japanese manufacturing firms. This can be explained by the 
argument made by Nakano and Nguyen (2013), who believed that foreign investors avoid any 
risk-taking strategies, which results in losing investment opportunities. This gives evidence 
that foreign investors having the ultimate control over firms in MENA countries can harm 
firms. This is because foreigners in this region are not willing to take risks in expanding 
firm’s activities.   
Regarding institutional ownership, it has significant positive effects on all performance 
measures used in the study, which explains the hypothesis (H2b). This finding was uncovered 
in many empirical studies that investigated the role of institution ownership on firm value. 
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Tsai and Zheng (2007) found that American restaurants controlled by institutions, especially 
financial institutions, significantly and positively affect Tobin’s Q. Also Ellili (2011) 
concluded that institutional ownership has a positive influence on the wealth of the 
shareholders. Gedajlovic et al. (2005) found that institution ownership has a positive influence 
on manufacturing firms. Fazlzadeh et al. (2011) and Alfaraih et al. (2012) found institutional 
investments have positive effects on public firms that were listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange and Kuwait Stock Exchange, respectively. This can be explained by the fact that 
institutions have voting rights and can monitor firm activities and, accordingly, enhance firm 
performance (Tsai & Zheng, 2007). So, the study gives confirmation that institutional 
ownership is one of the effective types of owners in MENA public firms. This is because 
institutions can support firms with the knowledge and technology which help in good 
performance.    
Government ownership has a positive impact on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q as settled in the 
hypothesis (H2c). The same finding was corroborated by Gul et al. (2010), who used the 
Chinese market and found that government ownership increases firm stock price. Also, in the 
MENA region, Ben Naceur et al. (2007) examined the effect of ownership structure in newly 
privatised banks and found that firms that kept government ownership after privatisation, had 
improved profitability, as measured by ROA and ROE. Using four Arab countries, Omran et 
al. (2008a) found that government investment in a firm has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. 
Government interests align between managers and owners, producing the capability to solve 
the asymmetrical flow of information disclosed to investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Also, 
the government has the power to access different sources of information and different 
financing organisations and non-government firms (Eng & Mak, 2003). So, having 
government shares in MENA pubic firms can help firms in mitigating agency costs and obtain 
good performance. This is because governments in the MENA region can easily expand 
firms’ activity by supporting funds and information.  
Regarding the hypothesis (H2d); although the current study indicated individual owners have 
a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q, they have no significant effect on ROA and ROE. 
This result was also shown by (Pathak et al., 2012) who found no relationship between 
individual investors and firm ROA. Ibrahim and Samad (2011) found that ROA is lower in 
family-owned firms than in firms with non-family ownership. Omran et al. (2008a) found that 
individual ownership has significant negative effects on ROA and ROE. This can be 
219 
 
explained by the fact that individuals controlling the firm may acquire positions for 
themselves and use their power to extract firm resources (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). This 
gives evidence that when individuals control firms in MENA countries, they benefit 
themselves at the expense of a firm’s benefits. So it seems that public firms in this region are 
controlled by individuals who are highly likely to have an agency problem between large and 
minority shareholder, and misuse a firm’s resources for private benefit.  
In conclusion, ownership types have different roles in corporate governance in MENA 
countries. This indicates that each type of investors have different targets to achieve within 
the firms. The current findings indicate that foreign, institution, and government ownership 
have positive effects on firm performance; however, individuals do not show any significant 
effects on improving firm ROA and ROE.  
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Chapter Six : Thesis Summary and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Thesis Contribution and Data Summary 
This study investigated three important dimensions on ownership structure. Firstly, the factors 
that affect ownership concentration in the MENA region. Secondly, the effects of ownership 
concentration on firm performance and thirdly the effects of ownership identity on firm 
performance. This study contributed to the current literature on ownership structure, as the 
first of its kind (to the author’s best knowledge) to investigate the effects of ownership 
concentration and ownership identity on firm performance in the MENA region. In addition, it 
was the first study to have an examination of the factors that affect ownership concentration in 
the MENA region. Moreover, this research was the first of its kind to have an examination of 
the effects of political factors, namely the Arab revolution (Arab Spring), on ownership 
structure and firm performance of the examined companies in the MENA region. Figure 6.1 
gives an overview of the dependent and independent variables of the thesis. 
Figure ‎6.1 Thesis Summary Gives Overview about the Dependent and Independent 
Variables  
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The data consisted of a sample of publicly listed companies from eight MENA countries – 
Turkey, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain – for the period 
spanning from 2008–2014. The initial dataset contained 1,263 firms from different sectors 
and 8,841 firm-year observations. The industry was divided into three main categories: (a) a 
financial group that incorporated all financial institutions, including insurance companies, but 
excluded banks, (b) an energy and manufacturing company group that included all enterprises 
that produce goods for non-service uses, and (c) a service group that included all businesses 
that provide services, such as education, communication, technology, and utilities. After 
excluding any sample that had neither performance nor ownership structure data, 912 firms 
across the different sectors and 5,521 firm-year reports remained.  
6.2 Finding Summary 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis was an attempt to answer three main questions regarding 
ownership concentration in the MENA region. First the determinate of ownership 
concentration in the MENA region – the results indicate that ROL and corruption control have 
negative effects on ownership concentration. This means that low investment protection and 
high corruption increase the ownership concentration. These results align with the theoretical 
implications made by (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, López de 
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998), who believed that the strength of the law that protects 
investors in public firms is negatively related to the level of ownership concentration. As 
practical implications, this explain that investors in the MENA region want to protect their 
investment by increasing their voting right in the firm, this is because the law that protects 
their investment are not sufficient. So, practically this explains why public firms in MENA 
countries are characterised by a high level of ownership concentration.   
 On the other hand, both firm size and firm age have a significant and positive relationship 
with ownership concentration. Thus, the results correlate with other research findings, 
showing that industry and firm size affect ownership structure. For example, Gedajlovic 
(1993) and Crespi-Cladera (1996) reported that firm size has a positive relationship with 
ownership concentration. Concerning the effects of financial performance on ownership 
concentration, only Tobin’s Q had a significant positive effect on increasing ownership 
concentration. This may explain why future market performance in the MENA region attracts 
investors more than past performance (ROA and ROE).  
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Regarding the second question, what are the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance? The study found positive effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. This finding supports the theoretical implications of the agency literature and 
the role of ownership concentration in countries with low investment protection. Thus,  
ownership concentration enables blockholders to maintain control over the firms in which 
they invest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Short, 1994). Moreover, these results indicated that 
blockholder ownership in a firm plays an effective role in mitigating agency problems 
between shareholders and managers (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). This may be explained by the 
fact that monitoring by blockholders often results in more efficient manager performance 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). This gives evidence that owners with a high level of voting rights in 
MENA countries, has practical implications in corporate governance. In addition the 
concentration of ownership in the MENA region practically effects in substituting the law that 
protects investors, and it will help in mitigating agency costs by increasing firm performance.  
However, the number of blockholders negatively affected firm performance which means that 
only a small number of blockholders can control firms effectively in the MENA region. 
Theoretically, this finding aligns with the argument of (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) who stated that managers’ behaviours cannot be controlled in a diffused 
ownership structure. Also, Nyman and Silberston (1978) argued that control should be viewed 
as a type of power, rather than something that is structural. Thus, in practical implication, 
small numbers of owners can gain enough power to control the firm. According to the results 
of this study, the power of largest owners in MENA public firms enhances firm performance 
and enable them to control managerial behaviour toward the firm’s benefits.  
On the subject of the third question of this thesis that investigates the consequences of 
ownership identity on firm performance, the results showed that firms which have some 
degree of foreign ownership perform positively. These results support the theoretical 
implications that foreign ownership enhances firm performance by providing technology, 
research and development, and managerial skills (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Also, foreign 
investors play an important role as independent, outside monitors, who control the behaviour 
of both management and majority shareholders (Choi, Sul, & Min, 2012). As practical 
implications, this explains that overseas investors aside with other type of investors in MENA 
public firms, can form a good tool in mitigating the agency problem and enhancing firms’ 
performance. However, the study results shows that when foreign investors have the ultimate 
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power over company voting rights, an adverse effect is seen in ROA and ROE. Theoretically, 
this can be explained by the argument made by Nakano and Nguyen (2013), who believed 
that foreign investors avoid any risk-taking strategies, which results in losing investment 
opportunities. Accordingly, foreigners have bad implications on MENA firms’ performance 
when they control the firms.  
Individual owners have significant positive effects on Tobin’s Q, yet they have negative 
effects on operating performance which is measured by ROA and ROE. This results meet the 
theoretical implications that family members acquire top-management positions, which 
enables them to have control over a firm’s board of directors and gives them the opportunity 
to use the firm’s resources for their own gains (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Accordingly, in 
practical implications, public firms in MENA countries owned by an individual are highly 
likely to have an agency problem between large and minority shareholder and misuse the 
firm’s resources for private benefits.  
Regarding the effects of institutional ownership, there is a positive significant effect on all 
performance measures used in the study. This can be explained theoretically by the fact that 
institutions have voting rights that enable them to monitor firm activities and, accordingly, 
enhance firm performance (Tsai & Zheng, 2007). The study result shows that institutions 
ownership has good implications on firms’ performance by enhancing both accounting and 
market ratios in the firms they invest in.  
Also, the results demonstrate that government ownership has positive implications by 
enhancing ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. These results conceive the theoretical implications that 
government ownership could solve the asymmetrical information flow that is disclosed to 
investors and can align the interests of managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
is because government has access to different sources of information using it links with  
financial organisations and non-government firms (Eng & Mak, 2003). Nevertheless, these 
results give an indication that ownership types have different roles in corporate governance in 
MENA countries, and this indicates that each type of investors have different targets to 
achieve within the firms. 
Also the study result proves that firm size had positive significant effects on ROA and ROE, 
showing that larger firms are more profitable than smaller companies. However, bigger firms 
have a negative effect on Tobin’s Q. Firm age positively affects firm performance; old firms 
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have a higher return on their assets and equity, as well as on Tobin’s Q. Regarding financial 
leverage, the results show that companies with a high leverage are less profitable than low-
leveraged firms. Auditor type has a positive impact on firm performance; that is, companies 
being audited by one of the biggest firms report higher ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q than firms 
hiring other auditors. Moreover, GDP growth as a country factor showed to have a positive 
effect on firm performance.  
The Arab Spring’s effects on both ownership structure and firm performance show a positive 
impact on firm performance, even after controlling for year effects in the regression models. 
This may be the result of the corrections that happened in the legal systems in the countries 
affected by this revolution. Such corrections eliminated dictatorships and increased 
transparency and accountability in businesses.  
However, the results showed that Arab Spring has had a negative relationship with ownership 
concentration. Thus, the average ownership concentration has decreased in countries affected 
by the Arab Spring. This may be because of the investment risk of the affected countries. This 
finding can be explained by the Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) argument that the degree of 
shareholder protection affects ownership structure.  
6.3 Study limitations 
The study has interesting results regarding the role of ownership concentration on firm 
performance and the factors that influence ownership concentration in the MENA region. 
However, the study has limitations that should be taken into consideration when looking at 
the conclusions. First, although the study uses a broad cross-section to cover the main 
geographic parts of the MENA countries (Gulf states, Mashreq countries, and Maghreb 
countries), many countries were excluded because of a shortage of data.  
Second, the thesis was an investigation into the role of corporate governance on firm 
performance, but only one mechanism, ownership concentration, was utilised; nevertheless, 
there are many mechanisms that were addressed in other literature on corporate governance, 
such as a board of directors and CEO duality. Using those mechanisms in a future study could 
help give a more complete conclusion about the effects of ownership concentration aside with 
the other mechanism. However, because of the shortage data on those variables, they were 
excluded from the current study.  
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Third, the study used only three ratios (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) as financial performance 
measures. However, many other measures, such as firm net profit, earnings per share, and 
return on sales, could be used to measure firm performance. Finally, because of the data 
shortage, the study period was limited to 7 years, between 2008–2014.  
6.4 Recommendation for Further Research 
This study was a contribution to the current literature on ownership concentration in the 
MENA region. However, as mentioned in the previous section, this research only used one 
mechanism of corporate governance and involved countries that had available data. Thus, 
there are many ways to extend this study in the future.  
One further research opportunity is to use another corporate governance mechanism, such as a 
board of directors, with ownership concentration, and to then compare the results with this 
study to make a more definite conclusion. Another possibility for future research is to use 
other firm performance measures, such as firm net profit, earnings per share, and return on 
sales, to examine how ownership concentration affects those measures.  
Also, this study indicated that there are significant effects regarding the Arab Spring 
movement on both firm performance and ownership concentration. However, these results 
could not be linked to another study’s results because the current study was the first to address 
the effects of the Arab Spring movement. Accordingly, this creates an opportunity for further 
research to investigate how a political change such as Arab Spring can positively influence 
firm performance and lead to a reduction in ownership concentration. 
Moreover, this study was conducted in 2013 and has data that went up to 2014, which is 4 
years after the Arab Spring started. There is an obvious gap where further research could 
come in and use an extended period to examine the long-term effects of the Arab Spring 
movement on both firm performance and ownership concentration in the affected countries.  
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